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Abstract 
 
Believe it or not:  Examining the case for intuitive logic and effortful beliefs 
By Stephanie Howarth 
 
The overall objective of this thesis was to test the Default Interventionist (DI) account of 
belief-bias in human reasoning using the novel methodology introduced by Handley, 
Newstead & Trippas (2011). DI accounts focus on how our prior beliefs are the intuitive 
output that bias our reasoning process (Evans, 2006), whilst judgments based on logical 
validity require effortful processing. However, recent research has suggested that reasoning 
on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as previous accounts claim. In order 
to investigate whether belief based judgments are resource demanding we instructed 
participants to reason on the basis of both the validity and believability of a conclusion whilst 
simultaneously engaging in a secondary task (Experiment 1 - 5). We used both a within and 
between subjects design (Experiment 5) examining both simple and complex arguments 
(Experiment 4 – 9). We also analysed the effect of incorporating additional instructional 
conditions (Experiment 7 – 9) and tested the relationships between various individual 
differences (ID) measures under belief and logic instruction (Experiment 4, 5, 7, 8, & 9). 
In line with Handley et al.’s findings we found that belief based judgments were more prone 
to error and that the logical structure of a problem interfered with judging the believability of 
its conclusion, contrary to the DI account of reasoning. However, logical outputs sometimes 
took longer to complete and were more affected by random number generation (RNG) 
(Experiment 5). To reconcile these findings we examined the role of Working Memory (WM) 
and Inhibition in Experiments 7 – 9 and found, contrary to Experiment 5, belief judgments 
were more demanding of executive resources and correlated with ID measures of WM and 
inhibition.  
Given that belief based judgments resulted in more errors and were more impacted on by the 
validity of an argument the behavioural data does not fit with the DI account of reasoning. 
Consequently, we propose that there are two routes to a logical solution and present an 
alternative Parallel Competitive model to explain the data. We conjecture that when 
instructed to reason on the basis of belief an automatic logical output completes and provides 
the reasoner with an intuitive logical cue which requires inhibiting in order for the belief 
based response to be generated. This creates a Type1/Type 2 conflict, explaining the impact 
of logic on belief based judgments. When explicitly instructed to reason logically, it takes 
deliberate Type 2 processing to arrive at the logical solution. The engagement in Type 2 
processing in order to produce an explicit logical output is impacted on by demanding 
secondary tasks (RNG) and any task that interferes with the integration of premise 
information (Experiments 8 and 9) leading to increased latencies. However the relatively 
simple nature of the problems means that accuracy is less affected.  
We conclude that the type of instructions provided along with the complexity of the problem 
and the inhibitory demands of the task all play key roles in determining the difficulty and 
time course of logical and belief based responses. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review  
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Review  
Throughout the reasoning literature, many researchers have examined response 
accuracy scores to problems in which the believability of the conclusion conflicts with 
the logical status of the argument (see Sá, West & Stanovich, 1999), take the following 
example:  
All plants need water 
Roses need water 
Therefore, roses are plants. 
In the case presented above the invalid conclusion is often endorsed because it 
represents what is believed to be true (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983). However if the 
content of the argument is changed to the following:  
All plants need water 
Humans need water 
Therefore, Humans are plants. 
 
Belief in the conclusion is no longer in conflict with its logical status, making the 
conclusion easier to reject (Evans et al., 1983). These examples help illustrate the 
impact that beliefs in a conclusion can have over the ability to interpret the validity of 
an argument. However, the influence of our beliefs is not confined to reasoning, 
consider the following problem: 
 14 
 
Jack is 34 years old and from Kent. He studied Marine Biology at Plymouth University 
and wrote his thesis on the conservation of vulnerable marine life. As a student he 
worked part time at the city Aquarium.  
Which statement is more probable; that a) Jack enjoys drinking Malt Whisky or that b) 
Jack is a lecturer in Marine Biology and enjoys drinking Malt Whisky? According to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) those who give the answer b, are using the information 
representative of the person from the description or the `representative heuristic’ as 
opposed to giving the statistically more likely outcome. The Conjunction Fallacy, as 
this example is referred to, highlights the conflict we experience between a response 
based on what we believe is true (or more representative of the information presented) 
to one that requires more effortful processing. In this case to establish that a conjunction 
of two characteristics cannot be more probable than one characteristic on its own (P (A 
+ B) ≤ PA - conjunction rule). Nevertheless, even though I know that `a’ is more 
probable, there remains a strong intuition that Jack is a whisky drinking Marine 
Biologist.  
The Dual Process Theory (DPT) provides a theoretical framework to explain the 
conflict experienced between two systems, with distinct cognitive processes, generating 
conflicting responses. To test their predictions dual process theorists often use some of 
the tasks described above and typically instruct participants to reason logically. In this 
thesis I will examine the accuracy and latency of judgments when participants are 
instructed to evaluate either the logical validity or believability of presented 
conclusions. The objective of this thesis is to test traditional dual process accounts of 
belief-bias by examining the impact of secondary tasks and executive processes on the 
performance of judgments made under belief or logic instruction.  
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This chapter begins with an overview of Dual Process Theories (DPT) followed by an 
introduction to the Default Interventions (DI) DPT of reasoning. We review some 
paradigms used to test the DI account, namely the belief-bias paradigm and examine 
some of the research interpreted as providing empirical support for the DI DPT, 
covering literature on individual differences and neuropsychology. This leads on to 
some general critique of DPT followed by a more specific critique of the DI account 
from research on conflict detection. We will also consider the implications of research 
that proposes an intuitive route for detecting logical validity. The review finishes with 
discussion of an alternative Parallel Competitive (PC) dual process account and the role 
of inhibition in reasoning. Finally, the chapter concludes with a rationale for the 
experimental work presented in this thesis.  
 
1.2 Introduction to Dual Process Theories 
Classic DPT of deductive reasoning suggests that there are two systems producing 
responses to reasoning problems. The first, often referred to as System 1, is described as 
fast, heuristic and dependant on context for the production of intuitive conclusions. The 
more controlled, analytic system, often referred to as System 2, is context independent 
and can deliver logical inferences using explicit information only (Stanovich & West, 
2000).  
This model has been extended to several areas of research including learning (e.g. 
Reber, 1996), attention (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), reasoning (Evans, 2003), decision 
making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and social cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). 
These distinct cognitive systems have been defined in different ways throughout the 
literature; for example, Epstein (1994) described one system as experiential and the 
other as rational. Sloman (1996) defined the systems as associative versus rule-based. 
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Stanovich (1999) labelled them System 1 (heuristic and associative) and System 2 (rule-
based). However, the processing features within each system have been defined as 
sharing some fundamental characteristics. Evans (2009) suggested that these processes 
can be classified as Type 1: fast, automatic, unconscious and effortless by nature and 
Type 2: slow, controlled, conscious and effortful. Type 1 processes are described as 
relatively undemanding of computational capacity and based on personal experience 
and associations (Verschueren, Schaeken & d’Ydewalle, 2005). Type 2 processes, on 
the other hand, are necessary for hypothetical thinking (Evans & Over, 1996) and are 
demanding of working memory.  
In the Conjunction fallacy problem presented earlier, using a representativeness 
heuristic to arrive at the answer would be a Type 1 process, whereas applying the 
conjunction rule would require some Type 2 processing. Type 1 and Type 2 processes 
are assumed to play significant roles in reasoning, judgment and decision making and 
the conflict between these two processes can explain why for example, we can 
simultaneously demonstrate stereotypes in measures of implicit attitudes (such as the 
IAT), but show no evidence when asked about our explicit attitudes to different groups. 
A stereotyped response would be considered an automatic, Type 1 output that requires 
inhibiting or overriding in favour of a more considered logically deduced Type 2 output. 
This is known as the Default Interventionist (DI) dual process account (Evans; 2003; 
2007), which has been developed in part to explain other experimental phenomena such 
as the belief-bias effect which will be discussed further in section 1.2.2.  
1.2.1 Default Interventionist Dual Process Accounts of Reasoning   
The DI DPT posited by Evans (2008) defines Type 1 processes as generating default, 
automatically cued responses (Evans, 2006). These responses are based upon beliefs, 
learned associations or stereotypes and can be resisted or intervened on by more 
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conscious, deliberative Type 2 processing, if a conflict between the two responses is 
detected. In order to produce an alternative response, cognitive effort and working 
memory resources are required to inhibit the Type 1 output (Handley, Capon, 
Beveridge, Dennis & Evans, 2004). However, overriding a Type 1 response would also 
depend on adequate cognitive ability, the application of relevant instructions and having 
sufficient time available for more reflective thinking (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). 
Consequently, the initial intuitive response to a problem is often accepted (Stanovich, 
2009a).  
There is a considerable amount of experimental research that has been construed as 
evidence for the DI dual processing account which we will address in more detail in the 
next section. First we will consider the belief-bias effect as one of the key methods 
offering empirical support for dual process accounts in reasoning (Evans, Barston, & 
Pollard, 1983; Stanovich, 1999; Wilkins, 1929).  
1.2.2 Belief Bias 
Traditionally, belief-bias is the label given to the phenomena of assessing the 
conclusion of a deductive inference on the basis of personal belief, rather than the 
logical validity of the argument. Take the following example; 
If a child is crying, then it is happy, 
Suppose a child is crying, 
Does it follow that the child is happy? 
According to propositional logic a valid conclusion would be that the child is happy, 
however people’s beliefs often influence the inferences they draw. In the example above 
people will frequently judge that the conclusion does not follow because it is 
inconsistent with the belief that a child is sad when it cries (Evans, Handley, Neilens & 
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Over, 2010). Social psychology provides much evidence on how prior opinion biases 
the evaluation of communication (Biek, Wood & Chaiken, 1996; Dole & Sinatra, 1998) 
whilst the ability to resist these beliefs is seen as a fundamental part of critical thinking 
(Sa, West & Stanovich, 1999). 
Evans, Barston & Pollard’s (1983) research on belief-bias with syllogisms found three 
common effects from the manipulation of belief and logic. Evans et al. presented 
participants with four types of syllogisms; valid-believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-
believable and invalid-unbelievable (see Table 1.1) and asked participants to judge 
conclusion validity (i.e. whether the conclusion necessarily followed from the 
premises). The three common effects were; a main effect of logic, showing competence 
in deductive reasoning, a main effect of belief, indicating the strong influence beliefs 
have over judgments and an interaction between belief and logic, demonstrating how we 
rely on our beliefs more when the conclusion of an arguments is invalid.   
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Table 1.1 
Overall percentages for the acceptance of the conclusion as a function of logical 
validity and believability, taken from Evans et al., (1983). 
 Believable Unbelievable 
Valid No police dogs are vicious. 
Some highly trained police dogs are 
vicious. 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs 
are not police dogs.  
89% 
No nutritional things are inexpensive. 
Some vitamins are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some vitamins are not 
nutritional. 
56% 
Invalid  No addictive things are inexpensive. 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some addictive things are 
not cigarettes. 
71% 
No millionaires are hard workers. 
Some rich people are hard workers. 
Therefore, some millionaires are not 
rich people.  
10% 
 
Research on belief-bias has provided significant insight into the way in which people 
reason when belief and logic conflict (Evans et al., 1983; Wilkins, 1929). Particularly, 
research has shown that whilst heuristics such as a belief heuristic or representativeness 
can be economically effective when making judgments, they often lead to predictable 
errors in both the laymen and the expert population (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
There is research to suggest that some individuals can follow the rules of logic when 
high in intellectual ability (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004), when 
emotionally charged and when given specific instructions. Goel and Vartanian (2011) 
showed that administering syllogisms with politically incorrect negative content (i.e. the 
justification of rape) actually weakened the belief-bias effect. Evans, Newstead, Allen & 
Pollard (1994) demonstrated that providing participants with detailed instructions with 
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specific reference to the logical necessity of the argument also helped to reduce belief-
bias. However the effect was not completely eliminated, corroborating the 
aforementioned research which illustrates our propensity to error in favour of prior 
knowledge. 
Neuropsychological studies on belief-bias offer further support for a dual mechanism 
theory and evidence for distinct brain regions involved in belief and logic based 
reasoning. More specifically, Goel & Dolan (2003) posit that belief-bias may be 
influenced by brain areas associated with emotional processing.  
The dual process theory was developed in part to explain the belief-bias effect, equally 
the effect is used to support dual processing; more specifically DI dual processing 
which emphasises the Type 1 nature of responses based on prior knowledge that conflict 
with the Type 2 processing required to process the underlying structure of the problem. 
Furthermore, according to the DI account, Type 1 processes are quick and effortless and 
precede the slower Type 2 processes which are reliant on working memory resources 
(Evans, 2003; Handley, Newstead & Trippas, 2011). In the next section we will review 
additional research interpreted as empirical support for the DI dual processing account 
which included research employing speeded tasks, individual differences and 
neuropsychological effects of the belief-bias phenomenon. 
 
1.3 Empirical Support for DI Dual Processing 
As mentioned in the introduction to DPT, dual systems or dual processing has extended 
across many areas of research and in general the theories associate similar attributes to 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes. For example, the evolutionary old nature of Type 1 
processing which is rapid, automatic and requires little effort compared to, analytical 
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Type 2 processes, which are conscious, more controlled and are required for logical 
reasoning (Evans, 2008).  
Table 1.2  
Examples of support for Dual Processing  
 
Secondary Task 
 
  
Developmental 
De Neys (2006) instructed participants to 
complete syllogistic reasoning problems 
whilst loading working memory with a 
secondary task. Results showed that WM load 
only significantly impacted on logic based 
reasoning.  
Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, and 
Stanovich (2002) examined children between 
the ages of 10 and 13years and showed that 
analytical, Type 2 processing correlated with 
age and cognitive ability.  
 
Individual Differences 
 
 Neuropsychology 
 
Type 2 functioning is known to require 
working memory, which in turn, is highly 
correlated reasoning ability (Capon et al. 
2003).  
Consistent with this, Stanovich and West 
(2000) demonstrated that normatively correct 
responses correlated with higher cognitive 
ability. Additionally, Newstead et al. (2004) 
further demonstrated that intellectual ability 
was a good predictor of logical performance 
in syllogistic reasoning. 
 
Goel et al. (2000) examined fMRI data on 
reasoning tasks to show that distinct parts of 
the brain are responsible for two different 
kinds of reasoning. Goel & Dolan (2003) 
demonstrated that the left temporal lobe 
system was activated during belief based 
reasoning, whilst the right lateral prefrontal 
cortex was activated when inhibition, 
associated with belief-bias, was required in 
order to complete a logical task.  
 
 
Table 1.2 illustrates some of the areas of research offering empirical support for dual 
processing.  As stated previously, the DI account emphasises the quick and effortless 
nature of belief based reasoning and the idea that responses based on prior knowledge 
would come before a logical output has time to complete. Evans and Curtis-Holmes 
(2005) examined this idea with a syllogistic reasoning study carried out under limited 
time and showed that increased time pressure increased belief based reasoning. This 
finding is consistent with the view that belief based responses are available early and are 
consequently more common when time limits are imposed.  
According to Evans (2009) Type 2 processes are slower, effortful and pull on working 
memory (WM) resources, therefore the Type 2 processes required for reasoning about 
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the structure of an argument should be affected by boosting the demands on WM. 
Research investigating the effect of increasing cognitive load and thus limiting WM 
resources supported this notion by magnifying the belief-bias effect (De Neys, 2006; 
Quayle & Ball, 2000).  
For example, De Neys’ (2006) research reinforced the claim that the heuristic system 
(Type 1 processes) operates automatically, whilst the analytic system (Type 2 
processes) pulls on executive resources. De Neys presented participants with a dot 
memory task, consisting of a dot pattern which the participants were required to 
remember prior to completing a syllogistic reasoning task, and then reproduce in an 
empty matrix. The findings offered support to the DI dual process framework by 
demonstrating that burdening executive resources increased the rate of belief-bias. This 
was interpreted as; increasing the load on WM only affects the analytic system 
responsible for overriding the heuristic response to belief- logic conflict questions.  
Similarly, Quayle and Ball (2000) established an association between spatial recall 
abilities and the belief-bias effect, showing that those with a lower spatial span 
produced more belief-bias, offering additional support to the DI account. However, De 
Neys (2006) also argued that it is not that individuals differ in their motivation to reason 
logically, more that those with higher WM span are more successful at completing the 
analytic process required to reason logically, or as Quayle and Ball (2000) explain; at 
times the demands of judging logical necessity is simply too great if there are 
insufficient resources available.  
Thompson, Prowse Turner & Pennycook (2011) argue that a monitoring mechanism 
governed by a `feeling of rightness’ for an answer is an important addition to a complete 
dual process theory on reasoning. According to this Metacognitive dual process 
account, an initial Type 1 output is accompanied by a `feeling of rightness’ (FOR) 
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which regulates the amount of analytic engagement that occurs. When the FOR is 
persuasive, people are more likely to stay with their original answer, when it is weak, 
deliberative Type 2 analysis is cued. 
The DI dual process theory emphasises the association of beliefs and prior knowledge 
with Type 1 processes, however, they are also associated with non-logic heuristic 
processes such as `matching bias’.  Empirical support for matching bias comes from a 
commonly used logical puzzle (since its creation in 1966) known as the Wason 
Selection Task. The abstract problem presents participants with four cards as illustrated 
in Figure 1.1: 
Conditional rule: If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side of the card. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 
Example of the 4 cards presented in the Abstract Selection Task. 
Participants are presented with the conditional rule and asked to judge which card they 
should turn over to determine truth or falsity of the rule. The correct response is A and 
7, since the statement can only be falsified by revealing a case where an A card does not 
have a 3 on the other side. However the task is strongly influenced by the tendency to 
choose cards that match the cards referred to in the rule (A & 3) (Type 1 process) as 
opposed to using deliberative logical reasoning (Type 2) to arrive at the correct answer 
(Evans, 1998). This task has been interpreted as offering experimental support for dual 
processes when reasoning.  
Dual process theories have also received significant support form research on individual 
differences. For example, Stanovich (1999) has argued that, unlike System 1, System 2 
A 3 7 D 
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(and therefore Type 2 processing) is associated with measures of general intelligence 
involved in the ability to decontextualize and decouple reasoning from beliefs.  
Consistent with this view, abstract deductive reasoning and the ability to resist belief-
bias correlates with WM, intelligence and certain cognitive styles (Macpherson & 
Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1997). People with greater WM 
capacity or cognitive capacity are more proficient in logical reasoning for both spatial 
and syllogistic problems (Capon et al., 2003) and specific cases of conditional reasoning 
(Barrouillet & Lecas, 1999; Markovits, Doyon & Simoneau, 2002). Markovits et al. 
used concrete and abstract conditional problems and presented participants with three 
possible conclusions to choose from. They found a consistent correlation between 
verbal WM and reasoning performance on both types of conditionals. Barrouillet and 
Lecas (1999) tested children between the ages of 8 and 15 on conditional rules in the 
form of stories. The children were asked to indicate all the possible examples (or 
models) in which the rule would be met. The results indicated that the higher the WM 
capacity the more models the children constructed to finish the task, suggesting that the 
ability to search for counter examples or alternative models is an analytical process 
(Verschueren et al., 2005) associated with WM capacity.  
Stanovich and West (2008) examined a large number of thinking biases, drawn from the 
literature on judgments, decision making and reasoning. The biases included the 
conjunction fallacy, base rate neglect, belief-bias and matching bias. They found that 
the capacity to resist belief-bias correlated highly with cognitive ability, including 
matching bias on the four card selection task and belief-bias in syllogisms. Individuals 
that produced high SAT scores displayed better performance on the selection task and a 
reduced belief-bias effect. Stanovich and West conjectured that the main source of 
association between cognitive ability and the biases they examined is down to whether 
an individual has the capacity for sustained inhibition or the “cognitive decoupling” 
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capacity (also referred to as the ability to separate imaginary situations from real world 
representations; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012) required to carry out the override of a 
heuristic response. Take for example a syllogistic reasoning problem where belief and 
logic conflict: individuals higher in cognitive ability would be better equipped at 
inhibiting the heuristic cue, based on background knowledge, and holding it in 
suspension whilst decoupling the structure of the problem from this background  
knowledge in order to work through the logical structure. Those lower in this ability 
would be more likely to rely on heuristic Type 1 outputs based on prior knowledge. 
Stanovich and West (2008) argued that all the tasks they examined which indicated an 
association with cognitive ability must involve some type of inhibition and/or sustained 
cognitive decoupling; the central feature of Type 2 processing necessary for 
hypothetical thinking (Evans, 2007). Similarly, Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011; 
2014) showed that cognitive style (as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Task) was a 
relevant predictor of an individual’s tendency to default to heuristic processing 
(cognitive miserliness). In other words, the better the ability or willingness to engage in 
Type 2, analytical processes, the better the chance at overriding an incorrect default 
response.     
The view that cognitive ability is related to the capacity to inhibit prepotent responses, 
based on our beliefs, and decouple them from the logical structure of an argument, is 
strengthened by work carried out on causal conditional inferences. Evans, Handley, 
Neilens and Over (2010), instructed participants to reason deductively or pragmatically. 
In the former case participants were asked whether a conclusion logically followed from 
a conditional statement assumed to be true. In the latter case participants were instructed 
to judge their degree of belief in the conclusion supposing the premises, as a way of 
eliciting belief based reasoning. The findings revealed that those with higher cognitive 
ability were less belief based in their deductive reasoning but no less so when asked to 
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reason pragmatically. Evans et al. concluded that higher ability participants were better 
able to decouple their beliefs but only do so when specifically instructed to reason 
deductively, implying that perhaps pragmatic reasoning is the more natural way of 
reasoning. 
Newstead, et al., (2004) also found that those with higher intellectual ability were less 
distracted by the believability of a syllogistic argument, more able to decontextualize 
the problem and respond according to logic rather than belief. Furthermore, higher 
ability participants were more proficient at handling conflict between content and the 
logical structure of an argument. This indicates that the ability to abstract rules from 
their context is an important factor when reasoning. With WM and general intelligence 
highly correlated (Colom, Abad, Quiroga, Shih & Flores-Mendoza, 2008; Engle, Kane 
& Tuholski, 1999), it has been suggested that Type 2 processing, unlike Type 1, also 
engages WM (Evans, 2007; 2009). Research that shows Type 2 thinking, like WM, is 
susceptible to the effects of aging offer support for this notion, more specifically by the 
decline in performance on belief-logic conflict problems in syllogistic reasoning tasks 
as a function of age (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). De Neys and Van Gelder (2009) 
corroborated Gilinsky’s findings with a life span study on an age range of 12 to 65+ 
years, showing a curvilinear effect of age on belief-bias, where younger children and the 
older adults have trouble with reasoning when belief and logic conflict. De Neys et al. 
concluded that inhibition plays a key role when dealing with conflict in reasoning and 
decision making (the role of conflict will be discussed further in section 1.4) 
In the last 15 years neuro-imaging methods have been increasingly used to investigate 
the role of different brain areas in reasoning tasks. Goel (2003) demonstrated that the 
frontal-temporal system is associated with activation of knowledge and experience, 
whilst the parietal system is linked to formal processing and the visuospatial system for 
syllogistic reasoning. Goel argues that the former is elementary and effortlessly 
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engaged, corresponding to “heuristic” processing whilst the latter is associated with 
“universal” processing and requires effort to engage when for example conflict is 
detected between belief and logic. Further research has suggested that anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) is activated when conflict is detected (also see section 1.4) and the right 
lateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC), which is associated with executive control, is 
required for any subsequent inhibition of intuitive responses, (also see section 1.4.1) 
more specifically, the right inferior frontal cortex (IFC) is associated with the belief-bias 
effect (De Neys, Vartanian & Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003).  
Tsujii and Watanabe (2009) used near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) and an attention 
demanding concurrent task to show that those with enhanced activation in the right IFC 
perform better on incongruent reasoning trials. This implicates the IFC as having an 
important role in the inhibition of default responses, explaining why a secondary load 
that impairs IFC activation leads to increases in belief-bias. This research suggests that 
distinct brain areas are required for belief based and logic based reasoning, which is 
consistent with the DI dual process account (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Finally, 
research involving the stimulation to the right inferior frontal cortex using transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) has been shown to enhance the belief-bias effect, whilst 
stimulation to the left inferior frontal cortex reduces belief-bias. Tsujii, Masuda, 
Akiyama and Watanabe (2010) argue that semantic information processing interferes 
with reasoning performance on incongruent trials, therefore when the right IFC is 
stimulated and inhibition is affected subjects fail to inhibit semantic processing and 
belief-bias is enhanced. In contrast, stimulation to the left IFC, improved reasoning 
performance on conflict trials by blocking irrelevant belief based responses.  
This section has provided evidence, across various fields of research, for dual process 
theories. More specifically the research has shown that responses based on prior 
knowledge are activated by default and complete quickly, whilst reasoning based on the 
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logical structure of a problem requires effortful, Type 2 processing, in support of the DI 
account. This review has also highlighted that Type 2 processing relies on WM 
resources, is linked to cognitive style and ability and develops with age. Furthermore, 
neuropsychological evidence suggests that belief and logic based reasoning are 
neurologically dissociable. However, despite the seemingly large body of evidence in 
support of a distinction between processing types, a number of authors have suggested 
that the data can be equally explained through a single system account. We consider 
their critiques in detail in the next section.  
1.3.1 Critique of Dual Processing  
As discussed in the previous section DP theorists make a distinction between Type 1 
and Type 2 processes. The former often characterised as implicit, quick and effortless 
whilst the latter is often categorised as explicit, slow and demanding on WM resources 
(Evans, 2008). However several authors argue that there are a multiplicity of dual 
processes beyond reasoning, such as social cognition and learning and that there is no 
consistency in terms of the characteristics attributed to these different types of 
processing. Newstead (2000) makes reference to the conflicting views on the 
characteristics of Type 2 thinking, for example; some research has made reference to its 
association with intelligence (Evans, 2010a) where as others have found few 
correlations between intelligence and rational processing (Klaczynski, Gordon & Fauth, 
1997).  
Gigerenzer and Regier (1996) criticise the terminology and categorisation of the 
characteristics involved in the two systems proposed by Sloman (1996); for example, 
how the representativeness heuristic (part of the associative system) can be expressed as 
“likelihood” in the rule-based language of probability. They suggest that the occurrence 
of two opposing responses in the case of the Wason Selection Task (Wason, 1966; 
 29 
 
1968) or Conjunction Fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) does not necessarily 
support two systems and could instead be the result of one formal rule based system, 
resulting in linguistic uncertainty, conjecture or competition between opposing formal 
rules (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996). Gigerenzer (1996) argues that heuristics such as 
representativeness or availability are vague in terms of their definition and do not 
provide adequate explanation of the underlying cognitive processes involved in 
generating a response to judgments.  Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996) carried out 
research on inferential tasks where choices had to be made between two alternatives, 
based on knowledge retrieved from memory. Using computer based simulations of 
people with varying degrees of knowledge; they questioned how well a cognitive 
algorithm would perform in a real-world environment. Gigerenzer et al. found that 
certain `frugal’ algorithms could draw as many correct inferences about a real world 
environment as algorithms representing rational (logical) inference. In other words, 
Gigerenzer’s research showed that judgments based on knowledge and shortcuts do not 
necessarily result in error, as previous accounts claim, and that the fast and frugal 
heuristics acquired allow for the delivery of optimal solutions to real world problems.  
Osman (2002) used variations of the Wason Selection Task to investigate some of the 
claims made about the errors commonly associated with the task (Wason & Evans, 
1975). The research focused on the assertion that unconscious biases encourage 
participants to focus their attention on cards matching the conditional rule. Osman 
found no sign of this attentional bias on the latency data and also revealed that tutoring 
on the task actually improved performance, refuting the inflexibility of unconscious 
processing that previous accounts claim. She argues that the results highlight the lack of 
sufficient evidence for unconscious reasoning and fail to support dual process claims 
made about the selection task.  
 30 
 
Generally Osman (2002) advises that the techniques used to expose unconscious 
reasoning are in need of improvement. More specifically Osman (2004) proposes that 
the evidence used to support separate systems is applicable to, and more consistent with 
a single system account. Osman (2004) introduces the dynamic graded continuum 
(DGC) model (Cleeremans and Jiménez, 2002) as a reasonable single system alternative 
that makes an important distinction between implicit and automatic reasoning. The 
DGC model proposes about the quality of a `representation’ in the mind changes (i.e. its 
strength or distinctiveness) along the continuum from implicit to explicit to automatic. 
Consciousness is seen as graded and dynamic according to subjective experience, for 
example; changing gears when learning to drive starts with explicit instruction that 
through repetition of the behaviour gradually moves along the continuum until it 
reaches automaticity, a behaviour that acts outside of conscious control. The same 
process can be used to explain the progression through reasoning, assigning different 
roles to consciousness when reasoning rather than different systems underlying 
responses. Similarly she interprets individual differences in reasoning as relating to 
differences in the degree rather than the kind of reasoning used.   
Keren and Schul (2009) also propose a uni-model, motivated by what they describe as a 
lack of clarity with dual-system theories which have been constructed on problematic 
methodologies and insufficient pragmatic evidence. For example, the two-system model 
has been used to explain conflict among mental states but Keren and Schul argue that 
the presence of conflict is not adequate evidence for two independent systems. Consider 
for example the belief-bias effect which attributes belief based reasoning to System 1 
and logical inferences to System 2 processes. Evans & Curtis-Holmes (2005) showed 
that System 1 predominates under limited time and increases belief-bias as evidence for 
dual processing. Keren and Schul argue that the effect can be explained by the logical 
validity and believability being two distinct types of external criteria that the single 
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system can be used to evaluate. Similarly with the `Linda problem’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) Keren and Schul suggest that rather than the individual considering 
two conflicting beliefs simultaneously, perhaps when they reason about the combined 
option in the Linda problem (Linda is a bank teller and a feminist) they temporarily 
forget the single option (Linda is a bank teller). Therefore, rather than a dichotomy of 
sequential or parallel processing, maybe the level or awareness of an alternative 
response fluctuates continuously when reasoning. In other words a single system can 
shift between many mental states to solve different tasks and these states are defined by 
an assembly of different features such as speed, level of control, awareness, etc… these 
features join in different ways at different times depending on the goal and also 
environmental limitations.   
Finally, Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) propose a unified theory based on rule 
processing and present a number of pragmatic arguments for this theory describing 
intuitive and deliberate judgments as rule-based. The rules can be optimising or 
heuristic and both types of judgment can use the same rules. For example, the 
recognition heuristic used to acknowledge a name or face is not deliberative but it can 
be used intentionally as a strategy, i.e. choosing a horse in at the Grand National. 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer suggest that rules are based on cognitive capacity in that the 
type of rule selected or the speed and accuracy at which a rule is applied will depend on 
individual differences in these cognitive capacities. They argue that both heuristic and 
deliberative rules can be equally difficult or easy to apply but there is a relationship 
between an individual’s processing potential and rule application. Under this unified 
model belief-bias is understood as conflict between rules, suggesting that improved 
deduction through tutoring can be explained by improved focal rule application. 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s propose a two-step rule selection process with this model, 
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whereby memory content and the task limit the rules available to an individual, whilst 
processing potential and environmental factors regulate the final rule selection.   
Aside from the empirical support already offered for dual processing (section 1.3), 
Evans and Stanovich (2013) offer some additional points for consideration in respect to 
the criticisms extended. Firstly they argue that Kruglanksi and Gigerenzer (2011) 
overlook the evidence that supports the case for qualitatively separate processing types 
and secondly, they contend that placing all dual process/system theories under the same 
umbrella is problematic. For example, Type 1 and Type 2 processing (Evans, 2009) is 
different to distinct modes of processing, which relate to different cognitive styles 
applied in Type 2 thinking. Modes of thinking can rely on personality, culture, situation 
and motivation and can vary continuously. Type differences relate to cognitive ability 
and modes relate to cognitive styles such as Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982) and Active Open Minded Thinking (Stanovich & West, 1997; 2008).  
Evans and Stanovich (2013) dispute the claim that intuition and deliberation being rule-
based is enough to support or refute the idea that they come from distinct cognitive 
systems. Moreover, they do not dispute the possibility that Type 1 associative 
processing can be formed through the implementation of rules. Evans (2010a) offers the 
Two Mind theory as a replacement for the Two System theory that has come under 
some criticism. The two minds consist of the old intuitive mind and the new reflective 
mind, both of which comprise a multitude of systems. The difference is that the new 
Two Mind theory implies an autonomous old mind that can influence behaviour directly 
whilst both Type 1 and Type 2 processing are part of the new mind and Type 2 
processes must cooperate with working memory.  
Furthermore, Evans (2010b) suggests that the distinction between intuitive and 
heuristics processes has been somewhat confused throughout the literature. He suggests 
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that “Intuitive” should be considered a Type 1 process and “Heuristic” as Type 2, 
because heuristics are based on simple yet explicit rules but can be as quick as a Type 1 
process. Finally, Stanovich (2009a; 2011) offers a detailed extension to his original 
model, implying hierarchies of control rather than separate systems. The model referred 
to as the “Tripartite” model suggests that the autonomous mind houses Type 1 processes 
whereas the algorithmic mind related to cognitive ability, contains the algorithmic level 
of Type 2 processing and the reflective mind, linked to epistemic dispositions, houses 
the reflective level of Type 2 processing. The autonomous system can be inhibited by 
the algorithmic mind but the override is initiated by higher level control of the reflective 
mind (Evans, 2011).            
In sum, Evans and Stanovich (2013) agree that it is ill-advised to assume all the 
suggested characteristics of the two processing types, are necessary and defining. 
However, they do argue for a clear distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 (terminology 
we employ throughout this thesis), where Type 1 processes are defined by their 
autonomy and Type 2 processes are identified as drawing on the working memory and 
allow for hypothetical thought through the process of “cognitive decoupling” 
(Stanovich, 2009b; 2011). Additionally, those with higher WM capacity will be better 
able to inhibit autonomous responses and engage in Type 2 processing as opposed to 
relying on automatic Type 1 responses (Stanovich & West, 1998a).  
Although DPT has come under considerable criticism and these critiques have been 
defended in a number of ways by Evans and Stanovich as illustrated above; there is also 
considerable empirical support for the account, as shown in section 1.3. To reiterate, 
default processing focuses heavily on how our prior beliefs are the intuitive output that 
bias our decision making processes (Evans, 2006), whilst logical reasoning necessitates 
effortful Type 2 processes. However, recent research has proposed that reasoning on the 
basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as these accounts claim (Handley et al., 
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2011). In the next section we begin by reviewing research demonstrating that reasoners 
can detect when there is conflict between responses. This suggests that responses can be 
triggered simultaneously rather than serially as most DI DP models claim. In addition to 
this we review the research indicating that reasoning based upon logical structure can 
often be completed quickly and intuitively.  
1.4 Conflict Detection and Logical Intuition 
As mentioned previously, the traditional DI account defines reasoning on the basis of 
knowledge or belief as a Type 1 process triggered by default, whilst a response based 
upon the logical structure of a problem draws on Type 2 processes. This section reviews 
some recent evidence that is inconsistent with this claim by suggesting that some 
structural processing resembles the fast and effortless characteristics of a Type 1 
response. We start with research showing that people have the ability to detect conflict 
between competing responses, which is contrary to the claims made by the DI DPT.  
De Neys and Glumicic (2008) examined the responses to base rate problems where the 
description and the base rate where either congruent (no-conflict), incongruent (in 
conflict) or neutral (neutral description). They demonstrated that participants took 
longer to process the conflict problems but verbal protocols showed that they were 
explicitly unware of any conflict. Furthermore, even when participants gave a response 
based upon the description rather than the base rate, evidence suggested that (through 
retrieval of base rate information) the base rates had also been thoroughly processed. De 
Neys and Glumicic claimed that implicit conflict detection, not only suggests intuitive 
awareness of the base rates, but is consistent with a parallel model. Stupple and Ball 
(2008) also offer evidence of conflict detection using inspection-time analysis on 
syllogisms to show that conflict problems, where logic and belief are inconsistent, lead 
to increased processing latencies relative to non-conflict problems (also see Ball, 
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Philips, Wade and Quayle, 2006). They offer an explanation which assumes that 
concurrent outputs from both heuristic and analytic processes are available, with the 
latter requiring more time to resolve.   
These studies support the notion that conflict is intuitively detected outside the 
requirement for Type 2 processing. De Neys, Moyens & Vansteenwegen’s, (2010) 
research also confirmed the effortlessness of conflict detection present with syllogisms. 
They used skin conductance responses (SCRs) to show autonomic arousal with 
inconsistent conflict problems implying a “gut” feeling of incorrectness. Gangemi, 
Bourgeois-Gironde & Mancini (2014) refer to this gut feeling as Feeling of Error 
(FOE), explained as the detection of the conflict between an intuitively incorrect and 
normatively correct answer to a problem.  Gangemi et al. used the bat and ball problem 
(Frederick, 2005) and a non-conflict version of the problem to examine the FOE on both 
generation and evaluation versions of the task. They followed these with a FOE 
questionnaire to assess the level of cognitive discomfort experienced from completing 
the problems. Gangemi et al. found that those who failed at the task experienced more 
FOE, suggesting that it is a reliable signal that errors are present and assume that it 
results from the detection of conflict impacting on reasoning performance. 
Consequently, it appears that even if detection is not explicitly expressed (e.g., De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008) and judgments are often biased, people do appear to sense their 
inaccuracies.  
De Neys, Vartanian & Goel (2008) introduced a neuro-scientific approach which 
analysed fMRI data captured on the classic “lawyer-engineer” base rate problem. 
Similar to De Neys and Glumicic (2008) they used congruent, incongruent, neutral 
(description neutral) and heuristic-control (base rates neutral) base rate problems. Their 
results showed that the area of the brain involved in conflict detection was activated 
even when participants responded based upon the stereotype, suggesting that they 
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intuitively detected their bias. In other words, even though participants gave a 
stereotyped response, on some level they were aware that it conflicted with the base 
rate. If people were not intuitively sensitive to the statistically correct response then the 
conflict observed in the anterior singular cortex would not have been detected (De Neys 
& Franssens, 2007; De Neys et al., 2008).  
According to the DI model, Type 2 processing does not start until conflict between 
Type 1 and Type 2 is detected; the question this model fails to address is how conflict 
can be detected in the first place if Type 2 processing has not been initiated? Bank and 
Hope (2014) conducted a study on belief-bias in relational reasoning using valid, 
determinately invalid and indeterminately invalid problems, each with both believable 
and unbelievable conclusions. They monitored EEG activity whilst participants solved 
the problems and found greater P3 amplitude (determined by the allocation of 
attentional resources when WM is updated) was present when belief and logic 
conflicted. Furthermore, P3 latencies were equivalent for belief and logic responses, 
indicating that they both influence reasoning at the same time and relatively early. 
These findings fall in favour of a Parallel Competitive model (PC) (Epstein, 1994; 
Handley et al., 2011; Sloman, 1996) consistent with the notion that logic (structural) 
and belief (relevant knowledge) are processed simultaneously as opposed to serially: we 
return to the PC model in the next section.   
The studies on conflict detection and the idea that a logical response can be triggered 
early and at the same time as a belief response suggests that people are sensitive to 
logical structure, which may indicate a degree of logical intuition. This interpretation is 
supported by Radar & Sloutsky (2002) who presented participants with the conditional 
and second premise to Modus Ponens (MP) problems within a story context, for 
example; if the weather is nice then Ed takes a walk; the weather was nice; and 
participants had to decide if a particular word had appeared within the story. The 
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findings indicated that participants were more likely to falsely identify that the 
conclusion had been presented, suggesting that MP were drawn implicitly at the 
comprehension stage, which is a rapid, automatic Type 1 process. This also extended to 
problems based on Affirmation of the Consequent. Similarly, Leo & Greene (2008) 
conducted research on inferences made about the relationship between the novel 
configurations of an array of faces presented, whereby participants were unaware of the 
task requirements. They found that inferences can be drawn without deliberate strategies 
and that logical relational processing can take place irrespective of task awareness.  
Morsanyi and Handley (2012) also suggested that a degree of logicality can be activated 
intuitively, with the use of syllogisms and liking ratings. They measured intuitive 
contributions to reasoning by examining how much participants `liked’ the concluding 
statement to an argument and found an effect of logical validity on liking judgments. 
Liking ratings are based on intuitive processing and are said to reflect a person’s 
affective state. With logicality affecting liking ratings, Morsanyi and Handley suggested 
that the logic effect was elicited by the conceptual fluency of processing the conclusion. 
In addition, they found that when emotional responses were attributed to background 
music the logic effect reduced, confirming that the participant’s affective state induced 
the effect. Indeed the logic effect remained present after reducing premise presentation 
time which confirmed that logical analysis does not always rely on time consuming, 
effortful processing (see Singmann, Klauer & Kellen, 2014, for a recent critique of this 
research).  
Of course we cannot forget the ample research on the belief-bias (see section 1.2.2) 
promoting the effortful nature of structural processing, but we should consider the way 
in which participants are instructed to carry out the reasoning task. In the majority of 
bias studies participants are specifically directed to judge whether a conclusion logically 
follows from the premises presented. Therefore, perhaps belief-bias can be explained in 
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terms of an individual’s inability to adhere to logical instruction. For example; Evans et 
al., (2010) showed that those higher in cognitive ability were more proficient at 
decoupling their beliefs but only when specifically instructed to do so. This might 
suggest that the demanding nature of logic based reasoning may actually be down to the 
effort required to apply a specific set of complex instructions.  
Handley, Newstead and Trippas (2011) introduced a new instructional set to their 
research on conditional reasoning which required participants to judge the believability 
of a conclusion as well as its logical validity. They examined the processing accuracy 
and latency data on both conflict and no-conflict problems. Depending on whether 
participants were instructed to reasoning logically or judge the believability of a 
conclusion, conflict problems would prompt different responses; whereas no-conflict 
problems elicited the same response regardless of instruction. They found that logical 
inferences on both MP and disjunctive arguments are accomplished relatively 
automatically and are immune to the influence of beliefs. Judging conclusion 
believability, on the other hand, is a slower process that is subject to interference from 
logical analysis. This effect was present in both a between and within subjects 
manipulation and extended to both accuracy and latency data. Their findings contradict 
the predictions made based on a DI account of reasoning and what would be expected if 
belief based judgments were based on fast, automatic Type 1 processes and logic based 
judgments were based on slow, deliberative Type 2 processes. Pennycook, Trippas, 
Handley & Thompson (2013) extended these findings to base rate problems whereby 
participants were instructed to respond on the basis of the base rate information or the 
personality description embedded in the problem. The former would require participants 
to disregard any background knowledge whilst the latter would require participants to 
overlook the statistical base rate information. They found that both statistical and 
stereotyped information interfered with one another and produced similar processing 
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times, suggesting that information based on either the base rate or background 
knowledge was triggered automatically and in parallel.  
Once again, both studies demonstrate that judgments based on the logical structure of 
the argument can be accomplished quickly and intuitively, and contrary to the DI 
account, they imply that belief judgments require some effortful processing. Other 
research has also emphasised the demanding nature of belief based processing, for 
example; belief-bias on conditional inferences has been shown to be unaffected by 
speeded problem presentation unlike syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Handley & Bacon, 
2009). Evans et al. (2009) found that the impact of speeded presentation was equal 
under deductive and pragmatic instruction. Newstead et al., (2004) found a strong 
relationship between cognitive ability (as measured by the AH5) and deontic selection 
tasks, which depend upon accessing relevant knowledge. Furthermore, Experientiality 
(as measured by REI, see Pacini & Epstein, 1999) as a measure of thinking disposition, 
did not correlate with belief-bias or the deontic selection task and cognitive motivation 
was a poor predictor of logical performance. Additionally,  recent research has shown 
that among pre-adolescent children, biased responding on reasoning tasks is more, 
rather than less, common in participants who score higher on measures of working 
memory (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008).  
 
Recent research has also shown that working memory load can result in a decrease in 
pragmatic responses on reasoning tasks accompanied by an increase in logical ones. For 
example, De Neys and Schaeken (2007) presented participants with sentence 
verification tasks, which involved awkward and under informative sentences that 
prompted scalar implicatures; for example the sentence `some oaks are trees’ would cue 
the implicature `not all oaks are trees’. The sentence is logically true but the cued 
implicature is false compared to general knowledge about trees. Therefore when asked 
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to judge whether the sentence is true or false the implicature leads participants to 
incorrectly judge the sentence as false.  Some authors have assumed that implicatures 
are generated automatically (Levinson, 2000)  however, De Neys and Schaeken (2007) 
showed that certain pragmatic implicatures were reduced under cognitive load whilst 
logical performance increased, suggesting that judgments based on knowledge must 
also rely upon Type 2 processes.   
 
Finally, De Neys, Schaeken & d’Ydewalle (2005) presented participants with causal 
conditional statements such as “if the air conditioning is turned on, then you feel cold”, 
followed by factual statements like “you feel cold, but the air conditioning was not 
turned on” and asked them to generate counterexamples to the rule. The results revealed 
that searching for counterexample information draws on WM capacity and the efficacy 
with which they are retrieved is reduced by WM load. Again these findings suggest that 
inferences based on prior knowledge can influence reasoning in ways that are slow, 
reflective and dependant on Type 2 processing (also see Verschueren et al., 2005).  
 
In this section we discussed conflict detection and how it supports the concept of logical 
intuition, suggesting that judgments based on the structure of an argument can be 
accomplished relatively automatically. The literature also revealed that when instructed 
to reason on the basis of belief, judgments are slow, more prone to error and are 
impeded by the validity of the argument.  Furthermore, the reliance on background 
knowledge to reason appears to increase as WM capacity develops (Morsanyi & 
Handley, 2008), all of which corroborate the view that judgments based upon beliefs 
can require effortful processing. We also briefly mentioned how the findings presented 
in this section are in conflict with the DI dual processing account and are more 
consistent with belief based and logical processing operating in parallel. In the next 
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section we will discuss the PC account in more detail and the role of inhibition in 
relation to the model.  
1.4.1 Parallel Processing and Inhibition 
Handley et al. (2011) suggest that reasoning about beliefs is often demanding and relies 
on the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. As mentioned previously (see section1.3.1) an alternate dual 
process model is the Parallel Competitive (PC) model (Epstein, 1994; Handley et al., 
2011; Sloman, 1996) which is common in social psychology (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) 
and has been applied to the judgment and decision making literature (Sloman, 1996). 
According to Sloman’s (1996) interpretation of the PC model, belief and logic influence 
each other bi-directionally, suggesting that people always simultaneously engage in 
both Type 1 (heuristic) and Type 2 (analytic) processing which occur in parallel and 
require conflict resolution through the inhibition of the inappropriate response. This 
model is more consistent with the findings in the previous section and more importantly 
it offers an explanation for the experience of conflict detection when reasoning, which 
the DI model fails to do.  
The PC account suggests that for an analytical Type 2 response to complete, it must 
inhibit the heuristic Type 1 output and the dominance of heuristic responding as 
demonstrated by the literature on biases, is the result of inhibition failure; for example, 
Houdé et al. (2000) monitored brain activation to show that increasing inhibitory 
processing through training, improved selection rate on the Wason Selection Task 
(Wason, 1966; 1968), suggesting that poor performance before inhibition training was 
the result of poor inhibition of the intuitive matching response rather than a lack of 
logical knowledge. Additionally, Moutier & Houdé (2003) confirmed that inhibition 
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training was better at improving reasoning performance on classical conjunction bias, 
than logical training.  
De Neys, Novitskiy, Ramautar & Wagemans (2010) conducted a study on both base 
rate and conjunction problems where the stereotypical description cued a heuristic 
response that conflicted with the `normatively’ correct answer. The results from both 
problem sets created two groups of `most’ and `least’ biased reasoners which were then 
examined using an EEG study of executive monitoring and inhibition skills. The results 
indicated that even though most reasoners detect they are biased, those that perform 
better on the reasoning problems are characterised by a superior inhibition capacity. 
This emphasises the key role of inhibition in overriding tempting yet erroneous 
intuitions to conflict problems.  
Markovits and Barrouillet (2002) suggested that an essential component in the 
development of conditional reasoning relies on an individual’s ability to inhibit 
information that does not fit with the presented problem. Simoneau and Markovits’ 
(2003) research lent further support, implying that reasoners can reason logically when 
given specific instruction suggesting that the ability to “inhibit” counterfactual 
information can explain why some people have the aptitude to “suppose premises are 
true” when they are not actually true. They also suggested that selective inhibitory 
processes underlie the development of any associative system which allows increasingly 
complex processing without the help of any explicit rule. 
De Neys & Franssens (2009) examined the inhibition process in reasoning with 
syllogisms, using a lexical decision task to test whether supressing beliefs during 
reasoning would affect their subsequent recall. Results showed that conflict between 
belief and logic increased latencies on lexical decisions for target words, and that the 
retrieval of these believable words was impaired. They concluded that this was not due 
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to a failure to detect conflict or the requirement to inhibit the heuristic response but 
rather a failure to complete the inhibition process, in favour of a parallel processing 
approach when reasoning.  
However there has been debate over the efficiency of a fully parallel model, for 
example De Neys & Glumicic (2008) argue that such a model dismisses the advantages 
of a heuristic route; in other words, if the heuristic process arrives at the correct 
response, why would people redundantly complete the analytical process? They 
hypothesised that if people complete the analytical process in all circumstances then 
base-rates on congruent and incongruent problems should be attended to equally. 
However, their research did not support this hypothesis or a purely parallel model. 
Equally, the research on conflict detection makes a solely serial model highly 
problematic; therefore De Neys (2012) offers an alternative parallel model.  He 
proposes parallel activation of two distinctive intuitive responses; one logical and one 
heuristic. The heuristic response will call on stereotypical associations and semantics 
whilst the logical response will pull on typically logical and probabilistic rules. If and 
when the responses conflict, then the deliberative and effortful processing is engaged. In 
order to explain why the heuristic system often dominates, he suggests that activation 
levels amongst the two intuitive responses differ. Where the heuristic response produces 
a more salient activation (De Neys, 2014) it nevertheless produces doubt and can 
account for the conflict detection (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) as well as explaining the 
need for inhibition of the heuristic response. However, when the heuristic response is so 
persuasive people may not engage the inhibition process, alternatively some people may 
be aware of the conflict, try and block the compelling heuristic response but fail to do 
so, which is referred to as the “flawless detection view” (De Neys, Cromheeke, & 
Osman, 2011). Again this supports the idea that people can be “intuitive logicians”, 
influenced by traditional logical principles when making decisions.  
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1.5 Summary 
In this chapter we introduced the literature on DPT in reasoning, concentrating on the 
broadly accepted DI approach (Evans, 2008) which associates belief based reasoning 
with default, Type 1 processes and reasoning based on the logical structure of an 
argument as pulling on Type 2 processes. Research on the belief-bias effect (Evans, 
Barston & Pollard, 1983) offers considerable support for the DI account, showing how 
the effect can be increased with time constraints (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) and 
under cognitive load (De Neys, 2006; Quayle & Ball, 2000) and how it can be reduced 
when participants are emotionally charged (Goel & Vartanian, 2011) or through explicit 
instructions to reason logically (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). However, 
the evidence of early conflict detection implies that people are implicitly aware of two 
competing sources of information based on knowledge (beliefs) and problem structure 
(validity) which offers support for an alternative PC dual process model of reasoning. 
Further research proposes the idea of intuitive logic (De Neys 2012; 2014) that has the 
ability to interfere with the believability of a conclusion (Handley et al., 2011). The 
concept of the intuitive logician provides a more optimistic view of human reasoning, in 
that it suggests that people have an intuitive sense of logical structure.  
 
1.6 Rationale and Structure  
The evidence supporting the intuitive nature of logic based reasoning (De Neys 2012; 
Morsanyi & Handley, 2012) and the view that belief based judgments also require 
effortful processing (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008; Verschueren et al., 2005) provides the 
framework for the research presented in this thesis.  
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Our broad objective is to investigate whether belief based judgments are in fact resource 
demanding, using Handley et al.’s (2011) novel methodology as our foundation. As we 
have seen, they investigated the accuracy and time course of processing when 
participants were instructed to respond, either, on the basis of logical validity or the 
believability of a conclusion. Their findings suggested that a) certain logical inferences 
are accomplished relatively automatically and are immune to the influence of beliefs 
and b) judging conclusion believability appears to be a slower process that is subject to 
interference from logical analysis. This research challenges the DI account of reasoning 
which is contrary to what would be expected if belief based judgments were based on 
fast, automatic Type 1 processes and logic based judgments were based on slow, 
deliberate Type 2 processes.  
Substantiated by their research and the premise that belief based judgments require 
effortful Type 2 processing, we investigate whether belief judgments will be equally, if 
not more so, affected by a secondary task as logical judgments. Each experiment 
throughout this thesis implements the original methodology of Handley et al. (2011) 
which allows us to evaluate the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere with one 
another. In Chapters 2 and 3, the interference between belief and logic is examined 
whilst participants engage in a secondary task demanding of working memory 
resources.  Chapter 2 examines the effect of a Dot Memory task and Random Number 
Generation (RNG) on conditional Modus Ponens (MP) arguments. Chapter 3 introduces 
more complex disjunctive arguments and several individual differences measures for 
investigation, as well as examining performance on the secondary task.  
An additional aim of the current research is to investigate the underlying executive 
processes necessary for belief and logic based reasoning; essentially determining 
whether their demand on executive resources differentiates. In Chapter 4 we investigate 
the role of working memory with the use of two original experimental designs 
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combining a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and an N-Back task (Kirchner, 1958) with 
simple (MP) and complex (Disjunctives) reasoning questions. Finally, in Chapter 5 we 
discuss our findings in relation the dual process framework, followed by 
recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2: The effect of secondary load on 
simple judgments.  
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 1 we discussed the Default Interventionists (DI) interpretation of belief-bias 
whereby belief responses are considered Type 1 processes that are generated by default 
and may require intervention from more deliberate Type 2 processes at times (Evans, 
2008) (see Figure 2.1 for representation).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 
An illustration of the DI model shows that a Belief based response, to a simple 
argument, is a Type 1, intuitive process that is triggered by default and completes early. 
A Logical response on the other hand, requires deliberate Type 2 processing and takes 
longer to complete. The vertical line represents the transition between T1 and T2 
processing and when conflict is implicitly detected.  
Default processing tends be associated with how prior beliefs and the use of heuristics 
impede on our decision making processes (Evans, 2006). In contrast other research has 
shown that belief based judgments may not be as fast and automatic as previous 
accounts claim (Evans, Handley & Bacon, 2009; Morsanyi & Handley, 2008; 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004). In fact it is becoming evident 
Belief 
Logic 
T1 T2 
Conflict 
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that some belief based judgments are effortful, relying upon the integration of relevant 
knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to generate a novel response. For 
example, De Neys, Schaeken & d'Ydewalle (2005), demonstrated with causal 
conditional reasoning, that the retrieval and integration of knowledge from 
counterexamples was directly associated with Working Memory (WM) capacity. 
Furthermore, Verschueren, Schaeken & d’Ydewalle (2005) highlighted the slow 
analytic nature of processing counterexample information and the ability this 
information has to override conclusions based on probabilistic processing.  
In the previous chapter we introduced Handley, Newstead & Trippas (2011) novel 
methodology that required participants to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments 
on the basis of either logical validity or believability. They consistently found that belief 
based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions 
and judgments relating to strongly held beliefs could themselves be undermined if they 
were inconsistent with the logical structure of an argument. This is contrary to 
predictions made by the DI account and inconsistent with the idea that belief based 
judgments are based on automatic Type 1 processes and logic judgments require 
effortful, Type 2 processes.  
Handley et al. (2011) proposed an alternative Parallel Competitive (PC) model to 
interpret their findings (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2 
An illustration of the PC model shows that both Belief and Logic based responses to a 
simple argument are initiated in parallel. Both responses require Type 2 processing, but 
Logic based responses complete first and require inhibiting in order for a Belief based 
response to complete.  
They suggested that the reasoning problems they presented prompted a rapid logical 
response (as opposed to a default belief based response) which required inhibition when 
presented with a belief based instructional set. Therefore, if responding on the basis of 
beliefs requires effortful processing and the inhibition of conflicting responses (Evans, 
2003), then based on Handley et al. belief based judgments should take longer and be 
more affected by a secondary load than logical judgments.   
The aim of the current chapter is to evaluate the degree to which logic and belief based 
judgments interfere with one another whilst participants engage in a secondary task. A 
secondary task that burdens WM resources will tax analytic, Type 2 processing and the 
ability to override heuristic, Type 1 outputs (De Neys, 2006). Consequently, judgments 
that require effortful Type 2 processing will be impeded by a demanding secondary 
task. This chapter explores the level of effortful processing required for belief and logic 
based judgments in line with the PC model (Figure 2.2). In accordance with Handley et 
Belief 
Logic 
T1 
Inhibition 
Conflict 
T2 
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al. belief and logic based responses are prompted simultaneously and logical responses 
complete first; if they are correct in their findings then we predict that when instructed 
to judge the believability of a conclusion, whilst engaged in a secondary task, fast 
completing logical responses will become harder to inhibit and thus hinder more 
effortful, belief based judgments.  
De Neys (2006) employed the secondary load method on syllogistic reasoning with the 
use of a spatial storage task and showed that belief-bias increased with a secondary 
load. De Neys interpreted this finding as indicating the heuristic nature of belief based 
reasoning and the notion that erroneous reasoning in the case of a belief-logic conflict is 
not only associated with, but also directly caused by, limitations in executive resources. 
However, like most research on belief-bias in reasoning, participants were only 
instructed to determine whether the conclusion followed logically from the premises of 
the syllogism. Consequently, the evidence of increased belief-bias under load may not 
be due to a reduced capacity to inhibit Type 1 processing but rather the result of 
participants failure to appropriately apply the correct instructions when their WM is 
impacted on.  
Handley et al. (2011) proposed that their evidence supported the role of Type 2 
processes in belief based judgments. Therefore, we will employ Handley et al.’s original 
methodology, that asked participants to judge conclusion validity as well as conclusion 
believability, whilst engaged in De Neys’ (2006) `Dot Memory Task’ as a direct test of 
the DI account. We hypothesise that when instructed to judge the believability of an 
argument, participants will be more affected by the secondary load than when instructed 
to judge conclusion validity.  
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2.2 Experiment 1 
The overall aim of Experiment 1 is to determine whether applying a secondary load will 
have a differential impact on belief and logic judgments for simple Modus Ponens (MP) 
arguments, specifically when the logical validity and belief in the conclusion are in 
conflict (see Table 2.1).  According to the DI model (see Figure 2.1) that highlights the 
default nature of belief based responses; logic judgments should be more affected by a 
secondary load. Alternatively, and in accordance with the PC model (see Figure 2.2), if 
belief based judgments are demanding on Type 2 processing, specifically the WM 
resources required to inhibit logic based inferences, then they should be more affected 
by a demanding dot memory task (see Figure 2.3). 
2.2.1 Method  
 
Participants  
A total of 81 psychology undergraduates from Plymouth University, England, took part 
in Experiment 1, in return for a course credit. Participants consisted of 67 female and 14 
male students. 
Design & Material  
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was used where participants were randomly assigned to the 
high load or low load group. Each participant received the same 64 reasoning problems 
under both belief and logic instructions (Instruction type). Half the problems were 
conflict problems (with conclusions that were valid and unbelievable or invalid and 
believable) and the other half were no-conflict problems (with conclusions that were 
valid and believable or invalid and unbelievable). Refer to the reasoning task below for 
more details.   
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Reasoning Task:  
Table 2.1  
Examples of the different types of Modus Ponens (MP) arguments used in Experiments 
1 – 3.  
 
Conflict Arguments 
 
No-conflict Arguments 
 
Argument 1 
 
Argument 2 
If it is raining then the street is dry                            If it is raining then the street is wet 
It is raining                                                                 It is raining      
(A) The street is dry                                                  (C) The street is wet 
Logic:      Belief:  X                                                             Logic:      Belief:   
Argument 3 Argument 4 
If it is raining then the street is dry                            If it is raining then the street is wet 
It is raining                                                                 It is raining      
(B) The street is wet                                                  (D) The street is dry 
Logic:  X     Belief:                                                                 Logic: X Belief:   X 
 
The reasoning task was presented to each participant on a computer screen. Participants 
received 64 conditional reasoning problems in Modus Ponens format (see Appendix B 
for a complete set of the stimuli). Thirty two were under belief instruction and 32 under 
logical instruction. In each of these sets there were 16 conflict trials, 16 no-conflict trials 
and in each case eight required a yes response or a press of the `s’ key on the key board 
and eight which required a press of the `k’ key for a negative response. Table 2.1 
demonstrates the type of questions presented to each participant. Argument 1 shows that 
the conclusion of the argument logically follows from the premise but is in conflict with 
what we believe to be true about the world. Argument 3 shows a problem where the 
conclusion is believable but does not follow logically from the premises. For arguments 
2 and 4 both the form (logical validity) and content (if it is believable) lead to the same 
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conclusion, hence there is no-conflict. The four argument types were randomly 
presented throughout the experiment with an equal number of belief and logic based 
responses.  
Table 2.2  
Examples of how an argument was presented under both instructional sets.  
Conditional argument presented  
under Logical Instruction  
Conditional argument presented  
under Belief Instruction 
 
If a dog is barking then it is silent  
(Premise 1) 
 
If a dog is barking then it is silent  
(Premise 1) 
     
Suppose a dog is barking (Premise 2)                                                                Suppose a dog is barking (Premise 2)      
  
Does it follow that the dog silent?                                                             Does it follow that dog silent? 
 
Valid ?          or         Invalid? 
 
Believable?        or        Unbelievable? 
 
For each problem the first (major) premise was presented alone; then when the spacebar 
was pressed the first premise disappeared and the second (categorical) premise, 
conclusion and two answers to choose from appeared on the screen. Before the 
experiment started participants received eight practice trials with feedback, which 
covered all four argument types (see Table 2.1). Four were presented alone and four 
were presented with a dot matrix pattern to memorise. The dot pattern was either simple 
or complex and was presented before the MP argument. When participants had 
responded to the argument, an empty matrix grid appeared where they were required to 
replicate the pattern they had memorised earlier (see Dot Matrix Memory Task). 
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Dot Matrix Memory Task:  
(1)          (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  
A Dot Pattern example in the High Load (1) and Low Load (2) Conditions. 
Participants were asked to memorize a 3x3 matrix filled with three or four dots, which 
was presented before each reasoning question for 850ms (De Neys, 2006). They were 
then required to reproduce the dot pattern after completing each reasoning task. 
Participants were split into high and low load conditions. The high load consisted of a 
matrix filled with a complex four-dot pattern, i.e., a ‘‘two- or three-piece’’ pattern based 
on Bethell-Fox and Shepard (1988), and Verschueren, Schaeken and d’Ydewalle 
(2004).  The two piece pattern meant that two or three of the dots that were adjacent to 
each other could not be adjacent to the remaining dot(s), (but they could connect 
diagonally) making up a two piece pattern. The three piece pattern meant that two 
connecting dots could not be adjacent to the remaining two dots, which could also not 
rest adjacent to each other (but could touch diagonally) making up a three piece pattern. 
The low load condition had a three dot pattern in a horizontal line (i.e., a ‘‘one-piece’’ 
pattern in Bethell-Fox & Shepard’s (1988) terms). The low load was to ensure a 
minimal burden was placed on executive resources. One hundred and twenty eight 
matrices were created altogether, 64 with a complex pattern, 36 of which were made up 
of two pieces and 28 three pieces, the remaining 64 were made up of six simple one 
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piece patterns repeated. The experimental program E-prime was used to design the 
study and display and capture the data. The program randomly assigned a dot matrix to 
every MP inference in the experiment. Consequently, each participant had a different 
randomly assigned set of matrices paired with each of the conditional arguments 
presented.   
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of four and were randomly assigned to the high or 
low load conditions. They were tested in partitioned booths and presented with 
instructions on a computer screen. Participants were informed that they would have to 
complete 64 reasoning problems and were instructed to answer either according to their 
beliefs or according to logic. Belief instructions emphasised the requirement to answer 
in relation to their knowledge of what is true in the world and indicate whether the 
conclusion was believable or unbelievable. They were then presented with following 
example:  
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be full? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world, you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is unbelievable. 
Logic instructions asked participants to assume each statement was true (even if in 
reality it was not true) and indicate whether the conclusion followed validly from 
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preceding sentences. They were then presented with same example under logic 
instruction:  
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be empty? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that “if you finish your drink then the glass will be full” and 
supposing you “finish your drink” you must logically conclude that your glass will be 
full. This is why the conclusion “does it follow that the glass will be empty” is logically 
invalid. 
The next set of instructions informed participant’s that they would be presented with a 
dot pattern (for a short period) before each reasoning problem, which they had to 
remember and reproduce on an empty matrix grid presented to them after completing 
the reasoning question. They had eight practice trials to complete before the main 
experiment, four without a dot pattern and four with. After each practice trial, feedback 
was provided specifying whether they had answered correctly or not on the reasoning 
task. Depending on their mistake the feedback resembled the following:  
You responded “invalid” instead of “valid”.  You were supposed to respond according 
to LOGIC. If you do not understand your mistake then ask the experimenter for further 
instructions before the end of the practice trials. 
When participants started the experimental trials, the accuracy and latency data was 
captured for each trial and logged from the presentation of the full problem until a 
response was given. 
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2.2.2 Results  
Following Handley et al. (2011), we analysed the full data and a reduced data set by 
eliminating those participants that scored below chance on the conflict problems (i.e. 
less than 50% accurate), which suggested that they were applying an inappropriate 
instructional set to the questions. We focus on the reduced data throughout this thesis 
(see Appendix C for full data sets) and dropped six participants from the current 
experiment giving a total of N = 75. All the accuracy data was Arcsine transformed to 
improve homogeneity of variance and control for the impact of ceiling effects (Milligan, 
1987).  Analyses on the latency data were performed on correct responses only and any 
missing data was replaced with the overall cell mean for that question type (i.e. belief 
conflict, belief no-conflict).  Items with latencies greater than 2 Standard Deviations 
(SD) from the mean were removed in order to reduce the influence of outliers that skew 
the distribution. The tables in each chapter present latencies with outliers removed and 
percentage accuracy scores, prior to transformation. 
A 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(High/Low load) mixed design was 
used with instruction (Belief/Logic) and problem type (Conflict/No-conflict) as within-
subject factors and load as a between-subject factor. A repeated measures ANOVA 
(analysis of variance) on transformed accuracy produced a marginal main effect of 
instruction; F(1, 73) = 3.435, p = .068, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .045, indicating that performance was 
slightly better under logic instruction than belief instruction (94% vs. 93%). There was a 
main effect of problem type, F(1, 73) = 51.057, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .412, showing accuracy 
scores significantly higher for no-conflict items compared to conflict items (97% vs. 
90%). Interestingly there was no main effect of load, F(2, 73) = 1.102, p = .297, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .015, showing that overall performance was unaffected by the dot memory task. 
 58 
 
There was a marginally significant interaction between instruction and problem type, 
F(1, 73) = 3.717, p  = .058, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .048, identifying a significantly larger difference in 
performance for problem type under belief instruction (89 % conflict vs. 97 % no-conflict) 
than under logic instruction (91% conflict vs. 97% no-conflict). These results replicate 
Handley et al. (2011) where belief-logic conflict has shown a greater impact on the 
believability of the conclusion. However, instruction did not interact with load; F(1, 73) 
= .020, p = .889, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  < .001, indicating that high and low memory load did not have 
differential impact on belief and logic instructions. None of the remaining interactions 
were significant (all p’s > .10). 
Table 2.3 
Average Accuracy and Latency scores for Conflict and No-conflict Problems under 
Belief and Logic Instruction across both groups. Result exclude below chance scores 
and include correct only latencies. Experiment 1: N = 75 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
____________________ 
 
Conflict           No-conflict 
 
Logic Instructions 
_____________________ 
 
    Conflict        No-conflict 
 
 
Overall  
Means 
High Load  
Response Accuracy 
(%) 
 
87 
 
96 
 
88 
 
97 
 
92 
 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 
 
4,199 
 
3,585 
 
3,621 
 
3,327 
 
3,683 
      
Low Load  
Response Accuracy 
(%) 
 
90 
 
98 
 
93 
 
97 
 
95 
 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 
 
 
3,948 
 
3,655 
 
3,727 
 
3,449 
 
3,695 
Mean 
Accuracy (%) 
(across each cell) 
 
 
89 
 
97 
 
91 
 
97 
 
Mean 
Latency (ms) 
(across each cell) 
 
4,074 
 
3,620 
 
3,674 
 
3,388 
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A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on correct response latency data, which 
generated a main effect of instruction, F(1, 73) = 36.921, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  =.336, with belief 
judgments taking more time to complete than logic judgments (3,847ms vs. 3,531ms). 
There was also a main effect of problem type; F(1, 73) = 36.928, p  < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .336, 
with conflict items taking longer than no-conflict items (3,874ms vs. 3,504ms)  but 
again there was no main effect of load; F(2, 73) = .005, p = .942, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .000. There was, 
however, a marginal interaction between instruction and load; F(2, 73) = 3.841, p 
= .054, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .050, showing a bigger difference between latencies for belief and logic 
instruction in the high load condition (3,892ms-Belief vs. 3,474ms-Logic) compared to the 
low load condition (3,802ms-Belief vs. 3,588ms-Logic). There were no other significant 
interactions to report (all p’s > .10). 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Generally, there was a very high accuracy rate amongst the participants in Experiment 
1. Nevertheless, the trend and direction of the accuracy data produced similar results to 
those of Handley et al. (2011) demonstrating that belief-conflict items produce less 
accurate responses and take longer to complete than logic-conflict items. The fact that 
conflict items take longer to complete implies that the participants, on some level, were 
aware of the conflict between logic (the form of the argument) and their beliefs 
regarding the content of the argument. This is consistent with previous research 
suggesting that participants are aware of conflict (e.g. De Neys & Glumicic, 2008).  
Interestingly, the secondary load had no impact on reasoning accuracy in contrast to 
previous research carried out on syllogisms (De Neys, 2006). One explanation for the 
absence of load impact could be down to the simplicity of the secondary task and its 
insufficient demands on WM; however the results do suggest that the secondary task 
was adequately demanding with an average of 53% correct in the high load condition 
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(complex matrices). An alternative explanation is that participants traded performance 
on the secondary task for performance on the primary task. However, 53% correct on 
dot matrices is substantially above the level of chance (0.79% for the complex matrices 
and 33.33% for the simple matrices) suggesting that participants were sufficiently 
engaged in the secondary task.  
An important question at this point is why the dot memory task did not impact on the 
processes required to answer the reasoning questions? Perhaps we need to consider the 
possibility that the reasoning task and the dot memory task are drawing on distinct 
processing resources. According to authors such as Rabbitt (1997), executive function is 
comprised of a fragmented system of control processes; therefore the control of verbal 
and visuo-spatial processing might activate distinct executive resources. Consequently, 
it is quite possible that the specific type of secondary task used here, was in fact tapping 
into a different type of working memory resource to that required to evaluate the 
believability of presented conclusions. Capon, Handley & Dennis (2003) showed that 
syllogistic reasoning loaded both spatial and verbal working memory (VWM) whilst 
Handley, Capon, Copp & Harper (2002) showed that conditional reasoning only 
correlated with VWM, suggesting that conditional inferences may be more heavily 
dependent on VWM than syllogisms. Consequently, if the dot memory task demands 
more on spatial WM, this could explain the absence of load impact in Experiment 1. 
Shah and Miyake (1996) also suggested a separation of WM resources for spatial 
thinking and language processing. They interpreted their results as demonstrating how 
cognitive resources that process and sustain spatial and verbal information are likely to 
be distinguishable (Logie, 1995). For example, data from dual-task models have 
demonstrated how the maintenance of spatial information in WM can be disrupted by a 
simultaneous spatial task but not by visual tasks and vice versa (Logie, 1986; Logie & 
Marchetti, 1991). Kim, Kim and Chun (2005) further demonstrated how the type of 
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interference shown on a Stroop test, depended on the type of WM load they used; in 
their words, impairment of executive control depends on the information of the 
concurrent task overlapping with the content of the WM.  
There is neurophysiological evidence that different types of information (spatial and 
visual in this example) are processed through distinct neural pathways in the brains of 
primates (Mishkin, Ungerleider & Macko 1983). Subsequent research also provides 
neurological evidence that the visuo-spatial sketch pad can be further divided into two 
functionally and anatomically distinct systems (Bloom, 1956) and brain-imaging scans 
demonstrate that retention of spatial information in the short-term is managed at a 
different location to the visual information in the brain (Smith et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, Logie (1995) proposed a rather passive role for the spatial subsystem.  
Later research however, infers a fainter distinction between the WM and Storage-
orientated Short Term Memory (STM) tasks (such as a dot memory task) and implicates 
the use of executive functions in both of them (Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah & 
Hegarty, 2001). Miyake et al. (2001) did, however, suggest that there are 3 spatial 
ability factors and they differ in the degree of executive involvement. It could be that 
the visuo-spatial storage is used when completing the dot memory task but does not 
place a substantial demand on the executive component. Consequently, a secondary task 
that burdens more heavily on executive functions rather than spatial STM may be a 
more appropriate secondary load. In the same paper Miyake et al. (2001) demonstrated 
a distinct separation between the Dot Memory task and Random number Generation 
(RNG). Their research indicated that whilst the two tasks correlated (inter-correlation: 
08 = very small) they were in fact tapping into different functions. Essentially, the dot 
memory task taps into the Visuo-spatial STM-WM and RNG engages executive 
functioning. This became the rationale for using RNG as the secondary load in 
Experiment 2.   
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2.3 Experiment 2 
Research has provided evidence that different types of information require the 
functioning of distinct executive resources (Logie, 1995; Shah & Miyake, 1996). This 
highlights the need to ensure the secondary task used draws upon the same cognitive 
resources as the primary task. There is the possibility that the dot memory task used in 
De Neys’ (2006) research required the same executive resources as those involved in 
syllogistic reasoning but not the same as those necessary to complete conditional 
inferences.  For example, Ford (1995) and Bacon, Handley and Newstead (2003) used 
written and verbal protocols to show that people use two distinct strategies for reasoning 
with syllogisms, some reason primarily spatially and others reason verbally. Spatial 
reasoners often use diagrams similar to Euler circles whilst verbal reasoners tend to 
approach syllogisms as if solving an equation, the principle of which was likened to the 
logical rules used to solve Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens arguments. Perhaps one 
explanation for De Neys’ findings was that some of the participants used were primarily 
spatial reasoners, hence the significant effect the spatial load had on the syllogistic task. 
Whereas there is evidence to suggest that for conditional inferences, reasoning requires 
an abstract Working Memory (WM) medium for representation and does not require the 
Visuo-Spatial Sketch Pad (Handley et al., 2002; Toms, Morris & Ward, 1993). 
Therefore, a secondary task that places a substantial demand on the executive 
component of WM such as Random Number Generation (RNG) may have a greater 
impact upon the primary task.  
Random Number Generation has been one of the most extensively used tasks to explore 
the functioning of the central executive component of the WM (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Typically the task requires participants to generate a sequence of random numbers from 
a set between 1 and 9, every second. Their performance is then measured through a 
variety of indices that calculate the randomness of the sequence generated. The ability 
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to create a random series of numbers is said to demand heavily on WM, take for 
instance the conscious restraint needed to prevent the instinctive inclination to follow a 
number one with a number two, whilst maintaining an awareness of previously 
generated numbers to compare with the concept of what is random. Furthermore, it has 
been well established that the generation of random responses is disrupted by and 
impedes simultaneously performed, attention-demanding, secondary tasks (Baddeley, 
1986; Brown, Soliveri & Jahanshahi, 1998).  
In order to eliminate the possibility of number articulation being accountable for any 
interference in Experiment 2, the Articulatory suppression (AS) technique was used as 
the low load condition. Articulatory suppression requires participants to repeatedly say 
a word or number out aloud in order to load the phonological loop component of WM, 
by preventing silent verbal rehearsal (Baddeley, 1986). It has been widely used to 
examine the role of verbal rehearsal in cognitive tasks, and is recognised to interfere 
with verbal short-term memory (Baddeley, Lewis & Vallar, 1984), without interfering 
with the accuracy of conditional reasoning problems (Evans & Brooks, 1981).  
Using the same methodology for the reasoning task as Experiment 1 and a secondary 
load more demanding of executive resources, we theorise that judgments requiring Type 
2 processing will be disrupted by the engagement in random number generation. In 
accordance with the PC model, the secondary load should interfere more with 
performance on belief based judgments. Alternatively, the DI account would predict 
that RNG will have its greatest impact on logic based inferences.  
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2.3.1 Method  
 
Participants  
A total of 74 psychology undergraduates and post graduates from Plymouth University 
took part in Experiment 2. Fifty four female and 20 male participants were recruited and 
awarded course credits for participation, or gratitude for volunteering.  
Design & Material  
 
A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed design was used where participants were randomly assigned to 
Random Number Generation group (high load condition), Articulatory Suppression 
group (low load condition) or the Control group (no load condition).  Each participant 
received the same 64 reasoning problems used in Experiment 1, under both belief and 
logic instructions (Instruction type). They consisted of an equal number of conflict and 
no-conflict problems and four practice trials (see experiment 1 for details).  
 
Random Number Generation 
The task of random number generation was based on the methodology used by Miyake 
et al. (2000) (although analysing random generation dates back to Baddeley, 1966). 
Participants were instructed to say aloud a number between 1 and 9, every second for 
the entire duration of the experiment. They were instructed to continue generating 
random numbers whilst solving the reasoning problems. To ensure they understood the 
concept of `random’, they were given the following example:  
Suppose you had written the numbers 1-9 on pieces of paper and put them in a hat. You 
take out one piece of paper, call out the number and return it to the hat. Then you reach 
for another piece of paper and do the same thing. The series of numbers you call out in 
that way should be random (Horne, Evan & Orne, 1982).   
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Before the start of the experiment, participants were told to keep the generation of 
numbers continuous, albeit tempting to pause whilst reading the questions they must 
keep to generating a number every second to the sound of the metronome beat. They 
were also advised that if they accidently went beyond the number range 1-9, they should 
try not to pause and continue on.  
Articulatory Suppression 
In the AS condition participants were instructed to say aloud the number two, every 
second for the duration of the experiment. The importance of keeping to the second was 
highlighted in the instructions.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested in maximum groups of four and were randomly assigned to the 
three conditions. They were tested in partitioned booths behind closed doors to keep 
vocalised distractions to a minimum. Each participant wore closed cup earphones to 
reduce background noise and listen to a metronome beat that was set to click every 
second. They each had a dicta-phone placed in front of the keyboard to capture the 
articulation of numbers. The control condition only had the reasoning task instructions 
to adhere to, whilst the RNG and AS condition had separate instructions for the 
secondary task (see Appendix A for details).  Response latencies were logged from the 
presentation of the full problem until a response was given. 
Analysing Randomness  
 
The RGCalc program (Towse & Neil, 1998) was used to analyse the randomness of the 
numbers generated by each participant in the high load condition. The program 
produces many different indices needed to examine randomness, but the three main 
measures used here were taken from Towse & Valentine (1997) and are as follows:  
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R = Redundancy:  A score of 0% means each response alternative is given with equal 
frequency where as 100% means the same response has been constantly selected 
throughout, for example: 2, 2, 2, 2. 
RNG = Random Number Generation: measures how often a response alternative 
follows another (on a scale of 0 to 1) for example; how often 1 follows 7 or 4 follows 8, 
throughout the data set. The closer RNG is to 1 the more predictable the pair sequence.  
A = Adjacency: measures a specific type of sequential pairing, in contrast to RNG 
analysis, for example; the commonality of 1, 2 or 3, 2 (neighbouring pairs on the 
number line). A score of 0% means no neighbouring pairs were presented, whilst 100% 
means all successive responses were adjacent number values. 
The three measures were used to ensure participants adequately engaged in the 
secondary task.  A score of 50% or higher on 2 out of 3 of the random indices was set as 
the criterion for eliminating participants not sufficiently engaging with the RNG task. 
Only one participant was removed on the basis of their randomness scores, for 
producing the sequence: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, throughout the experiment. Another 
elimination factor was the speed at which participants generated the random numbers. 
Participants were instructed to keep to one number per second. We calculated their 
articulation rate by predicting the number of digits that would have been generated in 
the task assuming an articulation rate of 1 per second. We then divided this number by 
the actual number of digits generated throughout the experiment.  The criterion for 
eliminating participants was to remove those that took longer than two seconds per 
number; however no participants were eliminated on these grounds. 
2.3.2 Results  
A total of seven participants were removed (N = 67), six for scoring below chance on 
the conflict problems and one for producing a deliberate sequence of numbers and poor 
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randomness scores. The accuracy data was Arcsine transformed and outliers were 
removed from the latency data. A mixed design ANOVA was carried out on the 
2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 3(RNG/AS/Control) mixed design. 
Accuracy scores revealed no main effect of instruction; F(1, 64) = .973, p = .328, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .015, indicating no significant difference between belief and logic judgments (85% 
vs. 87%), but there was a main effect of problem type; F(1, 64) = 50.555, p < .001, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .441, showing poorer performance on conflict items (81% vs. 90%). Load 
generated a significant main effect; F(3, 64) = 17.097, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .348, and post hoc 
analysis using LSD correction revealed significant differences in mean accuracy scores 
between the RNG and AS condition (p = .018), between the RNG and Control condition 
(p < .001) and a significant difference between the AS and the Control condition (p 
= .001). The means suggest that RNG was producing the greatest reduction in accuracy 
scores (meanRNG = 78%, meanAS = 85%, meanControl = 93%).  
There was no interaction between instruction and problem type; F(1, 64) = .697, p 
= .407, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .011, but there was a significant interaction between instruction and 
load; F(2, 64) = 5.679, p = .005, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  =.151 (see Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4 
Average Accuracy and Latency scores for Conflict and No-conflict Problems under 
Belief and Logic Instruction, across 3 Conditions. Result exclude below chance scores 
and include correct only latencies. Experiment 2: RNG (N = 21), AS (N=22), Control 
(N = 24)  
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
______________________ 
 
 Conflict          No-conflict 
 
   Logic Instructions 
   _____________________ 
 
    Conflict        No-conflict 
 
Overall 
Means 
RNG 
Response  
Accuracy (%) 
 
73 
 
85 
 
74 
 
81 
 
78 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 
 
4,391 3,960 3,605 3,623 3,895 
AS      
Response  
Accuracy (%) 78 89 82 90 85 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 
 
3,891 3,434 3,481 3,333 3,535 
Control      
Response  
Accuracy (%) 87 96 92 98 93 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 
 
4,182 3,648 3,731 3,534 3,774 
Mean 
Accuracy (%) 
(across each cell) 
 
 
79 
 
90 
 
 
83 
 
90 
 
Mean 
Latency (ms) 
(across each cell) 
4,155 3,681 3,606 3,497  
 
In order to determine between which groups the instruction by load interaction 
occurred, we reviewed two groups at a time using a repeated measures ANOVA. 
First comparing RNG with AS, the results revealed a main effect of load; F(2, 41) 
= 4.768, p = .036, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .102; with the RNG group producing poorer accuracy 
scores than the AS group (78% vs. 85%).  There was also a marginally significant 
interaction between instruction and load; F(1, 41) = 2.932, p = .094, 𝛈𝐩
𝟐  = .067, 
revealing that performance was better for logic-based judgments in the AS 
condition compared to those generating random numbers.  An independent sample 
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t-test on instruction confirmed that the significant difference between the AS and 
RNG condition was for logic instruction; t(41) = 2.234, p  < .05,  AS (M = 86.1, SD 
= .123), RNG (M = 77.8, SD = .124) compared to no difference for belief 
instruction; t(41) = 1.055, p = .298,  AS (M = 83.4, SD = .141), RNG (M = 79, SD 
= .14).  
Comparing RNG to the Control group, the outcomes were comparable, showing a 
main effect of load; F(2, 43) = 52.089, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .548, with performance 
accuracy significantly better in the control condition and a significant  interaction 
between instruction and load; F(1, 43) = 4.690, p = .036, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .098, again 
indicating that RNG had a greater effect on logic (78% RNG vs. 95% control) than 
belief (79% RNG vs. 92% control). Follow up analysis revealed that scores in the 
RNG group differed significantly from the control group, for both logic judgments; 
t(44) = 6.604, p < .001, RNG (M = 76.9, SD = .124), Control (M = 95.0, SD 
= .047) and belief judgments; t(44) = 4.020, p  < .01, RNG (M = 78.9, SD = .134), 
Control (M = 91.7, SD = .073). Finally, comparison between AS and the Control 
group produced a main effect of load; F(2, 44) = 10.218, p = .003, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .188; 
establishing better accuracy scores when no load was applied, whilst the absence of 
instruction by load interaction confirmed that the effect of articulation on 
performance did not vary as a function of instruction. In other words, there was no 
significant difference between instruction type for the Control and AS group, 
implicating RNG as having the main impact on instruction. All remaining 
interactions were not significant (all p’s > .10).  
A repeated measures ANOVA on correct response latency data uncovered a main 
effect of instruction; F(1, 64) = 11.779,  p = .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .155, with belief 
judgements taking longer than logic judgments (3,918ms vs. 3,551ms). There was a 
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main effect of problem type; F(1, 64) = 9.098, p = .004, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .124, with conflict 
problems taking longer (3,880ms vs. 3,589ms) but curiously there was no main 
effect of load; F(2, 64) = 1.148, p  = .324, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .035, suggesting that irrespective 
of the level of load imposed, there was no significant difference in response times. 
Finally, the only significant interaction was between instruction and problem type; 
F(1, 64) = 4.286, p = .042, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .063, revealing that the effect of conflict was 
greater on beliefs (4,155ms conflict vs. 3,681ms no-conflict) than on logic judgments 
(3,606ms conflict vs. 3,497ms no-conflict) (see Appendix C for full data sets). 
2.3.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we examined the impact of RNG on reasoning performance under 
belief and logic instruction. A secondary load more demanding of the executive 
components of WM produced the main effect we expected on overall accuracy scores. 
The results revealed a significant difference between the three conditions for their 
accuracy scores under belief and logic instructions; more specifically that there was no 
difference in accuracy on belief judgments between RNG and AS conditions, but there 
was a difference on logic judgments. However, although the comparison between the 
Control and the RNG condition revealed an interaction between load and instruction 
there was a significant difference for both types of judgment. Taken together these 
findings suggest that although there is some impact of RNG on belief judgments it has 
its greatest effect on logical judgments.  
Experiment 1 revealed no effect of the dot memory task on the reasoning data whilst 
Experiment 2 establishes RNG as having its greatest effect on the ability to reason 
under logic instruction more so than belief. This finding is consistent with the DI model 
(see Figure 2.1) that suggests logic judgments are more demanding of Type 2 
processing and involve more cognitive effort than judgments requiring a belief based 
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response, thus, logic judgments are affected to a greater extent by the taxing secondary 
load. This is surprising given that belief judgments take longer and are influenced to a 
similar (in Experiment 2) or greater degree (Experiment 1) by conflict. An important 
question is how we reconcile these two apparently contradictory findings?  
 
One potential explanation for the results concerns the presentation of the reasoning 
problems, and how it could be making logic judgments harder to solve. Take the 
following conditional statement:  
If a child is crying then it is happy (Major Premise) 
Participants are first presented with the major premise, which disappears when they 
press the space bar to reveal the categorical premise and conclusion:  
The child is crying (Categorical Premise) 
Is the child sad? (Conclusion) 
Reasoning on the basis of logic, requires the integration of information from the major 
premise with the categorical information of the second premise and then the evaluation 
of the conclusion. When participants are asked to evaluate the validity of a conclusion, 
they are expected to have retained and subsequently recall the information from the 
major premise, creating extra demands on WM; whereas reasoning on the basis of 
beliefs requires integration of information from the categorical premise with that 
presented in the conclusion which always remains on the screen. Consequently, the 
greater effect of RNG on logic judgments could be the result of participants forgetting 
the first premise which is only problematic when the secondary task taxes heavily on 
WM resources. In order to determine whether RNG impedes on logical reasoning by 
interfering with the WM process of integrating premise information or whether 
participant are failing to remember the information presented in the major premise, in 
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Experiment 3 we modify the procedure, such that the first premise always remains on 
the screen.  
2.4 Experiment 3 
In the previous experiment judgments based on the validity of the argument required 
retention of the information presented in the major premise, after it disappeared from 
the screen, and the subsequent recall of that information when answering the question. 
For belief based questions only the categorical premise and conclusion are required for 
judgment, which remained on the screen throughout response generation. Consequently, 
the outcomes from Experiment 2, implying that RNG had more of an impact on logical 
inferences, could be explained by the added WM load of remembering and recalling the 
major premise. To investigate this possibility the following experiment will keep the 
major premise on the screen in each trial which will limit the memory requirement 
under logical instruction in order to match the WM load in each condition.  
The results from Experiment 2 showed that carrying out a secondary task such as 
articulatory suppression (AS) was more challenging than completing the primary task 
alone, as in the control condition. However, the accuracy scores between the two groups 
confirmed that articulation was not responsible for the effects observed and did not 
impact differentially on performance. Therefore we include RNG and the Control 
condition for comparison in Experiment 3 and remain interested in determining whether 
the secondary load will have its greatest impact on belief or logic judgments.   
2.4.1 Method  
 
Participants  
A total of 76 paid participants took part in Experiment 3, 45 were female and 31 were 
male, all of whom were paid £4 each for their time.  
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Design & Materials  
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was used where participants were randomly assigned to the 
RNG or Control condition. Each participant received the same 64 reasoning problems as 
Experiment 1 and 2. Thirty two problems were presented under belief instruction and 32 
under logic instructions (Instruction type), consisting of conclusions that were valid and 
unbelievable or invalid and believable (Conflict) or conclusions that were valid and 
believable or invalid and unbelievable (No-conflict) (see experiment 1 for details).  
 
Reasoning Task:  
In each trial the major premise was presented on the computer screen for a total of 
3000ms and remained on the screen to ensure participants had enough time to read and 
understand it before the categorical premise, conclusion and response options were 
presented.  
Random Number Generation 
We used the same procedure as Experiment 2.  
Procedure 
The same instructions and materials as Experiment 2 were used, but this time 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Random Number 
Generation or the Control condition. 
Analysing Randomness  
 
The RGCalc program (Towse & Neil, 1998) was used to analyse randomness (see 
experiment 2). 
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2.4.2 Results 
We removed the data from 18 participants, three for taking longer than two seconds to 
generate numbers and 15 for scoring below chance on the conflict problems (i.e. less 
than 50% accurate).  In total five were removed from the Control condition (N = 30) 
and 13 from the RNG condition (N = 28) giving a total of N = 58. All accuracy data 
was Arcsine transformed and outliers were removed from the latency data. Only correct 
responses were recorded and exclude the 3000ms presentation time of premise 1. Any 
missing data was replaced with the overall cell mean for latency scores (the full data 
sets are presented in Appendix C).   
A 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(RNG/Control) mixed design ANOVA 
on the accuracy scores revealed a main effect of instruction; F(1, 56) = 14.460, p 
< .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .205, with logic judgments producing the most accurate scores across both 
conditions (90% vs. 84%).  There was a main effect of problem type; F(1, 56) = 54.650, 
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .494, showing poorer performance on conflict items (81% vs. 94%). 
There was also a marginal main effect of condition; F(2, 56) = 3.874, p = .054, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
= .065, which showed that RNG had an overall effect on performance compared to the 
control condition (84% vs. 90%). However, there was no interaction between 
instruction and condition; F(1, 56) = .019, p = .891, 𝜂𝑝
2   < .001, showing that RNG did 
not impact on logic judgments (88% RNG vs. 92% control) more so than belief judgments 
(81% RNG vs. 87% control). The remaining interactions were not significant (all 
p’s > .10).  
For the latency scores there was no main effect of instruction; F(1, 56) = .000, p = .992, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .000, but conflict problems took longer to complete than no-conflict problems 
(7,360ms vs. 6,923ms) producing a significant main effect of problem type; F(1, 56) = 
5.661, p = .021, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .092. There was a main effect of condition; F(2, 56) = 17.579, p 
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< .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .239, demonstrating a significant increase in latency scores when 
participants were engaged in RNG (8,375ms vs. 5,907ms). There was an interaction 
between instruction and problem type, F(1, 56) = 8.414, p  = .005, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .131, which 
follow up analysis revealed that the impact of conflict was significant for belief 
judgments; F(1, 56) = 14.896, p  < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .210, but not logic judgments; F(1, 56) 
= .065, p  = .799, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .001. However, instructions did not interact with condition; F(1, 
56) = .920, p  = .341, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .016, therefore latencies for both belief and logic judgments 
were comparable across both conditions.  Finally, none of the remaining interactions 
were significant (all p’s > .10). 
Table 2.5 
Average Accuracy and Latency scores for Belief and Logic Instructions across both 
Conditions. Result exclude below chance scores and include correct only latencies. 
Experiment 3: RNG (N = 28), Control (N = 30). 
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
______________________ 
 
 Conflict            No-conflict 
 
   Logic Instructions 
   ______________________ 
 
      Conflict         No-conflict 
 
Overall 
Means 
RNG 
Response  
Accuracy (%) 
 
70 
 
91 
 
82 
 
93 
 
84 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 8,813 7,643 8,219 8,826 8,375 
 
Control 
     
Response  
Accuracy (%) 82 92 87 97 90 
Latency Scores 
(ms) 
 
6,505 5,509 5,903 5,711 5,907 
Mean 
Accuracy (%) 
(across each cell) 
 
 
76 
 
92 
 
 
85 
 
95 
 
Mean 
Latency (ms) 
(across each cell) 
7,659 6,576 7,061 7,269  
* RNG = Random Number Generation 
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2.4.3 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 showed that RNG had its greatest impact on logic based 
judgments. In order to establish whether this finding was the result of increased WM 
demands affecting logic based reasoning, Experiment 3 kept the major premise on the 
screen whilst participants completed each trial. This alteration controlled for the 
possibility that forgetting the information presented in premise one hindered logical 
performance under RNG conditions.  
The findings in Experiment 3 demonstrated that even though overall accuracy scores 
were poorer in the RNG group, the secondary load did not differentially impact 
instruction type, as indicated by the absence of an interaction between instruction and 
condition. Currently, this suggests that simple MP inferences under both belief and 
logic instruction require some form of effortful processing, thereby contesting a DI 
interpretation of the findings. The general discussion will consider the implication of 
these findings with respect to the PC account.  
 
2.5 General Discussion  
The main objective of this chapter was to investigate the effect of a secondary load on 
reasoning performance when participants were required to make judgments based on 
logic or beliefs. Our aim was to examine the extent to which belief based judgments 
require effortful processing and evaluate the basic principles of the Default 
Interventionist (DI) account (see Figure 2.1), which claims that beliefs are triggered by 
default (Evans, 2006). The effect of secondary load would help us identify whether, 
belief, logic or both require effortful, Type 2 processing.  
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Experiment 1 broadly replicated the findings presented by Handley, Newstead and 
Trippas (2011) and concluded that overall performance on belief judgments was less 
accurate and look longer than logic judgments and that belief-logic conflict had a 
greater impact on the believability of the conclusion. However, we failed to replicate De 
Neys (2006) work which demonstrated that a dot memory task increased the effect of 
belief-bias with syllogistic inferences. These conflicting results may be due to the visuo-
spatial attributes of the memory task and the strategies used to reason with syllogistic 
inferences. Mental model theory assumes that syllogisms are mentally represented 
within spatially structured models (Friedman et al., 2008) and there is evidence to 
suggest that they are visuo-spatial in nature (Friedman et al., 2006). This could explain 
the effectiveness of a spatially demanding secondary task in De Neys’ research. In 
addition, other research has demonstrated that some people apply spatial strategies when 
reasoning with syllogisms, whilst others employ verbal strategies (Bacon, Handley & 
Newstead 2003; Ford, 1995). If participants where predominately spatial reasoners in 
De Neys study then a dot memory task would have been adequately demanding on 
syllogistic performance.  
In addition, Reverberi et al. (2010) suggest that syllogistic reasoning involves 
qualitatively different cognitive processes to conditional “if p then q” arguments. 
Through research on brain activation during the information integration stage associated 
with the second premise, they showed that the processes recruited when reasoning 
syllogistically were not engaged by conditional reasoning. Therefore, another 
explanation for the lack of effect of load could be that the dot memory task taps into 
distinct executive functions to those required for solving conditional inferences. In 
effect the task could have drawn heavily on visuo-spatial components, affecting 
syllogistic reasoning rather than the executive components required for conditional 
inferences such as verbal working memory (Handley et al., 2002). Consequently, the 
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lack of overlap between the primary and secondary task could have resulted in limited 
taxation of WM resources resulting in the absence of an effect of load (Logie, 1986; 
Logie & Marchetti, 1991).  
In both Experiments 2 and 3 we used a Random Number Generation task (RNG) for its 
well established capacity to engage the central executive element of WM and its ability 
to interfere with conditional reasoning (Meiser, Klauer & Naumer, 2001). In 
Experiment 2 we observed that differential memory demands of each judgment, as a 
consequence of the first premise disappearing, could have explained the selective 
impact of RNG on logic judgments. Consequently, in Experiment 3 we controlled for 
this by keeping the major premise on the screen throughout the reasoning process which 
produced an overall effect of load on accuracy. These findings demonstrate that RNG 
impacts equally on both types of judgments, suggesting they both require some form of 
effortful processing. Furthermore, the results are inconsistent with the DI account of 
reasoning that suggests belief judgments are fast, Type 1 processes, given that they are 
affected by cognitive load and take longer to process than logic judgments.  
One of the assumptions made at the beginning of this chapter, based on Handley et al.’s 
findings, was that both belief and logic based responses are triggered simultaneously but 
logic completes first (see Figure 2.2). The logical response then requires inhibiting in 
order for a belief based output to complete. Consequently, if RNG impacts on the 
cognitive resources required to inhibit logical responses then load would have had its 
greatest impact on belief judgments. The results from Experiment 3 revealed an equal 
impact of load, suggesting Type 2 processing under both instructional sets. However 
belief judgments were more prone to error and generally took longer to complete which 
may suggest distinct executive resources required for belief and logic based reasoning. 
According to the PC model, belief judgments require inhibition resources to supress fast 
completing responses based on logical validity, but it is also possible that logic 
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judgments require some reflective Type 2 processing such as premise integration, model 
construction and conclusion generation.  
This chapter used simple Modus Ponens (MP) arguments because they allow us to 
evaluate the extent to which belief-logic conflict impacts on logical or belief based 
judgments. However, it has been argued that MP is an intuitively direct deductive 
inference that can be triggered by subliminal stimuli and carried out automatically, even 
without instruction (Reverberi, Burigo & Cherubini, 2009; Reverberi, Pischedda, 
Burigo & Cherubini, 2012; Rips, 1988; 1994). The current findings do not support MP 
implicit nature since RNG impacted on overall performance in Experiment 3. However, 
the effect of secondary load was marginal therefore it is important to extend these 
findings to more complex arguments that are claimed not to be drawn automatically 
(Reverberi et al., 2012). 
Another possible explanation for the marginal effect of load and the higher logic scores 
produced in Experiment 3 is that participants were not engaging in formal deductive 
reasoning, but simply developing a shortcut strategy that allowed them to bypass the 
requirements to engage in more effortful processing; one such strategy is known as 
Matching Bias. In MP arguments a valid conclusion will be a direct match to the 
content of the consequent in the major premise. This potentially provides a shortcut for 
making a validity judgment that would not require integration of the minor premise. In 
other words, participants could have provided an accurate `valid’ response when the 
content of the first premise matched the content of the conclusion and an accurate 
`invalid’ response for mismatched content. Such a shortcut could explain why 
participants responded more rapidly under logic instructions and were only marginally 
affected by the secondary task. We discuss the suitability of disjunctive arguments for 
eliminating this matching shortcut, in the next chapter.  
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In Chapter 3 we investigate whether our findings can extend to more complex 
disjunctive inferences. Handley et al. (2011) replicated their initial findings using 
disjunctive arguments; additionally Reverberi et al. (2012) found that disjunctive 
arguments were not automatic, implying that they require more effortful processing than 
MP. Using more complex disjunctive arguments we expect to find that they are harder 
to reason with (Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992) and will produce lower 
accuracy scores over all. With regards to instruction type, we can expect that once again 
both belief and logic will be affected by the generation of random numbers. Finally, 
another key issue to be addressed in the following chapter is the extent to which 
belief/logic conflict impacts on judgments as a function of the complexity of the 
argument.  
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Chapter 3: The effect of RNG on simple and 
complex judgments. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
At the end of Chapter 2 the conclusion drawn was that simple Modus Ponens (MP) 
arguments for both belief and logic based judgments required some effortful processing. 
However, we also discussed two possible explanations for enhanced logic based 
accuracy scores that require further investigation. The first was Matching bias; a 
phenomenon documented in the selection task (Wason, 1968), connected with the 
problem of understanding implicit negation (Evans, 1972). In the selection task, 
participants are presented with four cards, each displaying one of two letters (A & D) or 
one of two number (3 & 7). The conditional rule presented to the participants is “if 
there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side of the card” and 
they are required to judge which card they need to turn over in order to determine truth 
or falsity of the rule. The correct response is A and 7, since the statement can only be 
falsified by revealing a case where an A card does not have a 3 on the other side. 
However, in the majority of cases, people ignore negation and simply match the cards 
referred to in the propositional rule (A & 7) (Evans, 1998). One possibility is that 
logical judgments can be made using a shortcut based upon this matching strategy, for 
example the following: 
If a child is crying then it is sad 
Suppose the child is crying 
Does it follow that the child is sad 
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With MP arguments a valid conclusion directly matches the content of the consequent 
in the major premise, offering a possible shortcut with logic based judgments and 
avoiding the requirement to integrate the minor premise. Furthermore, this matching 
strategy is more probable when the major premise remains on the screen as in 
Experiment 3. Disjunctions, on the other hand, do not permit this shortcut strategy, for 
example:  
Either the sky is blue or it is pink 
Suppose the sky is not pink 
Does it follow that the sky is blue 
Therefore, the first experiment in the present chapter will attempt to extend the previous 
findings by including complex disjunctives arguments.  
A second possible explanation for our findings is that logical MP inferences are drawn 
automatically (Reverberi, Burigo & Cherubini, 2009; Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo & 
Cherubini, 2012; Rips, 1988; 1994) and the possibility that they can be drawn 
automatically or by default could explain the greater effect of conflict on belief 
judgments. Reverberi et al. (2012) found that disjunctive arguments were not automatic 
and did not produce the same priming effects as MP inferences. Consequently, one 
might expect logic to interfere with beliefs for more automatic MP inferences but not 
with more complex logical arguments. The first study was also motivated by whether 
Random Number Generation (RNG) would impact on problems of increased 
complexity.  
In the previous chapter we discuss two Dual Process models of reasoning; the Default 
Interventionist (DI) model (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2) and the Parallel Competitive (PC) 
model (Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). According to the DI model, logic based judgments are 
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more demanding of Type 2 processes than belief based judgments and should be more 
affected by a secondary load. In order to explain the greater accuracy scores on logic 
judgments in Experiment 3 we could conjecture that MP arguments are drawn 
automatically (Reverberi et al., 2012) and that RNG interferes with response generation 
as opposed to the effortful process of activating a relevant inference rule. This would 
also explain why RNG impacts on belief judgments. Therefore, the DI account would 
predict that by increasing logical complexity, RNG would have its greatest impact on 
logic judgments thus encouraging belief based responses and producing the traditional 
belief-bias effect. The PC model would also predict that logic would be more impacted 
on by RNG for complex arguments but also that the bigger impact of conflict on belief 
judgments, as displayed in Experiment 3, would be reduced.  
 
3.2 Experiment 4 
In the following experiment we continue with the use of RNG as our secondary load in 
order to replicate the findings from Experiment 3 but also examine whether RNG 
impedes on performance to a greater extent when complex logical arguments are 
introduced. Moreover, we present some individual differences (ID) measures for 
additional investigation.  
Research on reasoning ability and ID has demonstrated that limitations in WM is key in 
explaining reasoning performance, with those higher in WM capacity, more proficient 
at drawing logical inferences (Capon, Handley & Dennis, 2003) and those with a higher 
WM span better equipped to use their resources to inhibit the activation of 
counterexamples when they conﬂict with the logical validity of a problem (De Neys et 
al., 2005). The degree of reasoning bias in various tasks has consistently correlated with 
individual differences, specifically cognitive ability (or general intelligence) as a result 
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of its strong association with WM capacity (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). Individuals 
with lower cognitive ability are usually more biased as a result of their limited WM 
capacity (Sá, West & Stanovich, 1999).  
Cognitive style refers to an individual’s motivation to engage in analytical processing 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012) and thus predict that those with 
a lower propensity to reason analytically will rely on less effortful, heuristic processing. 
Cognitive style can be measured using self-report questionnaires such as the Actively 
Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich & 
West, 1997; 2007) and the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005). AOT is a 
fundamental component of critical thinking, highlighting the ability to think in ways 
that support our own views as well as objectively search for alternative explanations in 
order to make impartial judgments. Thinking dispositions have been shown to correlate 
with an individual’s ability to override belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning (Macpherson 
& Stanovich, 2007; Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2002; Sá et al., 
1999; Stanovich & West, 1998a). The CRT measures an individual’s ability to suppress 
and disregard initial intuitive responses, in order to arrive at the correct, deliberated 
answer. The 3 item questionnaire is said to be a good predictor of the tendency to use 
heuristics and biases in making judgments and can explain more variance than the 
typical measures of cognitive ability, executive functioning and thinking dispositions 
(Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). For example the first of the items on the 
questionnaire reads;  
“A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?” 
The intuitive response is often 10p; however, this would mean that the bat only costs 
90p more than the ball. With further deliberation you can arrive at the correct answer 
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which is 5p, making the bat, £1.05 and £1 more expensive than the ball. Toplak et al. 
(2011) offers the CRT as a measure that can assess the inclination towards `miserly 
processing’, or the inclination to default to Type 1 processing due to its low 
computational expense (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2014).  
Experiment 4 will examine the relationship between cognitive style and ability on 
judgments made on the basis of logical validity and conclusion believability. We 
conjecture that if both belief and logic based judgments require some effortful 
processing then they should both correlate with WM measures. Furthermore, a higher 
ability to disregard an inappropriate intuitive response on the CRT should be linked 
with the instruction type that requires more effortful processing.  
3.2.1 Method  
 
Participants  
A total of 80 participants, 65 females and 15 males, took part in Experiment 4 in 
exchange for course credits.   
Design & Materials  
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was used where participants were randomly assigned to 
the RNG (Experimental) or Control condition. Each participant received 128 reasoning 
problems, both MP and disjunctive arguments (Complexity) under both belief and logic 
instructions (Instruction type), which consisted of both conflict and no-conflict 
problems (Problem type) (see Table 3.1 for more details).   
 
Reasoning Task:  
The same 64 MP conditionals from Experiment 3 were used in Experiment 4, with an 
additional 64 disjunctive arguments. The disjunctives consisted of an equal number of 
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denial inferences (see Disjunctive Type A, Table 3.1) where the categorical premise 
denies one of the components of the major premise and an equal number of affirmation 
inferences which involves confirmation of one of the components to the denial of the 
other (see Disjunctive Type B). The content of the arguments had an equal number of 
problems under belief and logic instruction and an equal number of believable or 
unbelievable, valid or invalid arguments. Thirty two of the disjunctives were presented 
under belief instruction and 32 under logic instruction. In half the arguments both belief 
and logic corresponded, in the other half they were in conflict with each other (see 
Appendix B for materials). 
Table 3.1 gives examples of conflict and no-conflict arguments associated with 
disjunctive Type A and B. The use of both denial and affirmation inferences ensures 
that there are no confounds between the polarity of the conclusion (i.e. whether it is 
negative or affirmative) and logical validity. The number of practice trials was also 
increased to include disjunctives arguments.  
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Table 3.1 
Examples of the Disjunctive arguments used in Experiments 4.  
 
          Conflict Arguments 
 
           No-conflict Arguments 
 
Disjunctive Type A 
 
Disjunctive Type A 
 
Argument 1 
 
Argument 2 
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue Either the sea is blue or it is pink 
Suppose the sun is not yellow Suppose the sea is not pink 
Does it follow that the sun is blue? Does it follow that the sea is blue? 
Logic:      Belief:  X                                                             Logic:    Belief:   
 
Argument 3 
 
Argument 4 
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue Either the sea is blue or it is pink 
Suppose the sun is not yellow Suppose the sea is not pink 
Does it follow that the sun is not blue? Does it follow that the sea is not blue? 
Logic:  X     Belief:                                                                 Logic: X Belief:   X 
 
Disjunctive Type B 
 
Disjunctive Type B 
 
Argument 1 
 
Argument 2 
Either the sea is blue or it is pink Either the sun is yellow or it is blue 
Suppose the sea is pink Suppose the sun is yellow  
Does it follow that the sea is not blue? Does it follow that the sun is not blue? 
Logic:      Belief:  X                                                             Logic:     Belief:   
 
Argument 3 
 
Argument 4 
Either the sea is blue or it is pink Either the sun is yellow or it is blue 
Suppose the sea is pink Suppose the sun is yellow 
Does it follow that the sea is blue? Does it follow that the sun is blue? 
Logic:  X     Belief:                                                                 Logic: X Belief:   X 
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Random Number Generation 
See Chapter 2, Experiments 2 and 3 for more details.  
Measures of Individual Differences 
Although cognitive ability and cognitive style are moderately to highly correlated, and 
both predict aspects of independent variance on heuristic and biases tasks (Stanovich, 
1999), we measured both using the AH4 Group Test of General Intelligence: Part one 
(Heim, 1970) as a measure of ability and the AOT (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007) 
and CRT (Frederick, 2005) as measures of style.  
Part one of the AH4 was the only section of the test administered since this is designed 
to assess the individual’s verbal and numerical ability which correlates more with verbal 
working memory than the visuo-spatial measures of part two. Since both sections are 
highly correlated (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004)  and verbal 
working memory has been shown to correlate with conditional reasoning (Handley, 
Capon, Copp & Harper, 2002) we decided that assessing the first section would suffice 
as the relevant measure of  intelligence.  
The Active Open-Minded Thinking Scale was taken from Macpherson & Stanovich, 
(2007) which comprises of 41 items, all taken from an assortment of sources: 10 items 
from a flexible thinking scale developed by Stanovich and West (1997); nine items 
measuring dogmatism (Paulhus & Reid, 1991); eight items from the Openness-Values 
facet of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992); nine items 
from the belief identification scale developed by Sá et al. (1999); three items from the 
categorical thinking subscale of Epstein and Meier's (1989) constructive thinking 
inventory and two items from a counterfactual thinking scale developed by Stanovich 
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and West (1997). The questionnaire required participants to respond using a six-point 
Likert rating scale. 
The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) consisted of the following three questions:  
 A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost?............................... 
 If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets?............................. 
 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the lake?.................................. 
The correct answer for the bat and ball problem, is 5 pence, because the bat costs £1 
more than the ball (i.e., the bat costs £1.05 and the ball costs 5p). In the widget problem, 
the correct response is five minutes and for the lily pads problem the correct answer is 
47. Those who fail to engage in the small amount of effortful processing required to 
arrive at the right response, often give one or all of the following responses; 10p, 100 
minutes and 24 days. 
Analysing Individual differences: 
 
Participants who scored at or above the median AH4 score of 42 were assigned to the 
high cognitive ability group (n =37), the remaining participants were assigned to the 
low ability group (n = 35). The same method was applied to the AOT scale, with those 
scoring 176 or above as the highly open-minded group (n = 38) and those below in the 
low open-minded group (n = 34). Finally, for the CRT task those that scored one or 
more out of three were assigned to the High CRT group (n = 29) and those that failed to 
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give a correct answer were assigned to the Low CRT group  (n = 43) (see Appendix B 
for ID materials). 
Participants  
Participants were tested in maximum groups of four and were randomly assigned to 
either the Control condition or Random Number Generation condition. Each participant 
was administered the AH4 test and given 10 minutes to complete the task. They then 
proceeded with the computer based reasoning task using the same instructions as 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 2) with additional practice trials containing disjunctive 
arguments (see Table 3.1). On completion of the reasoning task, they were asked to 
complete the AOT scale followed by the CRT, both of which were presented in paper 
format under no time restraints.  
3.2.2 Results 
 
Consistent with previous experiments, we eliminated those that scored 50% or below on 
the conflict items for both the RNG and Control condition. We also removed 
participants that took longer than two seconds on average to generate random numbers 
on the basis that they were not adequately engaged in the secondary task. In total, 13 
participants were eliminated, three for exceeding an average of two seconds per number 
generation and two for producing stereotyped sequences which gave a total of N = 31 
for the RNG condition and N = 36 for the Control condition. 
A 2(Belief/Logic) x 2 (Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2 (MP/Disjunctives) x 2 (RNG/Control) 
mixed design ANOVA was carried out on accuracy measures which were Arcsine 
transformed. The analysis showed a main effect of instruction (Belief/Logic); F(1, 65) = 
19.266, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .229, with logic judgments producing the most accurate scores 
across both groups (87% vs. 81%). There was a main effect of problem type 
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(Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 65) = 66.225, p <.001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .505, with poorer performance 
on conflict items compared to no-conflict items (78% vs. 90%). There was also a main 
effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 65) = 43.964, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .403, where 
MP produced higher accuracy scores than disjunctive judgments (87% vs. 81%) and a 
main effect of condition; F(2, 65) = 13.193, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .169, demonstrating that 
accuracy was lower under load (80% vs. 88%). However, load did not significantly 
interact with instruction; F(1, 65) = 1.968, p = .165, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .029. 
There was also an interaction between instruction and problem type; F(1, 65) = 20.278, 
p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .239, showing that there was a bigger impact of conflict on belief 
problems (72 % conflict vs. 90 % no-conflict) than logic problems (84% conflict vs. 90% no-
conflict). Follow up analysis was carried out to establish if the effects held for both 
arguments types and results revealed that for MP, instruction and problem type 
significantly interacted; F(1, 65)  =  9.613, p  = .003, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .129, with a bigger impact of 
conflict under belief instruction, which was also confirmed for disjunctive judgments; 
F(1, 65) = 22.868, p  < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .260. Mean accuracy scores can be found in Table 
3.2. Finally there was a significant interaction between complexity and problem type; 
F(1, 65) = 10.962, p  = .002, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .144, showing that the difference between conflict 
and no-conflict problems is larger for MP (80% conflict vs. 93% no-conflict) than 
disjunctives (76 % conflict vs. 86 % no-conflict). No other interactions were significant (all 
p’s > .05). 
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Table 3.2 
Average Accuracy and Latency scores across both groups for Belief and Logic 
Instructions, in each Problem Type, for MP and Disjunctive arguments. Experiment 4: 
RNG (N = 31), Control (N = 36). 
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
_____________________ 
 
 Conflict          No-conflict 
 
   Logic Instructions 
    ___________________ 
 
 Conflict          No-conflict 
 
Overall Means 
RNG - MP 
Average Response (%) 
 
68 
 
91 
 
81 
 
91 
 
83 
Latency Scores (ms) 7,747 7,517 7,898 7,376 7,635 
 
Control - MP 
     
Average Response (%) 79 94 90 97 90 
Latency Scores (ms) 5,327 5,515 6,398 5,295 5,634 
 
RNG - Disjunctives 
Average Response (%) 
 
64 
 
84 
 
77 
 
79 
 
76 
Latency Scores (ms) 9,443 9,518 9,652 8,945 9,390 
 
Control - 
Disjunctives 
Average Response (%) 
 
 
75 
 
 
89 
 
 
88 
 
 
92 
 
 
86 
Latency Scores (ms) 7,431 7,552 6,878 6,781 7,161 
 
Mean Accuracy (%) 
(across each cell) 
 
72 
 
90 
 
84 
 
90 
 
      
Mean       
Latency (ms) 
(across each cell) 
7,487 7,526 7,707 7,099  
  
   
 
As in chapter 2, outliers were removed from the latency scores and missing data 
accounted for no more than 4% of the overall data in this chapter.  A mixed design 
ANOVA was carried out, which produced no main effect of instruction (Belief/Logic); 
F(1, 65) = .808, p = .372, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .012, and no main effect of problem type (Conflict/No-
Conflict); F(1, 65) = 2.611, p = .111, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .039. There was however, a significant main 
effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 65) = 66.329, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .505, and a 
main effect of condition;  F(2, 65) = 21.506, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .049, confirming that 
disjunctive judgments take longer to solve than MP (8,276ms vs. 6,635ms) and that 
participants take significantly longer to produce responses when engaged in a secondary 
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task (8,513ms-RNG vs. 6,398ms-Control). The analysis did not produce any significant 
interactions for the latency scores (all p’s > .05). 
Accuracy scores on the ID measures were collapsed across both the experimental and 
control conditions. We only report significant main effects and interactions between 
experimental variables and ID measures and only excluded those that scored 50% or 
below on conflict items of the reasoning task, since performance on the secondary task 
was not relevant for this analysis. Between subject analyses was carried out on high and 
low groups for each ID measure which produced the following results: a significant 
main effect of AH4;  F(2, 70) = 9.607, p = .003, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .121, with the high AH4 group 
performing better (88%) than the low group (79%) and a significant interaction between 
instruction and AH4; F(1, 70) = 4.004, p = .049, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .054, indicating that there was a 
larger difference between high and low cognitive ability for logic judgments (92% high 
vs. 82% low) compared to belief judgments (84% high vs. 77% low) (see Table 3.3).  
Similarly the results from the CRT measure produced a significant interaction between 
instruction and CRT; F(2, 70) = 4.024, p = .049, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .054, showing a bigger difference 
between the high and low groups for logic judgments (90% high vs. 85% low) compared 
to belief judgments (80% high vs. 81% low) but there was no main effect of CRT; F(2, 
70) = .409, p  = .524, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .006. There was also a marginally significant interaction 
between problem type and CRT; F(2, 70) = 3.235, p=.076, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .044, with less of an 
effect of conflict in the high group (81% conflict vs. 90% no-conflict) compared to the low 
group (77% conflict vs. 90% no-conflict) (see Table 3.4). The results suggest that high CRT 
scorers perform better on logic based judgments and separate analysis on the high and 
low groups revealed that the difference between conflict and no-conflict items was 
larger for the low CRT group. This could imply that those who score high on the CRT 
measure have a more accomplished ability to reason based on the logical structure of an 
 94 
 
argument. Finally, there was no main effect of open-mindedness; F(2, 70) = 1.551, p 
= .217, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .022, and no significant interactions with AOT for accuracy scores, nor did 
the latencies significantly interact with any ID measure (see Appendix C for full data 
sets).  
Table 3.3 
Average Accuracy scores for Belief and Logic Instructions on Conflict and No-conflict 
items across High and Low AH4. Results exclude below chance accuracy scores. High 
AH4 (N = 37), Low AH4 (N =35).   
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
________________________ 
 
    Conflict          No-conflict 
 
   Logic Instructions 
    ____________________ 
 
    Conflict        No-conflict 
 
Overall 
Means 
High AH4 
Average 
Response (%) 
 
75 
 
92 
 
90 
 
94 
 
88 
 
Low AH4 
     
Average 
Response (%) 69 85 78 85 79 
 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each cell) 
 
72 
 
89 
 
84 
 
90  
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Table 3.4 
Average Accuracy scores for Belief and Logic Instructions on Conflict and No-conflict 
items across High and Low CRT. Results exclude below chance accuracy scores. High 
CRT (N = 29), Low CRT (N =43).   
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
________________________ 
 
  Conflict             No-conflict 
 
   Logic Instructions 
    ____________________ 
 
    Conflict         No-conflict 
 
Overall 
Means 
High CRT 
Average 
Response (%) 
 
71 
 
89 
 
90 
 
90 
 
85 
 
Low CRT      
Average 
Response (%) 73 89 80 90 83 
 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each cell) 
 
72 
 
89 
 
85 
 
90  
      
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
In the introduction to this chapter we offered two possible explanations for greater 
accuracy on logic judgments in Experiment 3; one being a matching shortcut facilitated 
by the structure of MP arguments when instructed to reason on the basis of logic. The 
second refers to the implicit nature of MP inferences (Reverberi, Burigo & Cherubini, 
2009; Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo & Cherubini, 2012; Rips, 1988; 1994) and the 
possibility that they can be drawn by default. Research indicates that disjunctive 
arguments do not complete automatically (Reverberi et al., 2012) nor is any matching 
heuristic possible with these complex inferences. Therefore, if either explanation is 
responsible for the greater impact of conflict on belief judgments then the conflict 
should not arise with disjunctive arguments. Furthermore, we wanted to examine 
whether RNG would have greater impact when logical complexity was increased.  
The results revealed there was no evidence that increasing complexity reduced the 
influence of conflict on belief judgments. This is inconsistent with an explanation of 
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this effect based upon a matching strategy or the automaticity of MP inferences. The 
overall accuracy scores for logic judgments were better than belief judgments and the 
validity of the argument still had greater impact on the believability of a conclusion 
even for more complex inferences. Furthermore, the findings showed a robust effect of 
the secondary load for both disjunctive and conditional arguments under both sets of 
instructions. Again this suggests that belief based judgments are not available by 
default, contrary to the DI model, and both belief and logic inferences require effortful 
processing that pull on executive resources.  
However, higher scores on both the CRT and AH4 tasks were associated with more 
accurate performance under logical instructions, whilst there was a smaller difference 
for belief based judgments. It is important to note that these effects were small, but 
nevertheless they suggest that cognitive ability and cognitive style are most strongly 
related to logical reasoning. One possibility is that distinct executive resources are 
required under different instructional conditions. In the general discussion we will 
consider the implications of these findings in more detail. 
A characteristic of the experimental task is that participants are often required to switch 
from trial to trial between responses based upon logic or beliefs. There is good 
experimental evidence that task switching is demanding of executive resources 
(Monsell, 2003). One possibility is that RNG impacts upon performance because of this 
task switching requirement. In Experiment 5 we manipulate instructions in a blocked 
design in order to evaluate the influence of RNG under belief and logic instruction 
where there is no requirement to switch between response types. A blocked design also 
allows an evaluation of performance on the secondary task as a function of the primary 
task requirements. This is important given that participants will often sacrifice 
performance on one task in favour of maintaining performance on the other (Gilhooly, 
Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, 1993; Gilhooly, Logie & Wynn, 2002; Phillips, 1999). One 
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possibility is that the trade-off between the primary and secondary tasks differs as a 
function of the specific instructional requirements.   
 
3.3 Experiment 5 
Task switching or shifting is an executive function defined by our ability to disengage 
from an irrelevant task and subsequently actively engage in a relevant task (Miyake et 
al., 2000). Others argue that shifting should be defined as our ability to perform a new 
operation in the face of proactive interference having performed a different operation on 
the same stimuli (Allport & Wylie, 2000). Either way, shifting between mental states is 
considered an important aspect of executive control required for adequate performance 
on executive tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, shifting has shown to sustain considerable temporal costs (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). Consequently, switching between two instructional sets could be 
impacting on both accuracy and latency scores. Therefore Experiment 5 aims to control 
for this possibility, by administering a blocked design. This would eliminate switching 
demands and also allow us to interpret performance on the secondary task by analysing 
the randomness data for each condition. The design should provide a clearer indication 
of the impact RNG has on reasoning performance and allow us to examine the impact of 
logic and belief judgments on RNG performance.  
3.3.1 Method  
 
Participants  
Fifty one females and 20 male participants took part, in exchange for course credits.  
Design & Materials  
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A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed blocked design was used where participants were randomly 
assigned to belief-first or logic-first blocks within the RNG or Control condition. Each 
participant received the 128 reasoning problems from Experiment 4, both MP and 
disjunctive arguments (Complexity) under both belief and logic instructions (Instruction 
type), which consisted of both conflict and no-conflict problems (Problem type).  
 
Reasoning Task:  
A blocked design was used, whereby the 128 problems from Experiment 4, were 
separated into 4 blocks of 32 arguments. Each block consisted of 16 MP arguments and 
16 disjunctives; in two of the blocks participants received belief instructions only and 
two of the blocks logic instructions only. For a belief block, 16 conclusions required a 
believable response and 16 an unbelievable response. For a logic block, 16 conclusions 
required a valid response and 16 an invalid response. Each participant was presented 
with two belief blocks and two logic blocks but they were randomly allocated to belief-
first or logic-first for both RNG and Control groups. The belief-first group were 
presented with block one under belief instruction, block two under logic instruction, 
block three under belief instruction and block four logic instruction; for the logic-first 
groups, the reverse applied.  
Random Number Generation 
The RGCalc program was used to analyse the randomness of the numbers generated by 
each participant (see Experiment 2 & 3, Chapter 2 for more details). Since we were 
measuring randomness and articulation speed as a dependant measure, we did not 
exclude participants for being too slow or for poor randomness scores.  
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Procedure 
Before starting the reasoning task, each participant was required to generate a baseline 
set of random numbers for a total of five minutes.  These sets of numbers provided a 
baseline measure of the randomness indices that could be compared against each 
experimental block. The control groups were also asked to provide a baseline measure 
but only as a way of ensuring both conditions (RNG and Control) started the reasoning 
questions at the same level of cognitive fatigue following the five minute task. The five 
minute interval was based on previous analysis demonstrating that without a secondary 
load, participants would take an average of five minutes to complete 32 questions, 
which was the number of problems allocated to each experimental block. 
The instructions were altered to incorporate the baseline measure for each participant. A 
five minute timer was built into the computer program which would automatically 
instruct the participants to stop counting when the time was up and proceed to the next 
part of the experiment.  
3.3.2 Results 
 
As in Experiment 4, we eliminated those that scored 50% or below on the conflict items 
for both the RNG and Control condition. A total of 10 participants were eliminated, six 
from the RNG group and four from the Control group, which gave a total of N = 30 in 
the RNG condition and N = 31 in the Control condition.  
Randomness Data  
We looked at the overall randomness indices across the three` primary task’ conditions 
(belief instruction, logic instruction and baseline). To compare the three independent 
variables of randomness a MANOVA was carried out to control for type 1 error.  
Results showed a significant difference in randomness indices based on the primary 
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task; F(6, 208) = 5.386, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .136. Separate ANOVAs indicated that the 
primary task had a statistically significant effect on Redundancy scores; F(2, 105) = 
17.316,  p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .248, but not on Adjacency scores; F(2, 105) = .458, p = .634, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .009 or RNG scores; F(2, 105) = .024, p = .976, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  < .001. Post hoc analysis 
showed that the significant difference for Redundancy scores was between baseline and 
logic instruction (p < .001) and baseline and belief instruction (p < .001) but not 
between belief and logic instruction (p = .673). The Adjacency and RNG scores were 
not significantly different across the three primary tasks. Therefore, the randomness 
data demonstrated RNG performance was equivalent across the two instructional 
conditions and that the primary task impacted upon performance on the secondary task. 
Accuracy Data 
Overall analysis; Block 1 to 4:  
A mixed design ANOVA on Arcsine transformed accuracy scores uncovered a main 
effect of instruction (Belief/Logic); F(1, 59) = 14.359, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .196, confirming 
that performance was better under logic instruction (88% vs. 82%).  There was a main 
effect of problem type (Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 59) = 40.138, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .405, 
showing poorer performance on conflict items (80% vs. 90%). There was a main effect 
of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 59) = 22.195, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .273, with MP 
producing higher accuracy rates (87% vs. 83%) and a main effect of condition; F(2, 59) 
= 8.525, p  = .005, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .126, with RNG reducing accuracy scores (81% vs. 89%): 
replicating all the main effects of Experiment 4.  
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Table 3.5  
Block 1 – 4: Average Accuracy and Latency scores, across both groups, for Belief and 
Logic Instructions in each Problem Type, for MP and Disjunctive arguments. Results 
exclude below chance scores and include correct only latencies. Experiment 5: RNG (N 
= 30), Control (N = 31).  
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief 
Instructions 
  MP-c   MP-nc 
 
Belief 
Instructions 
    D-c     D-nc 
 
Logic 
Instructions 
  MP-c   MP-nc 
 
Logic  
Instructions 
     D-c     D-nc 
 
 
Over all 
Means 
RNG 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency Score 
(ms) 
 
 
74 
 
5,460 
 
 
 
87 
 
5,191 
 
 
70 
 
6,858 
 
 
84 
 
6,743 
 
 
82 
 
5,644 
 
 
 
90 
 
6,408 
 
 
77 
 
7,672 
 
 
80 
 
8,185 
 
 
81 
 
6,520 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency Score 
(ms) 
 
 
78 
 
4,263 
 
 
 
94 
 
3,962 
 
 
75 
 
5,841 
 
 
92 
 
5,350 
 
 
91 
 
4,511 
 
 
 
97 
 
4,263 
 
 
90 
 
5,775 
 
 
95 
 
5,596 
 
 
89 
 
4,945 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each 
cell) 
 
Mean  
Latency (ms) 
(across each cell) 
 
76 
 
 
4,861 
 
91 
 
 
4,577 
 
73 
 
 
6,350 
 
88 
 
 
6,047 
 
87 
 
 
5,078 
 
94 
 
 
5,336 
 
84 
 
 
6,724 
 
88 
 
 
6,891 
 
 
 
There was also an interaction between instruction and problem type; F(2, 59) = 9.778, p 
= .003, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .142, again demonstrating how the belief/logic conflict had more of an 
impact on judgments concerning the believability of the conclusion (74 % B-conflict vs. 
90 % B-no-conflict) rather than its validity (85% L-conflict vs. 91% L-no-conflict). 
However, RNG had a larger impact on logic based judgments (82% RNG vs. 93% control) 
compared to belief based judgments (79% RNG vs. 85% control), as indicated by the 
instruction by condition interaction; F(2, 59) = 7.295, p = .009, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .110. Follow up 
analysis revealed that the effect was only significant under logic instruction; F(2, 59) = 
15.874, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .212, compared to belief instruction; F(2, 59) = 1.981, p = .165, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .032. In order to eliminate practice effects as a possible explanation for the absence 
of load impact on belief judgments, we carried out separate analysis on both instructions 
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for earlier (1 & 2) and later blocks (3 & 4). Results revealed a marginal effect of RNG 
on the earlier blocks; F(2, 59) = 2.943, p = .092, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .048 and no effect in the later 
blocks; F(2, 59) = 2.363, p = .130, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .039, for belief based judgments, whereas the 
effect of RNG was present under logic instruction in both the earlier block; F(2, 59) = 
12.120, p = .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .170 and later blocks; F(2, 59) = 13.722, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .189. 
This suggests that the absence of an effect of load on belief judgments cannot be 
explained by belief judgments becoming more automatic over time, thus confirming 
that RNG has its greatest impact on logic judgments.  
Latency Data 
Overall analysis; Block 1 to 4:  
Analysis carried out on correct only response latencies produced a main effect of 
instruction (Belief/Logic); F(1, 59) = 5.786, p = .019, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .089, indicating that belief 
based judgments took less time to complete than logic based judgments (5,458ms vs. 
6,007ms), in contrast to Experiment 4. There was a main effect of complexity 
(Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 59) = 108.661, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .648, with disjunctives taking 
longer than MP judgments (6,502ms vs. 4,962ms) and a main effect of condition; F(2, 
59) = 16.596, p  < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .220, with longer latencies in the RNG group compared to 
the control group (6,520ms vs. 4,944ms). There was also an interaction between 
problem type and condition; F(1, 59) = 5.170, p = .027, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .081, which further 
analysis revealed was driven by the control condition; F(1, 30) = 5.522, p = .026, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .155, showing that conflict items took longer to complete (5,098ms) compared to 
no-conflict items (4,793ms). The difference was not significant in the RNG condition; 
F(1, 29) = 2.514 p = .124, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .080 (6,409ms conflict vs. 6,632ms no-conflict). There were 
no other interactions to report (all p’s > .05) (for full data sets see Appendix C). 
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3.3.3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 5 a blocked design was adopted in order to minimise the impact of 
switching demands on task performance. The idea was to evaluate the impact of RNG 
on the primary task independent of the requirement for participants to switch 
instructional set as a function of the response options presented. Interestingly, in line 
with Handley et al. (2011), the impact of conflict was greatest under belief instruction, 
suggesting that even when participants are aware from trial to trial that they only need 
to respond based upon the believability of the conclusion; the competing logical 
structure continues to interfere with their ability to do so. Surprisingly, given the greater 
difficulty of responding based upon beliefs, the impact of RNG was greatest under 
logical instruction. This did not arise because participants were differentially allocating 
resources across the primary and secondary tasks. Although redundancy was greater in 
the random sequences generated under secondary task conditions, there was no evidence 
that this differed across instructional conditions. One other important observation in 
Experiment 5 was that belief judgments were significantly quicker than logic judgments, 
in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2 (Chapter 2) where trials were interspersed.  
Up to this point we have reliably established that people are less accurate under belief 
instruction, however, in the current experiment belief judgments took less time than in 
previous studies and in Experiment 4 logic judgments were linked to the AH4 and CRT. 
The evidence appears to be consistent with the idea that logic judgments are in fact 
more effortful and more demanding of cognitive capacity. The question is whether there 
could be an alternative explanation for the lower accuracy scores on belief-conflict 
problems? One possible explanation for the impact of logic on beliefs concerns the 
nature of content in the problems presented and participant’s uncertainty about the 
believability of the conclusions when making belief judgments. Therefore, in order to 
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ensure that uncertainty regarding the belief status of the conclusions is not contributing 
to the error rates under belief instruction, Experiment 6 will assess the level of 
consistency in participants evaluations of the believability of the conclusions employed 
in Experiments 4 and 5.  
 
3.4 Experiment 6 
The aim of the current experiment is establish whether there are any discrepancies in the 
evaluation of conclusions with regards to the believability of its content, for MP and 
disjunctive arguments.  
3.4.1 Method  
 
Participants  
Nine females and seven male participants volunteered to take part in this short study, 
which took approximately five minutes to complete.  
3.4.2 Materials and Procedure 
 
Participants were presented with lists of stimuli consisting of information from the 32 
MP and 32 Disjunctive arguments used in Experiments 4 & 5. For example; for MP 
arguments the believability of the conclusion is a function of the believability of the 
conditional statement. Therefore, in order to check whether participants were consistent 
in judgments of believability we presented the antecedent of the conditional as a 
supposition (e.g. suppose a hamster is fed) followed by the consequent as a conclusion 
(e.g. will the hamster live?) and instructed participants to judge whether the conclusion 
was believable or unbelievable considering the supposition. From the 32 disjunctive 
problems participants were presented with a list of concluding statements only (e.g. 
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does it follow that the sun is green?) and asked whether they thought the information 
presented in the statement was believable or unbelievable (see Appendix B).  
3.4.3 Results 
 
Modus Ponens: 
Based on the 16 participants that took part in this experiment, there were a total of 512 
judgments for the conditional items presented. Half of the conclusions were used as 
believable items and half were used as unbelievable items.  
32 items x 16 participants = 512 responses  
Of the 256 unbelievable conclusions 252 were evaluated as unbelievable and the full 
256 believable conclusions were judged to be believable. Overall, this indicates that 
99.2% of judgments were answered in line with the classification of belief status of the 
conclusion used to classify responses in the experimental work.  
Disjunctives:  
For the more complex inferences, 249 of the 256 unbelievable conclusions were 
evaluated as unbelievable and 254 out of 256 were judged to be believable. The results 
show that 98% of the judgments were answered according to the responses expected in 
the experimental trials.  
3.4.4 Discussion 
 
Experiment 6 successfully demonstrates a high degree of consistency (98 – 99%) in 
belief judgments and based on these findings it appears unlikely that the results 
produced so far can be explained by uncertainty about the belief status of the 
conclusion.  
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3.5 General Discussion 
The principle objective in Experiment 4 was to discount two possible explanations for 
greater accuracy scores on logic judgments compared to belief judgments. One 
explanation concerned a possible shortcut strategy with Modus Ponens that would allow 
participants to generate a logical response by matching the content of the first premise 
with the conclusion. A second potential explanation for the impact of logical validity on 
belief judgments is that Modus Ponens inferences are drawn automatically and hence a 
conclusion is available early that then interferes with belief judgments (Reverberi, 
Burigo & Cherubini, 2009; Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo & Cherubini, 2012; Rips, 
1988; 1994).  
According to Reverberi et al., (2012) disjunctive arguments are not drawn automatically 
and no shortcut strategy can be used to complete these inferences. Consequently these 
more complex problems were introduced in Experiment 4 to evaluate these two possible 
explanations for the findings. Moreover, we were interested in whether RNG would 
interfere to a greater extent with these more complex logical arguments. The second 
objective in this chapter was to determine whether switching demands were responsible 
for the main effect of RNG in Experiment 3 and 4 and if performance on the secondary 
task would differ under belief and logic instruction.  
Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated, contrary to the DI Dual Process account, that belief 
based judgments produce more errors than logic based judgments and that conflict 
between belief and logic instruction results in a greater impact on judging the 
believability of a conclusion. There was no evidence of a differential impact of logic on 
belief based judgments between MP and disjunctive arguments. Whilst some research 
has shown that propositional inferences are made spontaneously even when unnecessary 
for text comprehension (Lea. 1995), the current findings suggest that the automaticity of 
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the argument does not explain enhanced logic based accuracy in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 4 used the same method as Experiment 3, and showed that RNG affects 
both belief and logic judgments, suggesting that both depend upon effortful processing. 
Whilst RNG did have a greater impact on the more complex disjunctive arguments, the 
impact was comparable across both instructional sets.   
Experiment 5 employed a blocked design to eliminate the possible switching demands 
on the reasoning task, which could have made judgments more challenging. Switching 
is thought to involve executive processing, requiring the activation of a new task set, the 
inhibition of a previous task set, together with the reconfiguration of task set processes 
(Monsell, 2003). Interestingly, the principle findings regarding accuracy were replicated 
in the blocked design, but RNG only impacted significantly on logic judgments. The 
blocked design also enabled us to examine the impact of the primary task on secondary 
task performance in order to determine whether the effect would differ according to 
instruction type. The results provided no evidence for this and despite RNG having a 
greater impact on logic judgments, the generation of random numbers did not 
differentiate significantly between belief and logic instruction.  
Most of the literature suggests that logic based judgments are effortful and belief 
judgments are less so; however the behavioural data we have presented suggests 
otherwise. We conjecture in accordance with the PC model (Handley et al., 2011), both 
belief and logic based judgments are activated early. The underlying structure of the 
inference is processed rapidly and a logical response is available to the reasoner earlier 
than a belief based response which requires activation of relevant knowledge and its 
integration with the conclusion. We would argue that in order to answer according to 
beliefs, a readily available logical response requires inhibition, which explains why 
conflict between belief and logic consistently results in a greater impact on judgments 
of conclusion believability.  
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How might we reconcile the behavioural data, which suggests belief judgments are most 
demanding, with the secondary task data, which shows greatest interference with logic 
judgments? In our view the data were consistent with a Type2/Type2 conflict which 
arises because of competing responses. The logical response is available early, but 
nevertheless requires participants to effortfully reason from the underlying structure of 
the presented argument. This claim is consistent with research that links reasoning from 
simple propositional arguments with measures of Cognitive Ability (see, for example, 
Newstead, et al, 2004). In contrast the belief based response is available later and 
successful responding depends upon the inhibition of an available and competing 
response. The critical feature of this account is that both types of judgment depend upon 
Type 2 processing, but rely upon distinct executive resources.  A key characteristic of 
the RNG task is that the successful generation of random numbers depends upon 
minimising structure in the sequence of responses generated. The task also requires 
updating of working memory to ensure that generated sequences do not repeat previous 
ones. It is our conjecture that RNG consequently interferes with the ability to extract the 
underlying structure of an argument required for processing the validity of an inference 
but does not impact upon the capacity to inhibit the logical response; hence the larger 
effect of RNG on logic based judgments in Experiment 5.  
In order to explain the shift from the main effect of RNG (Experiments 3 and 4) to its 
increased impact on logic judgments, we have assumed that the switching between 
instructional sets in a mixed design (disengaging from one irrelevant task and 
effectively engaging in a relevant one) places additional demands on executive 
resources. These switching demands combined with RNG increase the executive 
demands of the task consequently impacting upon both types of judgment. More 
specifically, switching between belief and logic requires the ability to inhibit one 
instructional set for another; therefore the capacity to supress a fast completing logic 
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based response is affected from the offset, even if RNG does not impact on the 
capability of inhibiting a logical output. In a blocked design the inhibition required to 
switch instructional sets is eliminated, therefore belief based judgments are less 
affected. However, logical outputs still require inhibition, hence the belief/logic conflict. 
Random number generation nevertheless is still demanding of executive resources thus 
affecting logic based inferences and offering an explanation for the overall effect of 
load in a mixed design.  
As argued above, this account implicates effortful processing in both judgments types 
and a distinction in essential executive resources. This proposal receives some support 
from the results of the AH4, and CRT. In Experiment 4 participants with high AH4 
scores show higher accuracy on logical judgments than low AH4 scorers whilst the 
difference in accuracy on belief judgments is smaller. Although the effects are small in 
size, a similar pattern is observed with the CRT data suggesting that higher cognitive 
ability linked to the AH4 and cognitive style as measured by the CRT are associated 
with greater sensitivity to logical structure. Traditionally, the CRT is a measure of 
cognitive style designed to assess the inclination to override prepotent, incorrect 
responses by employing further reflection. We propose that the CRT also relates to a 
person’s ability to extract the underlying structure of the problem in order to arrive at 
the correct conclusion; hence its association with validity judgments. Interestingly, the 
data do not show that the CRT is linked to less belief-bias under logical instructions.  
Perhaps our findings suggest a Type 2/Type 2 conflict but that belief and logic depend 
on different executive resources. We attempted to address this notion by examining the 
randomness indices produced under each instructional set. Different indices generated 
by the RGCalc program are supposed to measure the distinct executive functions 
involved in RNG (Miyake et al., 2000), however, there was no differential allocation of 
resources to the secondary task as a function of instruction. Perhaps randomness indices 
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are not a robust enough measure of executive functions; therefore the next chapter will 
focus on evaluating the separate executive functions of inhibition and working memory 
in order to determine whether belief and logic judgments pull on distinct resources as 
explanation for the differential effect of the secondary task displayed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Executive Resources and Reasoning  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 3 we established that secondary load impacted on logic judgments more so 
than belief judgments but the impact of conflict was greatest under belief instruction, 
both when problems were interspersed (in line with previous findings) and when 
presented in a blocked design. How then do we integrate these two opposing results? 
One possible interpretation for these findings is that each type of judgment depends on 
distinct executive resources. The experimental data presented in the previous chapter 
supports the idea that logical responses to MP and disjunctives arguments are available 
early and require inhibiting in order to generate belief based responses. However, the 
greater impact of the load on logic judgments also suggests some effortful Type 2 
processing required for judgments based on the validity of an argument. We conjecture 
that RNG impacts on logical judgments by interfering with the ability to reason from 
the structure of the argument but does not affect the ability to inhibit a Type 1 logical 
output.  
Miyake et al. (2000) specified both the role of `inhibition’ and ` updating’ in RNG, 
however some researchers suggests that generating random numbers predominantly 
involves supressing stereotyped responses (Baddeley, 1998) whilst others posit that the 
main component is keeping track of recent responses and comparing them to a 
representation of what is considered random (Jahanshahi et al., 1998). Earlier we stated 
that RNG does not seem to impact on the ability to inhibit a logical response but 
conjecture that it affects the ability to monitor and update working memory 
representations as an explanation of the effect of load on responding to the logical 
structure of an argument. Consequently, we still assume that judgments based on the 
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believability of an argument pull on the executive function of inhibition, whereas 
logical inferences demand WM for the representation and integration of premise 
information. Therefore, the principle aim of the current chapter is to examine the notion 
that distinct executive resources are required for belief and logic judgments, by 
investigating the role of WM with a memory updating n-back task and the role of 
inhibition with an original take on the Stroop task.  
We predict that responses based on the logical structure of the argument will be most 
affected by the n-back task, and the Stroop task will have its greatest impact on belief 
based judgments.  
 
4.2 Experiment 7  
The objective of the current experiment is to examine the function of WM in relation to 
belief and logic based judgments, with the intention of explaining the conflict that arises 
because of competing responses potentially engaging different executive processes.  
In Experiment 7 we will investigate the role of memory updating in belief and logic 
based judgments. Memory updating is the executive function that monitors incoming 
information for its magnitude and appropriateness and updates the information in WM 
by exchanging old for new (Morris & Jones, 1990). The present experiment will add an 
additional instructional condition to the reasoning task that involves the identification of 
features presented in a previous trial (see Design and Materials section for more details). 
This n-back design means participants will be unable to predict whether they will be 
required to judge the validity or believability of a conclusion or recall the features in the 
preceding trial; thus increasing the demands of WM.  
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The N-Back Task 
N-back is based on a task created by Wayne Kirchner in 1958 to determine age 
differences in the short term retention for changing information (Kirchner, 1958). The 
n-back is a performance task requiring continuous maintaining, updating, and releasing 
of arbitrary bindings between items and temporal order positions (Friedman et al., 
2006). It is generally used to measure a part of WM and has been proposed as a 
technique for increasing fluid intelligence (Gf). It has also been a useful tool in the 
research on cognitive aging (Kirchner, 1958; Schmiedek, Li & Lindenberger, 2009), 
schizophrenia (Glahn et al., 2005) and has been used in cognitive neurosciences to look 
for commonalities and differences in brain activation produced by manipulations of the 
process and content of WM (Owen, McMillan, Laird & Bullmore, 2005).  
The task involves showing participants a sequence of letters or numbers and asking 
them to evaluate whether the current stimulus matches one presented earlier in the 
sequence or n- back, where n is commonly equal to one, two or three. For example, in a 
three back task, participants would have to say for each stimulus whether it matched the 
one presented three steps back. The task requires keeping the relevant information in 
WM and updating the contents as each new piece of information is provided, whilst n+1 
back is discarded. 
This experiment will use an original variant of the n-back task (see Materials) to explore 
the role of WM in the logic and belief judgment task. Additionally, we will employ a 
range of individual difference measures as a supplementary assessment of executive 
functioning, with the use of an Operation Span Task (adapted from Turner & Engle, 
1989), a short Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935) and the Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 
2005) in order to reveal any relationships between these measures and task 
performance. 
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4.2.1 Method  
 
Participants  
A total of 81 participants took part in exchange for two course credits. Seventy six 
females and five male participants were randomly assigned to either the Experimental 
condition (Memory Updating) or Control condition (No Updating). 
Design 
 
This experiment integrated the n-back task into the reasoning task, creating a 3 x 2 x 2 x 
2 mixed design. Participants were required to make judgments on the validity or 
believability of a conclusion or on the font style of the last word in the previous trial, 
creating three instructional sets and increasing the demands of WM in the experimental 
condition. Participants were presented with both conflict and no-conflict problems 
(problem type) in the form of MP and disjunctive arguments (complexity) in either the 
Experimental or Control group (condition) as the between subject factor.  
Jonides and Smith, (1997) argued that response inhibition can also play a role in the n-
back task, for example, in a three back task, there may be occasions when two back or 
one back matches the current stimulus, which would require the inhibition of the natural 
tendency to respond based on matching rather than updating. Therefore, in order to 
minimise the role of inhibition in the task, we ran a 1-back task.  
Material  
 
Reasoning Task:  
A novel set of 192 conditional arguments were created for Experiment 7. Each 
participant received 64 belief trials, 64 logic trials and 64 n-back trials. The trials in 
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each condition consisted of 32 MP and 32 Disjunctives arguments. For the belief and 
logic trials, 16 of each set were conflict problems, with valid/unbelievable or 
invalid/believable conclusions and the remaining 16 were no-conflict problems with 
conclusions that were valid/believable and invalid/unbelievable (see Appendix B).  
Experimental Manipulation - N-back Task:  
The 64 n-back trials were administered to each participant in both the Experimental and 
Control condition. In both conditions the font style of the last word in the concluding 
sentence was altered and participants were required to indicate whether the font of the 
last word in the previous trial matched the font of the current trial by responding `same’ 
or `different’ (see Table 4.1). The following five font styles were used in size 18 font: 
Lucida Handwriting, Bradley Hand ITC, Algerian, Ravie and Curlz 
MT. 
Table 4.1  
Examples of the integrated reasoning/n-back task and the format in which the trials 
were presented for both the Experimental and Control conditions.  
Previous Trial     Current Trial 
 
 
Either Flamingos are pink or they are 
purple 
 
Suppose flamingos are pink 
 
Does it follow that flamingos are 
purple? 
 
 
s) believable                k) unbelievable 
 
   If the bird is a Dove then it is orange 
 
 
    Suppose the bird is a Dove 
 
    Does it follow that the bird is  
    white? 
 
 
    s) same                  k) different 
 
 
The n-back trials were incorporated into the reasoning task, adding a third instructional 
set to the design. In the Experimental condition we increased the demands on WM by 
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having an equal number of `same’ and `different’ responses which required participants 
to update memory from trial to trial. A total of 32 n-back trials were different to those 
`1-back’ and 32 were the same and these were evenly distributed across MP and 
disjunctive arguments. Both conflict and no-conflict problems were also assigned 
equally often to both response options and conflict trials were either unbelievable or 
invalid whilst no-conflict trials were believable and valid. 
In the Control condition the 64 n-back trials were also assigned equally often to the 
conflict and no-conflict problems but there was no requirement to update working 
memory because the font style always matched the font in the previous trial. In other 
words, the trials only ever required a `same’ response in the control condition.  
The n-back trials were interspersed with the reasoning questions but had to be 
specifically placed in positions were the previous trial was either the `same’ or 
`different’. For this reason, we created 32 distinct pseudo-random orders in which to 
present the 192 trials.  
Measures of Individual Differences: 
Short Stroop Task   
The Short Stroop task was taken from a paper by Raz, Shapiro, Fan & Posner (2002) 
and adapted for computer administration. The stimuli comprised of a word written in 
one of four ink colours (yellow, blue, red and green) appearing at the centre of the 
computer screen where a black fixation cross was previously located. Two classes of 
words were used: colour words (Yellow, Blue, Red and Green) and neutral words 
(Flower, Ship, Lot and Knife). The neutral words match the coloured words on 
frequency and length and all characters were displayed on a white background. 
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The task consisted of six practice trials with feedback to begin, followed by 36 
experimental trials. These consist of 12 neutral trials, where the neutral word was in any 
of the four colours, 12 congruent trials where the colour word matched the colour and 
12 incongruent trials where the colour word was in any of the three colours other than 
the one to which it referred (e.g., the colour word BLUE in green ink). 
Participants were instructed to indicate the ink colour of the word by pressing one of the 
following four keys; V, B, N, and M, which correspond to the colours red, blue, green, 
and yellow. Two fingers of each hand were used to press these response keys (e.g., left 
middle finger for V and right index finger for N). Participants were instructed to focus 
their eyes upon a fixation cross at the centre of the screen until a stimulus appeared 
replacing the crosshair. The stimulus remained on the screen until participants 
responded but speed and accuracy were emphasized equally (see Appendix B for 
materials). 
The Stroop Interference Effect (SIE) was calculated by taking the average reaction time 
(RT) scores for neutral trials from the average RT scores of incongruent trials (I-N) as a 
measure of inhibition. 
Operation Span Task 
The Operation Span task (adapted from Turner & Engle, 1989) presented participants 
with a set of equation–word pairs on a computer screen.  Each trial consisted of a 
simple arithmetic operation followed by a single word (e.g., ‘‘bear’’) they had to recall 
at the end of the set.  
For example:  
(3 x 4) + 11 = 22 
Bear 
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Participants had to determine whether the sum of the equation given was correct or 
incorrect by clicking on `Yes’ for correct or `No’ for incorrect. They then had to 
memorise the word presented after the equation. 
Each equation remained onscreen until a verification response was given and the next 
trial was presented or for a maximum of 8 seconds. Once the equation disappeared, the 
word was presented for 750ms before the next equation was displayed. At the end of the 
set of trials, they had to recall all the words by typing them into the blank boxes 
displayed on the screen, in the same order in which they were presented. 
The task commenced with three practice trials followed by three target trials at each set 
size, which ranged from two to five. In other words, there were three trials at set size 
two (two equations per trial) and at the end of each of the two equation trials, 
participants had two words to recall. In set size three there were three trials with three 
equations in each trial and at the end of each trial there were three words to recall and so 
on to the maximum of five, which gave a total of 42 words to be recalled.   
Participants were told they were measured on speed as well as accuracy ensuring they 
solved the equations rapidly and helped avert possible rehearsal strategies. 
Global Span (GS) scores were calculated by totalling the number of correct word trials 
in each set. For example, a two word set had three trials of two words to remember in 
each trial, giving a top score of six points. A three word set had three trials of three 
words to remember, with a top score of nine points to reach. In order to obtain full 
points for a trial, every word had to be recalled correctly in the right order, or a score of 
zero was given for that trial. The GS score was a running total of points from each set 
which was then used in a correlational analysis with reasoning performance (See 
Appendix B for materials).  
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Cognitive Reflection Task 
The CRT consisted of the three questions presented in Experiment 4, Chapter 3, which 
were administered to each participant, post reasoning trials. Results for the CRT were 
calculated by separating participants into high and low groups. The high group 
comprised of those that scored one or more out of three whilst the low group failed to 
give any correct answers.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested in maximum groups of four in the same partitioned booths 
described in Chapter 2 and were randomly assigned to the experimental or control 
group. In both conditions, each participant was presented with 128 reasoning questions 
(64MP and 64 Disjunctives) plus the 64 n-back trials with an optional respite at the half 
way point. The experiment was presented on a computer screen, through an E-prime 
program. The instructions for the reasoning task were the same as those presented in 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 3), with additional instruction for the n-back trials. Twelve 
practice trials with feedback were administered to each participant prior to the main part 
of the experiment. Instructions for the n-back trials highlighted the importance of 
keeping track of the font in the previous trial since they would remain naïve to response 
requirements (i.e. whether they should answer according to logic, belief or font style) 
until the response options were presented.  The same n-back instructions were given in 
the control condition, even though the n-back trials always matched the font style in the 
previous trial.  
On completion of the 192 trials, a short Stroop Task and Operation Span Task were 
administered via computer, followed by the Cognitive Reflection Task which was 
completed on paper.  
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4.2.2 Results 
As in previous studies, we eliminated participants who scored 50% or below on the 
conflict items for both the Experimental and Control conditions. A total of six 
participants were eliminated, three from the Experimental condition (N = 37) and three 
from the Control condition (N = 38). Analyses were carried out on accuracy measures 
that were Arcsine transformed and on correct responses for the latencies. Outliers were 
removed from the latency data by two standard deviations from the mean of each cell 
and any missing data was replaced with the overall cell mean.  In all of the experiments 
reported in this chapter, missing data accounted for no more than 5.5% of the overall 
data. The tables throughout this chapter present response latencies and percentage 
accuracy scores, prior to transformation. 
The first set of analyses presented here is for the n-back instruction alone, followed by a 
second set of analyses evaluating the impact of belief and logic instruction on reasoning 
performance. The reason for examining the data in this way was to help us evaluate the 
effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. In terms of n-back performance we 
expected that accuracy would be influenced by the complexity of the argument and the 
presence of conflict. With regards to belief and logic instruction we expected the 
additional working memory demands of the n-back task to impact upon accuracy on the 
reasoning task. Specifically we predicted that logic judgments would be affected by the 
requirement to remember characteristics of the previous trial.  
N-Back Instruction 
 
A 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x 2(Experimental/Control Condition) 
mixed design ANOVA was carried out on Arcsine transformed accuracy data under n-
back instruction. The problem type and complexity variables presented here, reflect the 
type of problem that accompanies the n-back trials. The results revealed no influence of 
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problem type on n-back accuracy (Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 73) = 2.243, p = .139, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .030, but a significant main effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 73) = 
4.094, p = .047, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .053, where n-back trials accompanying disjunctives  resulted in 
lower accuracy scores than those accompanying MP (78% vs. 83%). This suggested that 
the more complex the problem, the more challenging it was for participants to recall the 
font style of the previous trial. Surprisingly, there was no main effect of condition; F(2, 
73) = 1.908, p = .171, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .025, showing no significant difference in performance 
between the control and experimental condition (78% vs. 82%). In fact the means 
suggest performance was poorer in the control condition, further supported by the 
interaction between complexity and condition, F(1, 73) = 4.105, p = .046, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .053, 
demonstrating that n-back accuracy on MP judgments was lower than disjunctives 
judgments in the control condition than experimental condition (79% MP-Control vs. 86% 
MP-experimental), whereas there was no effect of condition on disjunctive judgments 
(78% Disj-Control vs. 79% Disj-experimental) under n-back instruction. Table 4.2 indicates 
that performance was generally poorer across most cells for the control condition, apart 
from conflict-disjunctive items which underpins the 3 way interaction between 
complexity, problem type  and condition; F(1, 73) = 5.257, p = .025, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .067. As 
Table 4.2 indicates, this interaction appears to reflect a difference in n-back 
performance between MP and disjunctive-conflict problems in the experimental 
condition but not in the control condition. However, follow up analysis did not produce 
any significant interactions between problem and complexity for either the experimental 
condition; F(1, 36) = 2.434, p = .127, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .063 or the control condition; F(1, 37) = 
3.326, p = .076, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .082. All remaining interactions were not significant (all p > .05).  
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Table 4.2  
Average Accuracy and Latency scores on Conflict and No-conflict Problems for MP 
and Disjunctives items under n-back instruction, across both Conditions. Results 
exclude below chance scores and include correct only latencies. Experiment 7: 
Experimental Condition (N = 37), Control condition (N=38).  
 
 
Variable 
 
Conflict 
MP                  Disjunctives 
 
No-conflict 
MP                 Disjunctives 
 
 
Overall 
means 
Experimental  
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency (ms) 
 
 
85 
 
3,179 
 
 
 
78 
 
3,083 
 
 
 
74 
 
3,056 
 
 
 
78 
 
3,275 
 
 
86 
 
3,319 
 
 
 
79 
 
3,175 
 
 
 
83 
 
3,523 
 
 
 
77 
 
3,302 
 
 
82 
 
3,269 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency (ms) 
 
 
 
78 
 
3,209 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each cell) 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
76 
 
 
83 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
Mean Latency 
(ms) (across each cell) 
 
 
3,131 
 
3,166 
 
3,247 
 
3,413 
 
 
The mixed design ANOVA on response latencies for n-back instruction only produced a 
main effect of problem type; F(1, 73) = 4.746, p = .033, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .061, with n-back 
judgments associated with no-conflict problems taking longer than conflict problems 
(3,337ms vs. 3,148ms) but again there was no main effect of condition; F(2, 73) = .065, 
p = .800, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .001, showing comparable latencies for the experimental and control 
condition (3,269ms vs. 3,209ms). All remaining interactions were not significant (all 
p > .05). 
Belief and Logic Instruction 
 
The second set of analyses on the accuracy data was a 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-
Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x 2(Experimental/Control Condition) mixed design 
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ANOVA on both belief and logic instruction. Results produced a main effect of 
instruction (Belief/Logic); F(1, 73) = 35,460, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .327, with better 
performance on logic compared to belief judgments (94% vs. 89%) and a main effect of 
problem type (Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 73) = 33.004, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .311, with 
poorer performance on conflict items compared to no-conflict items (88% vs. 95%). 
There was a main effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 73) = 37.279, p < .001, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .338, where disjunctives produced lower accuracy scores than MP (89% vs. 94%) 
and no main effect of condition; F(2, 73) = .683, p = .411, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .009, showing no 
significant difference in accuracy scores across conditions (91% experimental vs. 92% 
control).  
There was a significant interaction between instruction and problem type; F(1, 73) = 
10.899, p = .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .130, consistent with previous findings where conflict between 
belief and logic had a greater effect on judgments of the believability of a conclusion 
(83% B-conflict vs. 94% B-no-conflict) than judgments of the conclusion’s validity (95% L-
conflict vs. 93% L-no-conflict) (see Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3  
Average Accuracy and Latency scores for Belief and Logic Instruction on Conflict and 
No-conflict Problems, for MP and Disjunctive arguments. Results exclude below chance 
scores and include correct only latencies. Experimental Condition (N = 37), Control 
condition (N=38) 
 
Variable 
 
 
Belief  
Conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Belief  
No-conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Logic  
Conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Logic  
No-conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Overall 
Means 
Experimental 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
87 
 
 
86 
 
 
96 
 
 
89 
 
 
94 
 
 
88 
 
 
98 
 
 
88 
 
 
91 
Latency (ms) 6,838 6,646 6,178 6,457 7,189 6,950 6,747 6,808 6,727 
 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
80 
 
 
98 
 
 
92 
 
 
98 
 
 
92 
 
 
99 
 
 
93 
 
 
92 
Latency (ms) 7,151 6,944 6,462 6,599 6,734 7,458 6,669 6,940 6,870 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each 
cell) 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
83 
 
 
97 
 
 
91 
 
 
96 
 
 
90 
 
 
99 
 
 
91 
 
Mean Latency 
(ms) (across each 
cell) 
 
 
6,995 
 
6,795 
 
6,320 
 
6,528 
 
6,962 
 
7,204 
 
6,708 
 
6,874 
 
 
There was a significant interaction between problem type and complexity; F(1, 73) = 
14.367, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .164, suggesting that conflict had less of an impact on disjunctive 
judgments (87% Conflict vs. 91% No-conflict) than MP judgments (90% Conflict vs. 98% 
No-conflict). There was an interaction between instruction and complexity; F(1, 73) = 
4.586, p = .036, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .059, with a bigger difference in performance between MP and 
disjunctive judgments under logic instruction (98% L-MP vs. 91% L-Disjunctives) than 
under belief instruction (91% B-MP vs. 87% B-Disjunctives). Finally there was a significant 
interaction between instruction and condition; F(1, 73) = 4.073, p = .047, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .053, 
showing a bigger effect of condition on logic judgments (92% experimental vs. 96% 
control) than on belief judgments (90% experimental vs. 88% control) suggesting that the n-
back task had a greater impact on logic, although it is worth noting that this effect was 
small.  
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The mixed design ANOVA on latencies produced a main effect of instruction; F(1, 73) 
= 5.628, p < .020, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .072, which showed logic based judgments taking longer than 
belief judgments (6,937ms vs. 6,660ms). This could suggest that the presence of the n-
back task slows down logic judgments. There was a main effect of problem type; F(1, 
73) = 14.403, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .165, with conflict items taking longer than no-conflict 
items (6,989ms vs. 6,608ms) but there was no main effect of condition; F(2, 73) = .153, 
p = .697, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .002, showing no significant difference in latencies between the 
conditions. All remaining interactions were not significant (all p > .10) (see Appendix C 
for full data sets).     
The next set of analyses reports the main effects and interactions between each 
experimental variable and the CRT measure. Participants were assigned to high and low 
CRT groups and a 2 (Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x 
2(High and Low CRT) mixed design ANOVA was carried out on all accuracy scores 
collapsing across both conditions. The results revealed a main effect of CRT; F(2, 73) = 
7.462, p = .008, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .093, where high CRT scorers produced better accuracy scores 
(95%) than low CRT scorers (89%). There were also significant 3 way interactions 
between instruction, problem and CRT; F(1, 73) = 4.683, p = .034, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .060, and 
between problem type, complexity and CRT; F(1, 73) = 4.151, p = .045, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .054. 
Separate analysis on the High (N = 26) and Low (N = 49) groups revealed that the 
interaction between instruction and problem type was significant in the low CRT group; 
F(1, 48) = 12.431, p = .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .206, but not significant in the high group; F(1, 25) 
= .110, p = .743, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .004. This shows that conflict has a greater impact on belief 
judgments (79% conflict vs. 93% no-conflict) than logic judgments (92% conflict vs. 93% 
no-conflict) for those in the low CRT group, compared to belief judgments (92% conflict 
vs. 96% no-conflict) and logic judgments (96% conflict vs. 98% no-conflict) in the high CRT 
 126 
 
group. Similarly, the interaction between problem type and complexity was carried by 
the low CRT group alone; F(1, 48) = 16.376, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .254,  with conflict 
impacting on MP judgments (87% conflict vs. 97% no-conflict)  more so than disjunctives 
(84% conflict vs. 89% no-conflict), whereas the difference between conflict and no-conflict 
problems was comparable for MP(95% conflict vs. 99% no-conflict) and disjunctives (92% 
conflict vs. 95% no-conflict) in the high CRT group; F(1, 25) = .467, p = .500, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .018.  
The latency data produced no main effect or interactions with CRT (all p > .05). 
Table 4.4 
Average Accuracy scores for Belief and Logic Instructions across Conflict and No-
conflict problems for MP and Disjunctive arguments. Results exclude below chance 
accuracy scores across High and low CRT. High CRT (N = 26), Low CRT (N=49). 
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief  
Conflict 
_____________ 
 
MP             Disj 
 
Belief  
No-Conflict 
_____________ 
 
MP             Disj 
 
Logic  
Conflict 
______________ 
 
MP             Disj 
 
Logic  
No-Conflict 
_____________ 
 
MP             Disj 
 
 
Overall 
Means 
High CRT 
Average 
Response 
(%) 
 
 
 
93 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
95 
 
Low CRT 
         
Average 
Response 
(%) 
 
78 
 
79 
 
96 
 
89 
 
96 
 
88 
 
98 
 
88 
 
89 
 
Mean 
Accuracy 
(%) (across 
each cell) 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
85 
 
 
97 
 
 
92 
 
 
97 
 
 
91 
 
 
99 
 
 
92 
 
 
The Global Span (GS) scores produced by each participant were correlated with the 
reasoning accuracy data across each cell (See Table 4.5). The results produced a 
significant positive correlation between GS scores and accuracy on belief items; r(73) 
= .330, p = .004, specifically belief-conflict items; r(73) = .315, p = .006, suggesting 
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that higher GS scores result in better performance on belief-conflict problems, which 
does not extend to logic-conflict problems; r(73) = .167, p = .152.  
The Stroop Interference Effect (SIE) was correlated with reasoning accuracy scores 
from each cell and results revealed a significant negative correlation with belief trials; 
r(73) = -.310, p  = .007, specifically belief-conflict items; r(73) = -.295, p = .010, which 
suggests that those who experience more Stroop interference perform worse on belief 
conflict judgments; again these findings do not extend to logic judgments; r(73) = -.028, 
p = .814. 
Table 4.5 
Correlations for Global Span scores and Stoop Interference Effect, measured against 
each Instructional set and for both Problem Types. Results exclude below chance 
accuracy scores.  
GS = Global Span; SIE = Stroop Interference Effect  
  
Belief No- 
Conflict 
 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Overall 
Belief 
 
Logic No- 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Conflict 
 
Overall 
Logic 
 
GS 
 
.204 
 
.315** 
 
.330** 
 
.171 
 
.167 
 
.177 
 
SIE 
 
-.196 
 
-.295* 
 
-.310** 
 
.043 
 
-.090 
 
-.028 
Key: ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 0.05 level. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The principle aim of Experiment 7 was to investigate whether increasing WM demands 
of the task by incorporating an additional requirement to remember and update 
characteristics associated with the previous trial would have a greater impact on logical 
judgments. The overall main effects from this experiment produced the same outcomes 
as Experiments 4 & 5, with lower accuracy scores for belief judgment, lower scores 
when the problems were more complex and when there was conflict between belief and 
logic. Additionally, the results confirmed that belief/logic conflict had a greater impact 
on the believability of the conclusion.  
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In support of our initial prediction, the experimental condition had more of an effect on 
logic based judgments as indicated by the interaction between instruction and condition 
(see analysis on belief and logic instruction). Furthermore, logic judgments took longer 
to complete than those based on beliefs. Evaluation of the results produced under n-
back instruction revealed that the complexity of the argument impacted on participants’ 
ability to recall the characteristics of the previous trial, also suggesting that the n-back 
task interfered with processing the structure of the argument. Unexpectedly, however, 
there was no main effect of condition for accuracy or latency scores under n-back 
instruction. This indicates that the experimental manipulation did not create greater 
demands on participants than the control condition. In fact the means show (although 
not statistically significant) that across the majority of cells, participants produced lower 
accuracy scores in the control condition under n-back instruction. The only cells that 
produced significantly lower accuracy scores in the experimental condition were 
conflict-disjunctive items, however the fact that there was a main effect of complexity 
suggests that the structure of the argument was still having an effect on what should 
have been a simple control task. This indicates that participants found most of the n-
back trials in the control condition as equally challenging as those in the experimental 
condition.  
There is one possible explanation for comparable accuracy and latency scores across 
conditions, under n-back instruction. Perhaps the control task created an extra memory 
load as a result of the continuous uncertainty about whether the current trial would ever 
mismatch the previous trial. For example, in the experimental condition, the correct 
answer for the n-back trials could be either the `same’ or `different’, whereas in the 
control condition, the correct response was always the `same’. Unless participants 
promptly realised this pattern (and some did) they would attempt to keep the font style 
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updated in their WM from trial to trial `just in case’ they differed; thereby creating a 
similar demand on WM resources to the experimental condition.  
Analyses on the CRT scores produced some contrary findings to those presented in 
Experiment 4 which showed that CRT was related to logic based reasoning more so 
than belief based reasoning. In the present experiment the results revealed that conflict 
had its greatest impact on belief judgments for the low CRT scorers. One interpretation 
for this is that those with a lower ability to inhibit an automatic (logical) response will 
find it harder to resolve belief/logic conflict in favour of a belief based output. However, 
since we only have two (opposing) data sets to base our interpretation on, we will 
reserve an explanation of the CRT findings for the general discussion.   
The operation span task has been widely used as measure of WM capacity and is 
acknowledged in requiring the operations of the central executive (Engle, Tuholski, 
Laughlin & Conway, 1999). In the current experiment we found that GS scores 
correlated with belief conflict trials suggesting that beliefs draw more heavily on WM 
resources. Furthermore, those better equipped at inhibiting a conflicting incorrect 
response, as measured by Stroop Interference, performed better on belief-conflict 
judgments. Neither of the measures correlated with performance on logic trials, which 
could be explained by the fact that logical performance was close to ceiling. However, 
logic judgments did take longer to complete, indicating that the presence of n-back trials 
slowed down logical reasoning without having an effect on accuracy. Again we will 
discuss these findings in more detail in the general discussion.  
The present study appears to confirm our original hypothesis that the n-back task has its 
greatest effect on logic based judgments; however the concern is that the overall 
accuracy scores between the experimental and control condition did not differ 
significantly. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude that the experimental 
 130 
 
manipulation had more of an impact on logic judgments when in effect the control task 
was functioning in a similar fashion to the experimental task and even proved more 
challenging for some participants. In other words the interaction between instruction 
and condition could instead be interpreted as the control task having more of an impact 
on belief based judgments (88% belief vs. 96% logic) compared to the experimental 
condition (90% belief vs. 92% logic). Nevertheless, we reserve any further conjecture 
about the current findings until we can ensure that the control task is not inadvertently 
exerting similar (or more) demands on WM than the experimental condition. Therefore, 
in order to minimise the demands of the control task, Experiment 8 uses a matching task 
for the control condition. 
 
4.3 Experiment 8  
In the current experiment we will use the same methodology for the Experimental 
condition as Experiment 7, integrating the n-back task into the reasoning task and 
asking participants to make judgments based on belief, logic or the font of the last word 
in a preceding trial. For the Control condition participants will be required to match the 
font style of the last word in the major premise with the font of the last word in the 
concluding sentence of the same trial; thereby eliminating any need to store and update 
information based upon the characteristics of the previous trial. This time we expect a 
significant difference between the conditions under n-back instruction which will allow 
us to more clearly evaluate the impact of a memory load on the judgment task relative to 
an undemanding control condition.  
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4.3.1 Method  
 
Participants 
A total of 79 participants took part in the current study, in exchange for course credits or 
£8 payment. Fifty nine females and 20 male participants were randomly assigned to 
either the Experimental (Memory Updating) or Control condition (Matching). 
Design & Material  
 
Experimental Condition: 
The design for the Experimental condition was the same as Experiment 7 with the n-
back trials integrated into the reasoning task, creating a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design. The 
same 64 Modus Ponens (MP), 64 Disjunctives and 64 n-back trials were used with the 
three types of instruction asking participants to make judgments based on conclusion 
believability,  conclusion validity or the font style of the last word in the previous trial. 
Again participants were presented with both conflict and no-conflict problems in the 
form of MP and disjunctive arguments for the reasoning task in both the Experimental 
and Control conditions (refer to Reasoning Task in Experiment 7).  
Control Condition: 
In the Control condition the 64 n-back trials were converted into 64 matching trials 
where participants were required to match the font style of the last word in premise one 
with the font style of the last word in the conclusion (see Table 4.5). Similar to the n-
back trials 32 of the trials matched in font style and required a `same’ response and the 
32 mismatched, requiring a `different’ response. An equal number of MP and 
Disjunctive arguments were distributed to matching and mismatching trials of which 
conflict and no-conflict problems were also evenly distributed to both response options. 
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Participants were presented with the same 128 reasoning trials as the Experimental 
condition, interspersed with 64 matching trials. As in Experiment 7, the full 192 trials 
were again presented in one of the 16 unique sequential orders created, to guarantee 
pseudo-randomisation of the stimuli.  
Table 4.6 
Examples of the Matching Trials presented in the Control Condition.  
Matching Trial Mismatching Trial 
 
 
Either the sun is yellow or it is  
blue 
 
Suppose the sun is blue  
 
Does it follow that the sun is  
yellow? 
 
s) same              k) different 
 
If the bird is a dove then it is  
 orange 
 
Suppose the bird is a dove  
 
Does it follow that the bird is  
White? 
 
s) same                  k) different  
 
 
Measures of Individual Differences: 
The Short Stroop Task and Operation Span Task were completed after the reasoning 
task, followed by the CRT (refer to Experiments 7 for details). 
Procedure 
The procedure was equivalent to Experiment 7 for both the Experimental and Control 
conditions, with participants being tested in maximum groups of 4, randomly allocated 
to the control or experimental group. In both conditions participants were presented 
with the 128 reasoning questions and 64 n-back trials as the experimental manipulation 
or 64 matching trials as the control task. Each group was presented with 12 practice 
trials before the main experiment. The instructions for the n-back task emphasised the 
importance of remembering the characteristics of the previous trial, whilst the control 
task restricted the matching of font style to the current trial, thereby eliminating any 
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unnecessary WM demands that may have been created by the control condition in the 
previous experiment.  
After the reasoning task, participants completed the short Stroop Task and Operation 
Span Task on the computer, followed by the written Cognitive Reflection Task (see 
Experiment 7 for more details). 
4.3.2 Results 
A total of six participants were eliminated, two from the Experimental condition (N = 
37) and four from the Control condition (N = 36), for performing below chance on 
conflict items. Analogous to Experiment 7, the first set of analyses presented is for the 
n-back and matching instruction, in order to examine the demands of the experimental 
manipulation compared to the control condition. This is followed by separate analyses 
on belief and logic instruction. 
N-Back vs. Matching Instruction 
 
A 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x 2(Experimental/Control Condition) 
mixed design ANOVA was carried out on Arcsine transformed accuracy data under n-
back instruction. The problem type and complexity variables presented, reflect the type 
of problem that accompanies both n-back and matching trials. The results uncovered a 
marginal main effect of problem type (Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 71) = 3.827, p 
= .054, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .051, showing that the n-back and matching trials accompanying conflict 
items produced marginally lower scores than no-conflict items (83% vs. 86%). There 
was also a significant main effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 71) = 12.712, p 
= .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .152, where n-back and matching trials accompanying disjunctives 
produced lower accuracy scores than those accompanying MP (82% vs. 87%). This 
suggested that participants found it more challenging to recall or match font style when 
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the problem was more complex. Finally, there was a main effect of condition; F(2, 71) 
= 17.132, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .194, which confirmed that performance was lower in the 
experimental condition than the control condition (80% vs. 89%). There were no 
significant interactions to report (all p > .05). 
Table 4.7  
Average Accuracy and Latency scores on Conflict and No-conflict Problems for MP 
and Disjunctives items under n-back Instruction (experimental) and Matching 
Instruction (control). Results exclude below chance scores and include correct only 
latencies. Experiment 8: Experimental Condition (N = 37), Control condition (N=36).  
 
 
Variable 
 
Conflict 
MP                  Disjunctives 
 
No-conflict 
MP                 Disjunctives 
 
 
Overall 
means 
Experimental  
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency (ms) 
 
 
81 
 
3,265 
 
 
 
92 
 
3,973 
 
 
 
76 
 
3,411 
 
 
 
85 
 
4,504 
 
 
84 
 
3,007 
 
 
 
93 
 
3,960 
 
 
 
81 
 
3,324 
 
 
 
88 
 
4,721 
 
 
81 
 
3,252 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency (ms) 
 
 
 
90 
 
4,290 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each cell) 
 
 
 
87 
 
 
81 
 
 
89 
 
 
85 
 
 
 
Mean Latency 
(ms) (across each cell) 
 
 
3,619 
 
3,956 
 
3,484 
 
4,023 
 
 
Response latencies for n-back instruction produced no main effect of problem type; F(1, 
71) = .144, p = .705, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .002. There was a main effect of complexity type; F(1, 71) = 
22.106, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .237, showing that n-back and matching trials accompanying 
disjunctive judgments took longer to complete than MP (3,990ms-Disjunctives vs. 
3,551ms-MP). There was also a main effect of condition; F(2, 71) = 13.691, p < .001, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .162, showing that performance in the control condition was significantly slower 
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than in the experimental condition (4,290ms vs. 3,252ms). The interaction between 
complexity and condition; F(1, 71) = 4.934, p = .030, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .065,  indicated that n-back 
performance on disjunctive judgments took substantially longer than MP judgments in 
the control condition (4,612ms-Disjunctives vs. 3,967ms-MP) whereas the difference was 
notably smaller in the experimental condition (3,368ms-Disjunctives vs. 3,136ms-MP). 
The implications of these findings will be addressed in the discussion section. All 
remaining interactions were not significant (all p > .1). 
 Belief and Logic Instruction 
 
A 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x 
2(Experimental/Control Condition) mixed design ANOVA was used for the second set 
of analyses measuring the effects under belief and logic instruction. The results 
produced a main effect of instruction (Belief/Logic); F(1, 71) = 22.482, p < .001, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .240, with better performance on logic based judgments than belief judgments 
(92% logic vs. 88% belief). There was a main effect of problem type (Conflict/No-
Conflict); F(1, 71) = 37.058, p <.001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .343, with conflict items producing lower 
accuracy scores than no-conflict items (87% vs. 93%). There was also main effect of 
complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 71) = 37.944, p <.001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .348, with poorer 
performance on disjunctives than MP judgments (88% vs. 92%) but no main effect of 
condition; F(2, 71) = .909, p =.344, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .013, signifying no substantial difference in 
accuracy scores across conditions (91% experimental vs. 89% control).  
The significant interaction between instruction and problem type was present; F(1, 71) 
= 16.034, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .184, replicating the ubiquitous finding that conflict has less 
impact on conclusion validity (91% L-conflict vs. 93% L-no-conflict) compared to the 
believability of a conclusion (84% B-conflict vs. 94% B-no-conflict) (see Table 4.8).  
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There was a significant interaction between problem type and complexity; F(1, 71) = 
10.255, p = .002, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .126, with conflict having less of an impact on disjunctive 
judgments (86% Conflict vs. 90% No-conflict) than MP judgments (88% Conflict vs. 96% 
No-conflict). There was also an interaction between instruction and complexity; F(1, 71) = 
27.773, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .281, with a bigger difference in performance between 
disjunctives and MP judgments under logic instruction (88% L-Disjunctives vs. 95% L-MP) 
than under belief instruction (88% B-Disjunctives  vs. 89% B-MP). 
Finally, there was a 3 way interaction between instruction, problem type and condition, 
F(1, 71) = 9.035, p = .004, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .113, which follow up analyses confirmed was carried 
by the experimental condition producing a significant interaction between  instruction 
and problem type; F(1, 36) = 18.727, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .342, compared to no interaction 
for the control condition; F(1, 35) = .745, p = .394, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .021. The results suggest that 
in the experimental condition the effect of conflict is greater for belief judgments (82% 
B-Conflict vs. 95% B-No-conflict) than logic judgments (94% L-Conflict vs. 94% L-No-
conflict), whereas in the control condition the effect of conflict is similar for belief (85% 
B-Conflict vs. 91% B-No-conflict) and logic judgments (89% L-Conflict vs. 92% L-No-conflict) 
(see Table 4.8).  
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Table 4.8  
Average Accuracy and Latency scores for Belief and Logic Instruction on Conflict and 
No-conflict Problems, for MP and Disjunctive arguments. Results exclude below chance 
scores and include correct only latencies. Experiment 8: Experimental Condition (N = 
37), Control condition (N=36).  
 
Variable 
 
 
Belief 
Conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Belief 
No-conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Logic 
Conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Logic  
No-conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Overall 
Means 
Experimental 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
84 
 
 
98 
 
 
91 
 
 
96 
 
 
91 
 
 
99 
 
 
89 
 
 
91 
Latency (ms) 6,615 6,318 6,244 5,971 6,464 6,880 6,290 6,832 6,452 
 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
86 
 
 
93 
 
 
90 
 
 
92 
 
 
85 
 
 
95 
 
 
89 
 
 
89 
Latency (ms) 6,446 6,336 5,717 6,090 5,993 6,371 5,358 6,366 6,085 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each 
cell) 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
85 
 
 
96 
 
 
91 
 
 
94 
 
 
88 
 
 
97 
 
 
89 
 
Mean Latency 
(ms) (across each 
cell) 
 
 
6,531 
 
6,327 
 
5,981 
 
6,031 
 
6,229 
 
6,626 
 
5,824 
 
6,599 
 
 
A mixed design ANOVA on response latencies produced no main effect of instruction; 
F(1, 71) = .796, p = .375, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .011, showing no significant difference in response 
latencies for belief (6,218ms) and logic (6,320ms) judgments, but there was a main 
effect of problem type; F(1, 71) = 9.097, p = .004, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .114, with conflict items taking 
longer than no-conflict items (6,428ms vs. 6,109ms). There was also a main effect of 
complexity; F(1, 71) = 6.009, p =.017, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .078, demonstrating quicker response times 
to MP arguments compared to disjunctive arguments (6,141ms vs. 6,396ms) but there 
was no main effect of condition; F(2, 71) = 1.217, p = .274, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .017, showing no 
significant difference in latencies across conditions. However a marginal interaction 
between instruction and condition; F(1, 71) = 3.949, p = .051, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .053, revealed that 
the difference between the control and experimental group for latencies was larger for 
logic judgments (6,022ms control vs. 6,615ms experimental) than for belief judgments 
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(6,147ms control vs. 6,287ms experimental). Analyses on the separate conditions confirmed 
that the main effect of instruction was only significant in the experimental condition; 
F(1, 36) = 4.478, p = .041, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .111, indicating that the experimental design slowed 
down performance on logic judgments more so than belief judgments (6,615ms vs. 
6,287ms). The latencies also produced significant interactions between problem type 
and complexity; F(1, 71) = 4.161, p = .045, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .055, suggesting that conflict had less 
of an impact on disjunctive latencies (6,477ms conflict vs. 6,315ms no-conflict) than 
latencies for MP judgments (6,380ms conflict vs. 5,903ms no-conflict). Finally, an 
interaction between instruction and complexity; F(1, 71) = 18.414, p < . 001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .206, 
showed a bigger difference in response times between MP and disjunctive judgments 
under logic instruction (6,027ms L-MP vs. 6,613ms L-Disjunctives) than under belief 
instruction (6,256ms B-MP vs. 6,179ms B-Disjunctives) (see Appendix C for full data sets). 
The next set of analyses reports the main effects and interactions between each 
experimental variable and the CRT measure. A 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-
Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x 2(High and Low CRT) mixed design ANOVA carried 
out on accuracy scores revealed a main effect of CRT; F(2, 71) = 4.914, p = .030, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
= .065, with high CRT scorers producing better accuracy scores (93%) compared to the 
low CRT group (87%). However, there was no interaction between instruction, problem 
and CRT; F(1, 71) = .019, p = .891, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 < .001, or problem type, complexity and CRT; 
F(1, 71) = .577, p = .450, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .008, as reported in the previous experiment and there 
were no other significant interactions to note (all p > .05).  
The Global Span (GS) scores only revealed a significant correlation with belief no-
conflict items; r(71) = .290, p = .013, suggesting that the higher the GS score the better 
the performance on these items. Surprisingly the correlations with the SIE were all 
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positive in this experiment; however none of which were at a reliably accepted level of 
significance.  
Table 4.9 
Correlations for Global Span scores and Stoop Interference Effect, measured against 
each Instructional set and for both Problem Types. Results exclude below chance 
accuracy scores.  
GS = Global Span; SIE = Stroop Interference Effect  
  
Belief No- 
Conflict 
 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Overall 
Belief 
 
Logic No- 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Conflict 
 
Overall 
Logic 
 
GS 
 
.290* 
 
.046 
 
.135 
 
.212 
 
.151 
 
.187 
 
SIE 
 
.228 
 
.171 
 
.206 
 
.210 
 
.222 
 
.228 
Key: ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 0.05 level. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
The principle objective of the current experiment was to examine the impact of n-back 
on performance relative to a control task that did not have any memory demands. 
Additionally, we wanted to evaluate whether the n-back task would have its greatest 
impact on logic judgments. The results comparing n-back instruction (experimental) 
with matching instruction (control) revealed that the experimental condition was 
sufficiently more demanding on performance than the control condition. The results 
also demonstrated that the complexity of the argument affected both the ability to recall 
and to match font characteristics, suggesting that both the n-back and the matching task 
interfered with structural processing. Moreover, embedded conflict within a problem 
marginally impacted matching and updating working memory, which proved 
significantly harder and took longer when the problems were more complex. Although 
accuracy performance was better in the control condition, participants took significantly 
longer to respond. One explanation is that with the n-back task participants are required 
to consistently keep an active representation of the last word in mind from trial to trial, 
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whereas with the matching task there is no active representation, instead participants are 
required to refer back to the first premise in order to make a match with the last word in 
the concluding statement, and this takes longer to complete.  
As specified earlier, our primary objective was to determine whether the n-back task 
was having more of an impact on logic judgments. Separate analysis on belief and logic 
instruction replicated all the main effects from Experiments 7, with belief judgments 
being more prone to errors, conflict problems harder to solve and disjunctive arguments 
producing poorer accuracy scores; as well as conflict having a larger influence on the 
believability of a conclusion. Follow up analyses revealed that the increased effect of 
conflict on belief judgments was only statistically significant in the Experimental 
condition, even though the means from the Control group tell a similar story, suggesting 
that logic impacts on belief judgments to a greater extent when demands on WM are 
increased.  
The findings from the current experiment conflict with our initial hypothesis which 
proposed that the n-back task would specifically impact on logic judgments. Instead it 
appears that a task demanding of WM resources such as the n-back has a greater impact 
on the already more challenging belief based judgments. This however, leaves some 
questions unanswered, for example; in what way is the n-back task affecting the ability 
to resolve belief/logic conflict? And why are logic judgments taking longer to 
complete?  We will consider these questions in more detail in the general discussion but 
in short we conjecture that there are two routes to a logical solution. One route is an 
independent Type 1 process completing first and creating an intuitive cue, perhaps 
accompanied by a feeling of rightness (Thompson, Prowse Turner & Pennycook, 2011), 
based on the logical structure of the argument. This output is what requires inhibiting 
and causes a Type 1/Type 2 conflict when instructed to reason on the basis of beliefs. 
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Inhibition of the intuitive logical cue is an effortful Type 2 process and the WM 
demands created by the n-back task affects the ability to keep the logic output inhibited.  
The second route to a logical solution is a Type 2 process that runs parallel to the route 
required for a belief based response. When instructed to reason explicitly on the basis of 
logic the second route is interfered with by the n-back task which can explain why 
logical inferences take longer to complete. However, these logical inferences are still 
simple and are therefore less prone to error than belief based judgments. At this stage 
we infer that the n-back task effects both belief and logic based judgments but in 
different ways.  
The purpose of this chapter, as discussed in the introduction, was to investigate the role 
of WM and the possibility that belief and logic based judgments pull on distinct 
executive resources. We predicted that the n-back task would have its greatest impact on 
logic and that inhibition (Experiment 9) will impact more on belief based judgments. 
Experiment 8 confirmed that the n-back task does impact on logic judgments, 
specifically the length of time it takes to produce a logical output, but it also 
demonstrated that increasing WM demands impacts on the ability to resolve conflict in 
favour of a believable response.  
We infer that the WM demands created by the extra response alternative requiring 
participants to store, recall and update font characteristics were making it harder to 
inhibit the intuitive logical output, in support of the previous assumption that belief 
judgments pull on inhibition resources. In order to investigate whether inhibition plays 
this key role in the effect of conflict on belief based judgments, Experiment 9 directly 
examines the executive function with a modified version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935) integrated with the reasoning task.  
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4.4 Experiment 9  
The following experiment will use a similar methodology to that previously described, 
expect this time an additional instructional condition is introduced to draw on the 
executive function of inhibition. The inhibition of pre-potent responses is a difficult 
resource to measure (see Friedman & Miyake, 2004, for discussion) but it is vital for 
understanding executive control and in this instance, understanding its role in reasoning 
under conflict.  We conjectured that an efficient way of gauging the effect of inhibition 
on reasoning was to customise a version of the Stroop task by incorporating it into the 
reasoning task and measuring the subsequent impact on accuracy and response 
latencies. We predict that inhibition is the central resource required for dealing with 
conflict between a fast completing logical response and producing an effortful belief 
based output. Therefore, increasing the inhibitory demands of the task should have its 
greatest impact on belief judgments. We will also examine individual differences in the 
same way as Experiments 7 and 8. 
The Stroop Task 
The Stroop task is one designed to provoke conflicting responses. John Ridley Stroop 
first introduced the technique in 1935, which required participants to name the ink 
colour of a coloured word that was either congruent or incongruent to the actual word. 
The prepotent response is to say the colour that is written rather than the ink colour; 
therefore a correct response on incongruent trials involves inhibiting the automatic 
inclination to read the word presented. In Experiment 9 we manipulate the ink colour of 
the last word in each problem presented and ask participants to make judgments based 
on the validity or believability of a conclusion or on the ink colour of the last word in 
the conclusion (see Table 4.10 & 4.11). The integration of a Stroop condition is 
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designed to increase inhibitory demands which will allow us to evaluate the subsequent 
effect this has on belief and logic based judgments. 
4.4.1 Method  
 
Participants  
A total of 112 participants took part in exchange for two course credits. Ninety two 
females and 20 male participants were randomly assigned to either the Experimental 
condition (Stroop-Inhibition) or the Control condition (No inhibition). 
Design  
 
This experiment used a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design which required participants to judge 
the validity or believability of the conclusion or the ink colour of the last word in the 
conclusion, creating three instructional sets. Participants were presented with both 
conflict and no-conflict problems (problem type) in the form of MP and disjunctive 
arguments (complexity) in either the Experimental or Control condition (condition) as 
the between subject factor.  
Materials 
 
Reasoning Task:  
The same 192 conditional arguments from Experiment 7 & 8 were used, with the 64 n-
back trials converted into Colour-Stroop questions. Each participant received 64 belief 
trials, 64 logic trials and 64 Colour-Stroop trials. The trials in each condition consisted 
of 32 MP and 32 Disjunctive arguments. For the belief and logic trials, 16 of each set 
were conflict problems, with valid/unbelievable or invalid/believable conclusions and 
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the remaining 16 were no-conflict problems with conclusions that were valid/believable 
and invalid/unbelievable (see Appendix B for materials).  
Experimental Manipulation – Colour-Stroop Task:  
The Colour-Stroop questions were created by changing the ink colour of the last word 
in the conclusion. Primary and secondary colours were predominately used (see Figure 
4.1), along with black, pink and white, since these were easier to identify than the 
blended tertiary colours and prevented replication of colour matches (i.e. blue on orange 
then orange on blue).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 
Colour Wheel showing the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Colours. 
In both the Experimental and Control conditions the participants were instructed to 
identify the ink colour of the last word, from the two response options given. In the 
experimental condition, the correct response always matched the ink colour of the final 
word in the conclusion and the alternative response option always matched the written 
word.  For conflict trials this set up a prepotent response to choose the alternative, 
incorrect response option. Additionally, the correct response on conflict trials was either 
invalid/believable or valid/unbelievable. For no-conflict trials, the correct response 
always matched the ink colour as well as the believable/valid or unbelievable/invalid 
 145 
 
response, whilst the alternative response either matched the belief based or the logical 
response on half the trials and an unrelated colour in the remaining trials. For example, 
if the correct response was the colour `pink’ which was also a valid/believable response 
then the alternative response would have been a colour that was the invalid/unbelievable 
response (on half the trials) or a colour that was unrelated to the believability or validity 
of the argument.  
Table 4.10  
Examples of the integrated Stroop trials for No-Conflict and Conflict Problems in the 
Experimental Condition. 
No-conflict Problems Conflict Problems 
 
If the fruit is a Strawberry, then it is red 
 
If the fruit is a Strawberry, then it is 
purple 
 
Suppose fruit is a Strawberry 
 
Suppose fruit is a Strawberry 
 
Does it follow that the fruit is  
red? 
 
s)green               k) red 
 
 
Either the Sky is blue or it is pink 
 
Suppose the Sky is blue  
 
Does its follow that the Sky is not 
pink? 
 
s) pink               k) blue 
 
Does it follow that the fruit is  
red? 
 
s) purple             k) red 
 
 
Either the Sky is blue or it is pink 
 
Suppose the Sky is pink  
 
Does its follow that the Sky is 
blue? 
 
s) blue               k) green 
 
*correct answer in bold. 
For the control condition, the correct response on conflict trials matched the ink colour 
and the written word, whilst the alternative response was an unrelated colour that had no 
association with a belief or logic based response. The no-conflict trials were the same as 
those in the experimental condition (see Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11 
Examples of the integrated Stroop trials for No-Conflict and Conflict Problems in the 
Control Condition. 
No-conflict Problems Conflict Problems 
 
If the fruit is a Strawberry, then it is red 
 
If the fruit is a Strawberry, then it is 
purple 
 
Suppose fruit is a Strawberry 
 
Suppose fruit is a Strawberry 
 
Does it follow that the fruit is  
red? 
 
s)green               k) red 
 
 
Either the Sky is blue or it is pink 
 
Suppose the Sky is blue  
 
Does its follow that the Sky is not 
pink? 
 
s) pink               k) blue 
 
Does it follow that the fruit is  
red? 
 
s) yellow             k) red 
 
 
Either the Sky is blue or it is pink 
 
Suppose the Sky is pink  
 
Does its follow that the Sky is 
blue? 
 
s) blue               k) green 
 
*correct answer in bold. 
 
Measures of Individual Differences: 
On completion of the Colour-Stroop reasoning task, the short Stroop Task, Operation 
Span Task and CRT were administered to each participant (see Experiment 7 for more 
details).    
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the Experimental or Control condition and 
tested in groups of four (see Experiment 7). They were asked to complete 12 practice 
trials before being presented with 192 problems in an unblocked design with the 
optional respite at the half way point. The experiment was presented on a computer 
screen with specific instructions for the colour-Stroop trials and the same instructions 
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for the reasoning task as those presented in Experiments 7 and 8. The randomisation of 
the trials ensured that participants would remain unaware as to whether they would need 
to answer according to logic, beliefs or the colour of the last word, until the response 
options were revealed.   
4.4.2 Results 
A total of 16 participants were eliminated for performing below chance on conflict 
items, three from the Experimental condition (N = 50) and 13 from the Control 
condition (N = 46). Equivalent to the preceding two experiments, the first set of 
analyses presents the results under colour-Stroop instruction, once again to ensure that 
the experimental condition proved sufficiently more demanding than the control 
condition; followed by the independent analyses under belief and logic instruction (for 
full data sets see Appendix C). 
Colour- Stroop Instruction 
 
A 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 2(MP/Disjunctives) x2(Experimental/Control Condition) 
mixed design ANOVA was carried out on Arcsine transformed accuracy data under 
colour-Stroop instruction. The problem type and complexity variables indicate the type 
of problem that accompanies the colour-Stroop trials. The results revealed a main effect 
of problem type (Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 94) = 37.066, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .283, with 
Stroop trials accompanying conflict problems producing lower accuracy scores than 
those accompanying no-conflict problems (96% vs. 99%). There was a significant main 
effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); F(1, 94) = 34.873, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .271, where 
Stroop trials accompanying MP judgments produced lower scores than those 
accompanying disjunctives judgments (97% vs. 99%). There was also a main effect of 
condition; F(2, 94) = 5.845, p = .018, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .059, which highlighted poorer performance 
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in the experimental condition compared to the control condition (97% vs. 98%). Results 
also revealed a significant interaction between problem type and complexity; F(1, 94) = 
21.597, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .189, indicating a bigger difference in performance between MP 
and disjunctives for conflict items (94% MP vs. 98% disjunctives) compared to no-conflict 
items (99% MP vs. 99% disjunctives). There was an interaction between problem type and 
condition; F(1, 94) = 54.942, p <.001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .369, which separate analyses revealed that 
the main effect of problem type was only present in the experimental condition; F(1, 
49) = 93.371, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .656, showing poorer performance on Stroop trials 
accompanying conflict problems compared to no-conflict problems (94% vs. 100%).  
There was also an interaction between complexity and condition; F(1, 94) = 115.982, p 
<.001,𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .552, which further analyses showed that performance was better for Stroop 
trials associated with MP judgments (99%) in the control condition compared to those 
associated with disjunctives judgments (97%) whereas the reverse was true in the 
experimental condition (99% disjunctives vs. 94% MP). Furthermore, the 3 way 
interaction between problem type, complexity and condition; F(1, 94) = 69.692, p 
< .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .426, was driven by the significantly larger interaction between problem 
and complexity for the experimental condition; F(1, 49) = 106.408, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .685, 
compared to the control condition; F(1, 45) = 5.447, p = .024, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .108. The results 
revealed that conflict had a bigger effect on Stroop trials accompanying MP judgments 
(98% no-conflict vs. 89% conflict) compared to those accompanying disjunctives 
judgments (100% no-conflict vs. 99% conflict) in the experimental condition. In the control 
condition there was no effect of conflict on disjunctive judgments (97% no-conflict vs. 
97% conflict) but performance was slightly better on MP conflict problems (99%) 
compared to no-conflict problems (98%), under colour-Stroop instruction.  
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Table 4.12  
Average Accuracy and Latency scores on Conflict and No-conflict Problems for MP 
and Disjunctives items under Colour-Stroop Instruction, across both Conditions. 
Results exclude below chance scores and include correct only latencies. Experiment 9: 
Experimental Condition (N = 50), Control condition (N=46).  
 
 
Variable 
 
Conflict 
MP                  Disjunctives 
 
No-conflict 
MP                 Disjunctives 
 
 
Overall 
means 
Experimental  
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency (ms) 
 
 
89 
 
4,191 
 
 
 
99 
 
2,893 
 
 
 
98 
 
3,971 
 
 
 
97 
 
2,801 
 
 
99 
 
4,201 
 
 
 
98 
 
3,323 
 
 
 
100 
 
4,099 
 
 
 
97 
 
3,146 
 
 
97 
 
4,116 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Latency (ms) 
 
 
 
98 
 
3,041 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each cell) 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
98 
 
 
99 
 
 
99 
 
 
 
Mean Latency 
(ms) (across each cell) 
 
 
3,542 
 
3,386 
 
3,762 
 
3,623 
 
 
The latency data for colour-Stroop instruction produced a main effect of problem type; 
F(1, 94) = 7.145, p = .009, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .071, with Stroop trials accompanying no-conflict 
problems taking longer than conflict problems (3,693ms vs. 3,464ms). This could be due 
to the fact that no-conflict problems strongly cue a response that is compatible with both 
belief and logic and therefore takes longer to shift to a response based on colour. There 
was a main effect of complexity; F(1, 94) = 5.400, p = .022, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .054, showing that 
under colour-Stroop instruction arguments presented as MP took longer than those 
presented as disjunctives (3,652ms vs. 3,504ms). Finally there was a main effect of 
condition; F(2, 94) = 27.137, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .224, indicating that overall, performance in 
the experimental condition was significantly slower than the control condition (4,116ms 
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vs. 3,041ms), consistent with the experimental condition being more demanding on 
inhibition.  
Belief and Logic Instruction 
 
The accuracy data was analysed using a 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 
2(MP/Disjunctives) x 2(Experimental condition/Control condition) mixed design 
ANOVA on Arcsine transformed data for belief and logic instruction. Results produced 
a main effect of instruction (Belief/Logic); F(1, 94) = 22.637, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .194, with 
logic judgments generating higher accuracy scores compared to belief judgments (93% 
vs. 89%). There was a main effect of problem type (Conflict/No-Conflict); F(1, 94) = 
56.043, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .374, with poorer performance on conflict items compared to no-
conflict items (88% vs. 94%). There was a main effect of complexity (Disjunctives/MP); 
F(1, 94) = 50.773, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .351, where MP produced higher accuracy scores than 
disjunctive judgments (94% vs. 88%) but there was no main effect of condition; F(2, 
94) = .010, p =.919, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  < .001, showing that performance between the experimental and 
control condition was not significantly different (91% vs. 91%).  
There was a significant interaction between instruction and problem type; F(1, 94) = 
8.467, p = .004, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .083, revealing that the belief/logic conflict had more of an impact 
on judgments of the conclusions believability (85% B-conflict vs. 94% B-no-conflict) than 
its logical validity (91% L-conflict vs. 95% L-no-conflict). There was also a 3 way 
interaction between instruction, problem type and condition; F(2, 94) = 3.710, p = .057, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .038, which separate analyses on both conditions revealed that the interaction 
between instruction and problem was present in the experimental condition; F(1, 49) = 
8.871, p = .004, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .153, but absent in the control condition; F(1, 45) =.789, p = .379, 
𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .017. This demonstrated that the effect of conflict was enhanced for belief 
 151 
 
instruction (82% conflict vs. 94% no-conflict) compared to logic instruction (93% conflict 
vs. 94% no-conflict) in the experimental condition. In the control condition the effect of 
conflict was comparable between belief instruction (87% conflict vs. 94% no-conflict) and 
logic instruction (89% conflict vs. 95% no-conflict). A significant interaction between 
problem type and complexity; F(1, 94) = 17.322, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .156, suggested that the 
impact of conflict was larger for MP judgments (89% conflict vs. 97% no-conflict) than 
disjunctives (85% conflict vs. 90% no-conflict) (see Table 4.13).  
Table 4.13  
Average Accuracy and Latency scores for Belief and Logic Instruction on Conflict and 
No-conflict Problems, for MP and Disjunctive arguments. Results exclude below chance 
scores and include correct only latencies. Experiment 9: Experimental Condition (N = 
50), Control condition (N=46).  
 
Variable 
 
 
Belief 
Conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Belief  
No-conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Logic 
Conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Logic  
No-conflict 
MP          Disj 
 
Overall 
Means 
Experimental 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
82 
 
 
97 
 
 
90 
 
 
95 
 
 
90 
 
 
97 
 
 
91 
 
 
91 
Latency (ms) 6,018 6,126 5,375 5,917 6,473 6,628 5,426 5,778 5,968 
 
Control 
Response 
Accuracy (%) 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
85 
 
 
97 
 
 
90 
 
 
92 
 
 
85 
 
 
98 
 
 
91 
 
 
91 
Latency (ms) 5,753 6,235 5,155 5,876 5,560 6,326 5,245 6,023 5,772 
 
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each 
cell) 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
84 
 
 
97 
 
 
90 
 
 
94 
 
 
88 
 
 
98 
 
 
91 
 
Mean Latency 
(ms) (across each 
cell) 
 
 
5,886 
 
6,181 
 
5,265 
 
5,897 
 
6,017 
 
6,477 
 
5,336 
 
5901 
 
 
Finally, there was a three way interaction between instruction, problem and complexity; 
F(1, 94) = 6.131 p = .015, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .061. Separate analyses on belief and logic instruction 
revealed a significant interaction between problem type and complexity under belief 
instruction; F(1, 94) = 19.695 p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .173, demonstrating a bigger effect of 
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conflict on MP judgments (97% no-conflict vs. 85% conflict) compared to disjunctive 
judgments (90% no-conflict vs. 84% conflict). Whereas under logic instruction there was 
no interaction; F(1, 94) = 1.451 p = .231, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .015, showing that there was no 
differential effect of conflict on MP judgments (98% no-conflict vs. 94% conflict) 
compared to disjunctive judgments (91% no-conflict vs. 88% conflict).  
A mixed design ANOVA on response latencies, produced no main effect of instruction; 
F(1, 94) = 2.150, p = .146, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .022, revealing no significant difference in latencies 
between belief (5,807ms) and logic (5,933ms) instruction. There was, however, a main 
effect of problem type; F(1, 94) = 34.661 p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .269, with conflict items taking 
longer to complete than no-conflict items (6,140ms vs. 5,600ms) and a main effect of 
complexity; F(1, 94) = 38.171, p < .001, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .289, indicating faster response latencies 
to MP judgments compared to disjunctive judgments (5,626ms vs. 6,114ms). The 
interaction between complexity and condition; F(1, 94) = 6.329, p = .014, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .063, 
suggested that there was bigger effect of condition on MP latencies (5,428ms control vs. 
5,823ms experimental), compared to the latencies on disjunctive judgments (6,114ms 
control vs. 6,112ms experimental). There was, however, no main effect of condition; F(2, 
94) = .359, p = .550, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .004, (5,772ms control vs. 5,968ms experimental). 
Lastly, there was a 3 way interaction between instruction, problem type and condition; 
F(1, 94) = 7.290, p = .008, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .072. Analysis on each condition revealed that the 
instruction by problem type interaction was present in the experimental condition; F(1, 
49) = 9.586, p = .003, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .164, showing that conflict had its greatest impact under 
logic instruction (6,551ms-L-conflict vs. 5,602ms-L-no-conflict) compared to belief 
instruction (6,072ms-B-conflict vs. 5,646ms-B-no-conflict). However, the interaction was 
absent in the control condition; F(1, 45) = .763, p = .387, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐  = .017, suggesting that 
there was no differential effect of conflict on logic instruction (5,943ms-L-conflict vs. 
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5,634ms-L-no-conflict) compared to belief instruction (5,994ms-B-conflict vs. 5,516ms-B-no-
conflict) in the control condition. In other words, logic-conflict items took longer to 
complete when participants were also required to engage in the colour-Stroop task.  
Accuracy scores on the CRT were collapsed across both the experimental and control 
conditions and only significant main effects and interactions between experimental 
variables and the CRT are reported. A 2(Belief/Logic) x 2(Conflict/No-Conflict) x 
2(MP/Disjunctives) x 2(High and Low CRT) mixed design ANOVA was carried out on 
accuracy scores which produced a main effect of CRT; F(2, 94) = 8.191, p = .005, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
= .080, with higher accuracy scores from the high CRT group (94%) compared to the 
low CRT group (88%). There was a significant interaction between instruction and 
CRT; F(1, 94) = 5.577, p = .020, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .056, with high CRT scorers performing equally 
well on belief and logic judgments (93% vs. 94%) compared to low CRT scorers, who 
performed less well on belief judgments compared to logic judgments (85% vs. 91%). 
There was a significant interaction between problem type and CRT; F(1, 94) = 4.753, p 
= .032, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .048; which showed that the low group performed less well on conflict 
items compared to no-conflict items (83% vs. 93%) whilst the high group produced 
similar scores for both problem types (92% conflict vs. 95% no-conflict). Finally, there was 
a marginal 3 way interaction between instruction, problem type and CRT; F(1, 94) = 
3.670, p = .058, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .038, which separate analysis carried out on each group revealed a 
significant interaction between instruction and problem type for the low CRT group; 
F(1, 50) = 10.912, p = .002, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .179, demonstrating that conflict had a greater impact 
on belief judgments (78% B-conflict vs. 92% B-no-conflict)  compared to logic judgments 
(89% L-conflict vs. 93% L-no-conflict). Whereas there was no significant interaction 
between instruction and problem type for the high CRT group; F(1, 44) = .493, p 
= .486, 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 = .011; showing that the effect of conflict was comparable for belief 
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judgments (91% B-conflict vs. 95% B-no-conflict) and logic judgments (93% L-conflict vs. 
96% L-no-conflict). The latency data produced no main effect or interactions with CRT 
(all p > .05). 
Table 4.14 
Average Accuracy scores for Conflict and No-conflict Problems, under both 
Instructions across High and Low CRT. Results exclude below chance accuracy scores. 
High CRT (N = 45), Low CRT (N=51). 
 
 
Variable 
 
Belief Instructions 
________________________ 
 
   Conflict         No-conflict 
 
  Logic Instructions 
________________________ 
 
    Conflict         No-conflict 
 
Overall 
Means 
High CRT 
Average Response 
(%) 
 
91 
 
95 
 
93 
 
96 
 
94 
 
Low CRT      
Average Response 
(%) 78 92 89 93 88 
      
Mean Accuracy 
(%) (across each cell) 
 
    85 94 91 95  
 
As in experiments 7 & 8, a correlational analysis was carried out on the data from both 
the Operation Span Task and the short Stroop Task (see Table 4.15). Results revealed a 
significant positive correlation between Global Span (GS) scores and belief items; r(94) 
= .268, p = .008, specifically belief-conflict items; r(94) = .256, p = .012, showing that 
the higher the GS score the better the performance on these problems, which extended 
to logic no-conflict items; r(94) = .212, p = .038. 
The data from the short Stroop task produced a significant negative correlation between 
the SIE and overall performance on belief trials; r(94) = -.244, p = .016 but specifically 
with belief conflict items; r(94) = -.288, p = .004, suggesting that those who experience 
less Stroop interference perform better on belief problems. 
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Table 4.15 
Correlations for Global Span scores and Stoop Interference Effect, measured against 
each Instructional set and for both Problem Types. Results exclude below chance 
accuracy scores.  
GS = Global Span; SIE = Stroop Interference Effect  
  
Belief No- 
Conflict 
 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Overall 
Belief 
 
Logic No- 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Conflict 
 
Overall 
Logic 
 
GS 
 
.178 
 
.256* 
 
.268** 
 
.212* 
 
.028 
 
.115 
 
SIE 
 
-.009 
 
-.288** 
 
-.244* 
 
.033 
 
-.185 
 
-.103 
Key: ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 0.05 level. 
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 9 was to examine the role of inhibition when reasoning under 
belief and logic instruction. More specifically we were interested in determining 
whether increasing the inhibitory demands of the task, by incorporating a colour-Stroop 
instruction manipulation, would help evaluate its role in the effect of conflict on belief 
based judgments.  
The effects from the previous experiments in this chapter were replicated, confirming 
that belief judgments are more prone to errors, conflict problems are harder to solve and 
MP judgments produce better accuracy scores, along with the prevalent finding that 
conflict between belief and logic impacts more on the believability of the conclusion for 
both accuracy and latency scores (Handley et al., 2011). One of the key results from the 
present study was that the Experimental condition increased this effect of conflict under 
belief instruction suggesting that logic impacts on belief judgments to a greater extent 
when inhibitory demands are increased by the Stroop Task.  
Separate analysis on colour-Stroop instruction revealed a main effect of condition, 
confirming that the experimental design was more taxing than the control condition. 
Furthermore, the results demonstrated that under colour-Stroop instruction MP 
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Inhibition 
judgments were harder and look longer to complete, and conflict had its greatest impact 
on these simpler judgments. This is contrary to experiments 7 & 8 that showed n-back 
instruction having a bigger effect on the more complex disjunctive arguments. One 
explanation for this relates to the reported automaticity of MP judgments (Reverberi, 
Burigo, & Cherubini, 2009) and the intuitive logical solution to these simple inferences. 
Let us imagine that the presentation of an `if p then q’ premise triggers a logical 
response that completes quickly. This response would require inhibition until response 
options were displayed and further inhibition if instructed to respond based on the ink 
colour of the word, which was in conflict with colour triggered by the logical response 
(e.g. if the fruit is a strawberry then it is purple – purple would need inhibiting, see 
Figure 4.2). A task that pulls on the inhibition resource, such as a Stroop task, will 
impact on the ability to supress the automatically cued response increasing Stroop 
interference for MP judgments.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Illustrates the effect of Inhibition under colour-Stroop Instruction for MP arguments.  
With disjunctive arguments perhaps the effect of conflict does not arise as early, 
consequently fewer resources are required to inhibit the logic response and therefore 
conflict has less of an impact on colour-Stroop judgments. In the general discussion we 
will consider in more detail the problem by complexity interaction displayed throughout 
this chapter.  
Logic 
Colour 
T2 
T1 
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The findings up to this point suggest belief judgments are effortful and tax on WM 
resources of inhibition. However, the experimental design appears to have a more 
considerable impact on the length of time it takes to complete logic-conflict items. As 
discussed in Experiment 8 we assume there are two routes to a logical output, one is 
intuitive and one requires Type 2 processing when given explicit instructions to reason 
logically. In this experiment the second route may be impacted on by the increased 
inhibitory demands created by the colour-Stroop task which interferes with the length of 
time it takes for a logical output to complete. This account will be discussed further in 
the general discussion.   
As in Experiment 7, the CRT data revealed that logic interfered more with belief based 
judgments in the low CRT group. This fits with the argument that belief-conflict items 
require inhibitory control over the fast completing logical response. Those participants 
who are less reflective over a response available early (the logical output), will find 
belief-conflict items more challenging to complete.   
Finally, results from the Operation Span task and short Stroop Task produced similar 
findings to Experiment 7; supporting the view that belief-conflict processing is effortful 
and correlates with measures of inhibition and WM capacity.  
 
4.5 General Discussion  
In the previous chapter we confirmed that both belief and logic based judgments require 
effortful processing, yet the greater impact of conflict on belief judgments and the larger 
effect of Random Number Generation (RNG) on logic judgments suggested that both 
pull on distinct executive resources. We conjectured that logic based responses 
completed quickly and required inhibiting in order to produce a response based on the 
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believability of an argument. Logical judgments, on the other hand, seemed to draw on 
alternative Working Memory (WM) resources. The aim of this chapter was to 
investigate the role of WM in belief and logic based reasoning with the use of a memory 
updating task and a task that required the executive resources of inhibition.  By 
employing a novel methodology and various individual differences measures we tested 
the function of these executive resources under distinct instructional sets. We 
hypothesised that the Stroop task would have a bigger impact on belief based judgments 
whilst the logical structure of the argument would be most affected by the n-back task.  
The findings revealed that the effect of conflict was greater for belief judgments in the 
experimental condition for both Experiments 8 and 9, suggesting that the presence of 
both the n-back and colour-Stroop task increases the impact of logic on belief based 
judgments. However, responses under logic instruction took longer (Experiment 7) and 
the experimental design slowed down performance on logic judgments (Experiment 8), 
specifically logic-conflict items (Experiment 9) more so than those under belief 
instruction.  
How then do we reconcile the findings that logic interferes with belief based judgments, 
yet a logical output takes longer to complete and is more impacted on by a task such as 
random number generation (Experiment 5)? 
As proposed earlier we offer the possibility of two routes to a logical solution; the 
intuitive route and the deliberative route. The intuitive route is a Type 1 process which 
completes outside explicit awareness and is sensitive to the structure of a problem. This 
automatic logical output is probably accompanied by a Feeling of Rightness 
(Thompson, Prowse Turner & Pennycook, 2011) based on conceptual fluency 
(Morsanyi and Handley, 2012) which provides the reasoner with an intuitive logical 
cue. However, this cue is not enough to give a logical response, when instructed to 
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reason logically, the second deliberative route must be engaged, which involves 
effortful Type 2 processing triggered in parallel to a belief based response.  
We conjecture, therefore that the instruction by problem interaction continually 
displayed throughout this thesis is the result of a Type1/Types 2 conflict and the 
requirement to inhibit an intuitive logical output when instructed to reason according to 
beliefs. Inhibition of the logical output is a challenging task that taxes WM. Extra 
demands on WM created by additional response alternatives that require continuous 
updating (n-back) or inhibiting (Stroop), will impact on the ability to keep an intuitive 
logical solution inhibited (see Figure 4.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 
Illustrates the Default Interventionist model for Belief based responding under Belief 
instruction. A logical output completes automatically and requires inhibiting in order 
for a Belief based output to complete. The n-back or Stroop task demands on WM which 
impacts on the ability to inhibit the Logical output. 
When instructed to reason logically, it takes explicit Type 2 reasoning or the `deliberate 
route’ to a logical solution. The explicit demands of the n-back or Stroop task may 
interfere with the integration of premise information and model construction, which 
WM demands (n-back or 
Stroop) 
 
Belief 
Logic 
T1 T2 
Inhibition 
Conflict 
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slows the response process but has less effect on accuracy scores due to the relatively 
simple nature of the problems (see Figure 4.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 
Illustrates the parallel processing involved when provided with Logic instructions. In 
order to deliver an explicit Logical output, Type 2 processing is engaged. The demands 
of the n-back or Stroop task interrupts premise integration and model construction 
which affects the length of time it takes to produce output.  
Another consistent finding throughout this chapter is that conflict has less of an impact 
on disjunctive arguments for accuracy scores (also see Experiment 4, Chapter 3) and 
latency scores (Experiment 8). We posit that this is due to the relatively automatic 
nature of the MP inference, in support of the intuitive route. For example, if the 
presentation of an MP argument triggers an intuitive logical cue that requires inhibiting 
in order to produce a belief based response then the impact of conflict is likely to be 
greater for MP arguments, specifically under belief instruction as displayed in 
Experiment 9. This could also explain why MP arguments are more affected by colour-
Stroop instruction, if for example the logical cue creates a Type1/Type 1 conflict with a 
colour cue, interfering with the ability to inhibit the ink colour for the written word (see 
Figure 4.2). 
Belief 
Logic 
T1 T2 
Conflict 
WM demands (n-back or 
Stroop task) 
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With the more complex disjunctive arguments we suppose that responses under belief 
and logic instruction both require some effortful Type 2 processing and thus conflict 
between the two occurs much later. With conflict occurring later, less inhibition of the 
logical response is required resulting in reduced interference with a belief based output.  
The automaticity of the MP argument can assist in the interpretation of the CRT 
findings in this chapter. Both Experiment 7 and 8 showed that the impact of conflict 
was greater on beliefs for low CRT scorers and this effect was bigger with simple MP 
arguments (Experiment 7). This could suggest that those people more inclined to give 
an intuitive response over one that requires deliberation, will find the conflict between 
belief and logic more difficult when asked to respond on the basis of belief and more so 
when making judgments with more automatic MP inferences. This interpretation 
supports the idea that an intuitive logical cue impacts on belief based reasoning. 
Furthermore, in Experiments 7 and 9 the short Stroop task revealed that those who 
experience less Stroop Interference perform better on belief conflict items, indicating 
that inhibition is a key component in belief-conflict judgments. Nevertheless the fact 
that WM also correlated with belief-conflict reasoning, offers the likelihood that 
inhibition is not the only executive resource required for these types of judgments.  
At this point, the results from the ID measures and the impact of the n-back on belief-
conflict judgments (Experiment 8) encourages the move away from the idea that one 
type resource is required for one type of reasoning as proposed at the beginning of this 
chapter. For example, in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) the CRT findings are not consistent 
with those in this current chapter. The previous findings showed that CRT was related 
to logical reasoning which we proposed was related to a person’s ability to extract the 
underlying structure of a problem to arrive at the correct conclusion. Perhaps the ability 
to resist a rapidly available response in favour of a more considered response involves 
many processes which include both inhibition and the extraction of problem structure.  
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As mentioned earlier we move away from the idea that belief judgments pull on one 
executive resource and logic pulls on another, however, the behavioural data and ID 
measures in this chapter do point to inhibition as a key factor in belief-conflict 
reasoning. That is not to say that logic judgments are not effortful and demand WM 
resources (and possibly inhibition at times), we conjecture that when instructed to 
reason logically the explicit Type 2 processes involve the integration of premise 
information and model construction as explanation for longer latencies in Experiments 7 
and the impact of RNG in Experiment 5 (Chapter 3). In the closing chapter we will 
discuss the two routes to a logical solution as an explanation for the findings in this 
thesis and discuss the implications of these findings in relation to the Dual Process 
theories on reasoning.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The main objective of this thesis was to test the Default Interventionist (DI) Dual 
Process account of belief-bias in human reasoning, using the novel methodology 
introduced by Handley, Newstead and Trippas (2011) which involved the manipulation 
of instruction. Handley et al. found that belief judgments were slower than logic 
judgments and the believability of a conclusion was impacted on by the logical structure 
of the argument (a finding that was reliably replicated in six of the experiments 
presented in this thesis, see section 5.2.1). They concluded that judgments based on the 
logical structure of the argument can be accomplished relatively rapidly and those made 
about beliefs require effortful processing which is inconsistent with a DI account of 
reasoning.  
In this thesis we tested the interpretation that belief judgments are effortful and logic 
judgments can be accomplished quickly; using a number of manipulations designed to 
increase cognitive load when reasoning under belief and logic instruction.  First we 
examined the effect of different types of secondary load on accuracy and latency 
performance of response with simple conditional arguments (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 
more complex arguments and various individual differences measures were introduced 
for examination. With the introduction of a between subjects manipulation, performance 
on the primary task was measured against the secondary task to see if there were any 
trade-offs between the two. Finally, in chapter 4 additional instructional conditions were 
incorporated in order to look at the role of WM and inhibition in belief and logic based 
reasoning. The experimental work supports a particular dual process interpretation 
which is discussed in section 5.4. 
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In this final chapter we start with a summary of the accuracy and latency data as a 
function of instruction (belief/logic), problem type (conflict/no-conflict) and complexity 
(MP/Disjunctives), in order to reveal any comparable findings with previous works. 
Next we look at the impact of secondary load across experiments, followed by the 
examination of distinct executive functions under each instructional set and the 
interpretation of the individual differences (ID) data. The theoretical implications of the 
findings are then discussed followed by our interpretation of the data in relation to a 
Parallel Competitive (PC) model. Support for the PC interpretation is then examined, 
followed by points for consideration in respect to research on biases. In the closing 
section, some potential areas of research development are discussed.  
 
5.2 Summary of Experimental Findings   
This experimental summary addresses each area of findings separately, starting with the 
accuracy and latency data summarised across instruction, problems type and 
complexity, in order to determine whether the pattern of results replicate earlier work by 
Handley et al.  The next section looks at the critical set of findings regarding the impact 
of secondary load on reasoning performance followed by a section on the effect of 
manipulating executive demands. The final section explores individual differences and 
reasoning performance under each instructional set. 
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5.2.1 Accuracy and Latencies 
 
Table 5.1  
A summary table illustrating the presence of a significant main effect (Instruction) or 
interaction for both Accuracy and Latency data in each experiment. For example; in 
Experiment 1, there was an interaction between Instruction and Problem Type for 
Accuracy data but not for Latencies. 
 
Experiment No. 
 
Instruction 
 
Problem 
 
Complexity  
 
Instruction *  
Problem  
 
Instruction * 
Complexity 
 
Instruction *  
Problem 
 * Complexity 
 
Complexity *  
Problem 
             
1 A(L) 
 
L(B) A(NC) L(C) N/A N/A A - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 - 
 
L(B) A(NC) L(C) N/A N/A - L N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3 A(L) 
 
- A(NC) L(C) N/A N/A - - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 A(L) 
 
- A(NC) - A(MP) L(D) A - - - - - A - 
5 A(L) 
 
L(L) A(NC) - A(MP) L(D) A - - - - - - - 
7 A(L) 
 
L(L) A(NC) L(C) A(MP) - A - A - - - A - 
8 A(L) 
 
- A(NC) L(C) A(MP) L(D) A - A L - - A L 
9 A(L) 
 
- A(NC) L(C) A(MP) L(D) A - - - A - A - 
Key: A = accuracy; L = latencies; A (L)=Logic higher scores; A(NC)= No-conflict higher scores; A(MP)= MP 
higher scores; L(B)=Belief take longer; L(L)=Logic take longer; L(C)=Conflict take longer; 
L(D)=Disjunctives take longer. 
 
From Table 5.1 what emerges is that in seven out of eight experiments there was an 
effect of instructional condition on accuracy scores. Belief judgments were consistently 
more difficult and resulted in more errors, consistent with the idea that belief based 
inferences are effortful. The table also shows that conflict problems were consistently 
harder and in six out of eight of the experiments they also took longer to complete. The 
interaction between these two factors (instruction and problem) revealed that conflict 
had a larger impact on belief judgments than logic judgments in six out of eight of the 
studies; for simple (Experiment 1) and complex problems (Experiment 4 – 9), in both a 
within-subjects and a blocked design (Experiment 5). Collectively these findings 
provide a clear replication of Handley et al.’s work. However, in terms of the latency 
 166 
 
data it is important to note that, although belief judgments took longer in Experiments 1 
and 2, there was no difference between latencies for belief and logic judgments in 
Experiments 3 and 4 and belief judgments took less time than logic judgments in 
Experiments 5 and 7. The longer latencies for logic judgments are discussed in section 
5. 4. 
One possible explanation for the greater effect of conflict on belief judgments is that 
MP inferences can be drawn automatically (Reverberi, Burigo & Cherubini, 2009; 
Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo & Cherubini, 2012). In Experiments 4 to 9 we included 
disjunctive arguments to see if the impact of conflict would extend to these more 
complex judgments and found that the impact was smaller for disjunctives compared to 
MP judgments. This finding was accompanied by a main effect of complexity showing 
that disjunctive judgments took longer to complete than MP judgments in four out of 
five studies. We conjecture that complexity has an impact on the extent to which belief 
judgments are influenced by a competing logical response; the more complex the 
inference the less opportunity for logic to interfere with beliefs (refer to Figure 5.4 
section 5.5.1). 
5.2.2 Secondary Load 
One of the key objectives of the research presented in this thesis was to evaluate the 
impact of increasing executive demands on reasoning under different instruction. Table 
5.2 provides a summary across all experiments in terms of the main effect of 
load/condition and its interaction with instruction, problem type and complexity. The 
table also includes Experiments 7 – 9 where a secondary task was not employed but 
additional instructional conditions were designed to increase executive demands; these 
experiments are discussed further in section 5.2.3.  
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Table 5.2  
A summary table illustrating the presence of a significant main effect of Condition/Load 
and the interactions with Condition/Load for both Accuracy and Latency data in each 
experiment.  
 
Experiment No. 
 
Load/Condition 
 
Instruction * Condition 
 
Instruction *  
Problem  
* Condition 
 
Complexity * 
Condition 
        
1 - 
 
- - - - - N/A N/A 
2 A 
 
- A(L-m) - - - N/A N/A 
3 A(m) 
 
L - - - - N/A N/A 
4 A 
 
L - - - - - - 
5 A 
 
L A(L) - - - - - 
7 - 
 
- A(B) - - - - - 
8 - 
 
- - L(L-m) A - - - 
9 - 
 
- - - A L - L 
Key: A = accuracy; L = latencies;  (m)=marginal; A(L)=impact on logic accuracy; A(B)= impact on belief 
accuracy; L(L)=impact on logic latencies. 
 
De Neys’ (2006) Dot Memory task was used as the secondary load in Experiment 1, 
however this particular spatial WM task failed to impact on reasoning performance 
which we conjectured was because it did not tax the verbal-working memory 
component required in reasoning with conditional arguments (Handley, Capon, Copp & 
Harper, 2002).  Therefore, Experiments 2 – 5 employed Random Number Generation 
(RNG) as the secondary load which has been shown to impact heavily on executive 
resources (Miyake et al., 2000).  
The effect of RNG on performance in each instructional condition varied across 
experiments as seen in Table 5.2. Experiment 2 and 5 showed that RNG increased the 
difficulty of making validity judgments whilst Experiments 3 and 4 showed RNG as 
having a comparable effect on belief and logic judgments.  
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To explain the load effect in Experiment 2 we hypothesised that the requirement to 
remember the major premise after it disappeared, in order make a validity judgment, 
was increasing WM load. To control for this, Experiments 3 and 4 presented the major 
premise for three seconds before displaying the categorical premise and conclusion, 
keeping the full problem on the screen until a response was given. This resulted in a 
main effect of load which suggested that both belief and logic based judgments require 
effortful processing that demand WM resources.  
Experiments 2 to 4 used a within-subjects design where belief and logic trials were 
randomly interspersed and participants were unaware of whether they would be 
responding according to beliefs or logic until the response options were presented. 
There are two possible consequences of this design; first is that it increases executive 
demands as a result of switching between instructional sets from one trial to the next. 
The second is that perhaps people reason logically through an argument before response 
options are presented because they are unaware of what the response requirements will 
be. Therefore, any effect of conflict is the result of these explicitly drawn inferences 
impacting on belief based judgments. To control for these possibilities, Experiment 5 
used a blocked design which limited any switching demands by presenting each 
instructional set in blocks. The design also meant that participants were aware from the 
onset of each trial whether they were required to respond on the basis of belief or logic. 
The findings showed that the impact of conflict on belief judgments remained 
suggesting that participants continued to process the logical inference even when there 
was no requirement to do so. The blocked design also permitted the assessment of the 
random numbers generated as a function of the primary task. The results indicated no 
differential allocation of resources to the secondary task as a function of instruction, but 
in contrast to Experiment 4 load had its greatest impact on logical inferences.  In other 
words;  generating random numbers had its biggest effect on structural processing but 
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the logical structure of an argument continued to interfere with the ability to reason on 
the basis of beliefs (see Table 5.1), even in a blocked design.  
The evidence demonstrating an impact of RNG on validity judgments, coupled with the 
higher level of difficulty displayed with belief judgments suggests that both draw upon 
some aspect of effortful processing. The question is why does RNG only impact on 
logic in a blocked design yet belief judgments are impacted on when trials are 
interspersed? One potential explanation is that RNG mainly interferes with processing 
the structure of an argument, whilst switching between belief and logic judgments 
places additional demands on executive resources that effects belief based inferences. 
Through the removal of these switching demands RNG only interferes with judgments 
that require structural processing. Therefore, belief and logic judgments may both 
require effortful processing but pull on distinct executive resources. 
5.2.3 Executive Functions 
The differential effect of load displayed in Chapter 3, could be explained in terms of 
each instructional set demanding distinct executive resources. For example, logic based 
judgments may draw upon Working Memory (WM) to process the structure of an 
argument; whilst belief based judgments are impacted on by the requirement to inhibit 
one instructional set for another (switching demands). Consequently, in Chapter 4 the 
executive functions of inhibition and WM were examined in relation to reasoning 
performance. In Experiments 7 – 9 additional instructional sets were incorporated into 
the reasoning task in order to increase WM and inhibition demands. Experiments 7 and 
8 used an original variant of the n-back task to examine memory updating and 
Experiment 9 used a Stroop task to assess the function of inhibition.  
The results from Experiment 8 revealed that a task demanding of WM resources such as 
the n-back task has a bigger effect on the already challenging belief based judgments. 
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Additionally, when inhibitory demands were increased with the Stroop task in 
Experiment 9, the impact of logic on belief based judgments was also increased. Taken 
together these findings suggest, contrary to Experiment 5, that belief judgments are 
more demanding of executive resources.  However, the latency data produced findings 
that were seemingly inconsistent with this interpretation. For example, in Experiment 7 
logic judgments took longer than belief based judgments, in Experiment 8 the 
experimental condition had a bigger impact on logic latencies and Experiment 9 
revealed that conflict had its biggest impact on logic latencies in the experimental 
condition.  The accuracy data supports the idea that belief judgments require effortful 
processing whilst the latency data suggests that increased executive demands of the task 
impacts on the time it takes to reason explicitly on the basis of logic. The account 
presented in section 5.4 attempts to reconcile the accuracy and latency data.  
5.2.4 Individual Differences 
Research has shown that limitations to WM, intelligence and cognitive style can affect 
an individual’s ability to resist biases (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich, 
2005; Stanovich and West, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1997). Stanovich and West (2008) 
found that individuals with high SAT scores displayed less belief-bias in syllogistic 
reasoning. They suggested that the ability for sustained inhibition of a heuristic response 
and the ability to separate imaginary situations from real world representations (see 
Stanovich & Toplak, 2012 for “cognitive decoupling”) is a fundamental component in 
overcoming biased behaviour. 
Experiment 4 examined whether individual differences in cognitive ability (as measured 
by the AH4; Heim, 1970) and cognitive style (as measured by the AOT; Macpherson & 
Stanovich, 2007 and the CRT; Frederick, 2005) were related to judgments under 
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different instructions. Experiments 7, 8 and 9 examined more specific measures of 
inhibition and WM with the use of a short Stroop task and an Operation Span task.  
In Experiment 4 both the AH4 and CRT were examined in the extent to which high and 
low scorers performed under belief and logic instruction. Across both measures there 
was a small but significant difference between the high and low groups under logical 
instruction. In contrast, Experiments 7 and 9 showed that high CRT scorers performed 
better than low CRT scorers on belief judgments when belief and logic conflicted. In 
addition the Global Span (GS) scores and Stroop Interference effect (SIE) correlated 
significantly with belief conflict items across both experiments whereas GS and SIE did 
not significantly correlate with performance under logic instruction.  
Although Experiment 4 showed a stronger relationship with logic judgments, the effect 
size was small; whereas the evidence revealing belief judgments to be more resource 
demanding covered a broader range of measures including cognitive style, inhibition 
and WM. However, it is important to be cautious with interpretations of the ID 
measures, since the experiments presented in this thesis were not typical individual 
differences studies and the data was collapsed across experimental conditions. 
Furthermore, logic judgments were closer to ceiling level, thus reducing the likelihood 
of observing significant relationships with the ID measures.  
The findings presented in this summary section have shown that belief based judgments 
are consistently more prone to error (see Table 5.1) and in six out of eight experiments 
are impacted on by the validity of the argument. Furthermore, whilst RNG impacts on 
the structural processes required for logical inferences (Experiment 5), switching 
between instructional sets may also increase the executive demands that effect belief 
based reasoning. The results from Experiments 7 – 9 indicate that enhancing the 
executive demands of the task, by incorporating extra response alternatives, increases 
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the impact of logic on belief based judgments (Experiment 8 and 9). One interpretation 
for this impact is attributed to the demands of successful inhibition of a fast completing 
logical response in order to produce a belief based output. Inhibition of the logical 
output requires effortful Type 2 processes and these processes are impacted on by 
resource demanding tasks as shown in Experiments 8 and 9. However the longer 
latencies for logic judgments as seen in Experiment 5, 7, 8 and 9 suggests that when 
reasoning explicitly under logic instruction the extra demands of the task impact on the 
time it takes for a logical response to complete. The next two sections cover the 
theoretical implications of these findings in relation to Dual Processing accounts of 
reasoning, followed by an account of the data interpreted through an alternative version 
of the PC model.  
 
5.3 Theoretical Implications  
 
5.3.1 Default Interventionism  
In the opening chapter of this thesis the DI dual process account of reasoning was 
introduced (Evans, 2008). This account posits that judgments based on prior knowledge 
or stereotypical information depends on intuitive Type 1 processes, which require 
inhibiting in order to produce the `correct’ logical output, through the engagement of 
Type 2 processes. The override of these intuitive Type 1 responses will depend on 
instruction (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994) and WM or cognitive capacity 
(Stanovich & Toplak, 2012; Stanovich and West, 2008).  
The behavioural data presented throughout this thesis does not fit well with the DI 
account; given that belief based judgments resulted in more errors and were more 
impacted on by the validity of an argument. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on 
 173 
 
belief judgments increased when the executive demands of the task increased and the ID 
measures from Experiment 7 and 9 correlated more strongly with belief-conflict trials. 
Taken together the data emphasises the role of Type 2 processing required for belief 
based judgments. Although there is extensive research that supports a DI account (see 
Chapter 1), these findings do not support the idea that belief based judgments are 
intuitive in nature. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 1, the DI account also fails to 
explain how conflict is detected early and this is a major limitation of the account.  
Research on conflict detection has shown that reasoners are implicitly aware of two 
sources of information and can detect conflict between these sources; namely belief and 
logic based information for syllogistic problems (De Neys & Franssens, 2007; De Neys, 
Vartanian & Goel, 2008) where conflict leads to longer inspection times of these 
problems (Ball, Philips, Wade & Quayle, 2006). Conflict detection is also evident with 
base rate problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) where the base rate information 
presented in a problem is unaffected by cognitive load (Franssens & De Neys, 2009). 
The question the DI account fails to resolve is; how can conflict be detected if logical 
and belief based responses rely on different `Types’ of processes? An alternative model 
is one that implies the parallel processing of two responses as an appropriate 
explanation for early conflict detection.   
5.3.2 Parallel Processing  
The original Parallel Competitive (PC) model as taken from Sloman (1996) suggests 
that both Type 1 (associative) and Type 2 (rule based) processes are activated 
simultaneously which addresses the issue of conflict detection. However the way this 
particular PC model is presented overlooks the efficiency of a Type 1 process by 
suggesting that Type 2 processes are always engaged (De Neys, 2012). Moreover, the 
findings we presented showed that validity judgments can complete quickly and are less 
 174 
 
prone to error; similar to the evidence suggesting that the detection of formal structures 
automatically trigger basic rule-like schemata (Reverberi et al., 2010). In addition, 
Morsanyi and Handley (2008) showed that cognitive ability relates to the use of prior 
knowledge when reasoning which taken together these findings are at odds with the idea 
that Type 1 processes = associative and Type 2 = rule based. 
De Neys (2012) offers a combined PC and DI model as an alternative account (see 
Figure 5.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 
A PC-DI model to show Belief and Logic as both intuitive Type 1 processes, followed by 
deliberate Type 2 processing.  
This model shows that deliberative Type 2 processing does not occur until conflict is 
detected between two competing Type 1 responses. This addresses the inefficiency of 
Sloman’s original PC model and focuses on the idea that logic based judgments can be 
processed intuitively (see De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012). To 
explain the traditional belief-bias effect, De Neys (2014) argues that whilst both 
knowledge based and logical processing occur simultaneously at the intuitive level, the 
`salience’ of belief based responses entices participants to give a heuristic response. 
However, the findings presented in this thesis along with the work by Handley et al. 
Logic 
T1 
Belief 
T2 
Conflict 
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(2011), have shown that logic can interfere with belief based judgments which would 
suggest that the logical solution is more `salient’. The model illustrated in Figure 5.1 
does not really explain why a belief based response would be more salient than a logical 
response; additionally it fails to indicate whether deliberative processing could also 
relate to belief based reasoning. 
To reiterate the key findings from the research presented: belief judgments are more 
prone to error, whilst logic judgments often complete quickly and are less prone to 
error. When the reasoning task is presented in a blocked design, or when WM demands 
are increased with an additional instructional condition, logic judgments take longer to 
complete. However, performance is generally poorer on belief conflict problems and 
these are more strongly associated with WM demands, inhibition and cognitive style. 
Taken together these findings suggest that belief based judgments involve effortful 
Type 2 processing. In the next section an alternative PC dual process interpretation of 
the findings is presented.  
 
5.4 An Alternative PC Account 
In our view and supported by De Neys’ work on conflict detection, certain logical 
inferences can be drawn automatically. We argue that a model that best fits the data 
under belief instruction is one in which the logical inference is accomplished rapidly 
and intuitively and requires inhibiting in order to generate a belief based response. 
However, this model would not explain why RNG interferes with logic judgments or 
why they take longer to complete in some experiments.   
In order to resolve these somewhat contradictory findings, we suggest that certain 
factors influence logicality.  For example, the Feeling of Rightness (Thompson, Prowse 
 176 
 
Inhibition 
Turner & Pennycook, 2011) generated by factors such as conceptual fluency (Morsanyi 
and Handley, 2012) can act as a logical cue outside conscious awareness.  Whilst factors 
that can influence explicit logical inferences are linked to WM, intelligence and certain 
cognitive styles (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich, 2005; Stanovich & West, 
1997). 
Therefore the proposal is that there are two routes to a logical solution; the first is the 
intuitive, fast completing logical route (see De Neys, 2012:2014) based on the feelings 
associated with valid and invalid arguments. These intuitive feelings about the 
conclusion trigger the Type 1 output that interferes with the ability give a belief based 
response. This Type1/Type2 conflict is responsible for the prevalent belief/logic 
interaction which shows logic having a greater impact on belief judgments. Therefore, 
we suggest that when instructed to reason on the basis of belief a modified version of a 
DI model fits the data, where a logical solution is generated intuitively and has to be 
inhibited until a belief based response is generated (see Figure 5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
A PC-Default Interventionist interpretation of Belief based judgments.  
When explicitly instructed to reason logically, the second, deliberative route to a logical 
solution is called on. This effortful route to a logical solution is impacted on by RNG 
(Experiment 5), takes longer to complete (Experiments 5, 7, 8 & 9) and is affected by 
increases in the complexity of the task.  However, due to the relatively simple nature of 
Logic 
T1 
Belief T2 
Conflict 
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these logical inferences, they are less prone to error. Consequently, a parallel processing 
model offers an appropriate interpretation of the data when explicitly instructed to 
reason logically. The model can explain the impact of load on accuracy scores and the 
increase in latencies (see Figure 5.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 
A Parallel Competitive interpretation of Logic based reasoning.  
Additional support for the theory that there are two paths to a logical solution is 
presented in the next section with the examination of behavioural data on problem 
complexity and individual differences measures.   
 
5.5 Further Support for Two Routes to a Logical Solution 
The first route to a logical solution, as presented in Figure 5.2, demonstrates the 
Type1/Type 2 conflict between intuitive logic and effortful beliefs. We argued that 
conceptual fluency and a feeling of rightness corresponds with a logical output being 
more strongly activated and is responsible for the impact of logic on belief based 
judgments. When provided with explicit instructions to reason logically, the second 
route is required which can be impacted on by factors such as WM resources. The data 
on both simple MP and complex disjunctives provides support for the two route theory.  
Logic 
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5.5.1 Complexity 
There is evidence that certain inferences can be drawn automatically, for example 
according to Radar and Sloutsky (2002) the direct or automatic route to a logical 
inference is connected to the conditional `if’ or the conjunction `or’ which are drawn 
during discourse processing. Radar and Sloutsky presented participants with short 
stories without conclusions, which corresponded with the MP or AC (affirming the 
consequent) inferences. They found that MP inferences primed a conclusion that 
participants mistakenly thought they had read, suggesting that logical MP inferences 
can be drawn without awareness (also see Leo & Greene, 2008; Reverberi, Pischedda, 
Burigo & Cherubini, 2012). The experimental data examining problem complexity in 
this thesis has shown that that conflict between belief and logic is greater for MP 
arguments (Experiment 4, 7 8 and 9). This supports the idea that the intuitive route to a 
logical solution completes first and requires inhibition if instructed to reason on the 
basis of beliefs.  
In contrast, these findings also showed that the effect of conflict was much smaller for 
disjunctive judgments which can be regarded as support for the second and explicit 
route to a logical solution.  Figure 5.4 illustrates how the conflict between belief and 
logic occurs much later, during Type 2 processing. When instructed to reason on the 
basis of belief, inhibition of the logic response may still be required but to a lesser 
extent, which results in less conflict between the two responses.  
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Inhibition 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 
A PC model illustrating the Belief/Logic conflict for Disjunctive arguments. These 
problems require Type 2 processing and conflict occurs much later.  
In Experiment 5, 7, 8 & 9, logic judgments look longer to complete and in Experiment 9 
there was an impact of conflict on logic latencies in the experimental condition. As 
further support for the second route to a logical solution, we conjectured that the parallel 
processing of belief judgments whilst answering according to logic, impacted on the 
time it took to produce an explicit logical output. This effect along with the small 
difference between logic conflict and no-conflict problems suggests that belief based 
responses can occasionally interfere with a logical output. We hypothesise that the level 
of conflict will depend on the complexity of the argument. For example, consider this 
more complex syllogistic problem:   
All doctors are fishermen 
Some fishermen are violinists 
Therefore, some doctors are not violinists 
For these types of problems a belief based response would complete first and require 
inhibiting in order for a logical output to complete. According to the model illustrated in 
Figure 5.5 both belief and logic based responses demand Type 2 processes creating a 
Type 2/Type 2 conflict. Unlike simple inferences there is less likely to be an intuitive 
Logic 
Belief 
Conflict 
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Inhibition 
route to a logical solution but, depending on the complexity of the syllogism, a belief 
based response may be available more rapidly.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 
PC model illustrating the Belief/Logic conflict for complex Syllogistic arguments.  
5.5.2 Individual Differences 
Consistent with the data that shows the CRT relating to logic based reasoning in 
Experiment 4 and belief based reasoning in Experiment 7 and 9, this could also provide 
support for two routes to a logical solution. Low CRT scorers are characterised as those 
more inclined to give a reflexive, intuitive response to a question that requires some 
deliberation to arrive at the correct answer. In Experiment 7 and 9 the impact of conflict 
was greater on beliefs for low CRT scorers than high CRT scorers, suggesting low CRT 
scorers rely more on their intuitive logical cues which results in more interference with 
belief based judgments (refer to Figure 5.2).  
When instructed to engage in explicit logical reasoning this requires effortful Type 2 
processing which will be influenced by factors such as WM and intelligence. Although 
the effect is a weak one, the relationship between CRT, AH4 and logic based inferences 
in Experiment 4 is consistent with a second and explicit route to a logical solution.  
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5.4.2 Summary of the Findings 
The research presented in this thesis suggests that accessing prior knowledge to 
formulate a conclusion requires effortful processing that is prone to errors. When 
instructed to reason about the validity of an argument, the integration of premise 
information and model construction also requires effortful processing which can be 
impacted on by a secondary load and take longer to complete. In contrast, simple 
arguments can cue an intuitive logical response, accompanied by a feeling of rightness 
associated with the validity of the argument, which cues a Type 1 output that interferes 
with belief based judgments. With more complex arguments such as syllogisms, a belief 
based response may complete first impacting on a logic based response. The data 
presented fits with a PC account that suggests both the logical structure of an argument 
and relevant knowledge are processed simultaneously. However, the direction of 
conflict experienced by the reasoner will depend on factors such as the complexity of 
the problem, the instructions delivered and the ability to draw on the appropriate 
executive resources for Type 2 processing. Both background knowledge and the 
structure of a problem provide important information that can be adhered to or 
dismissed and conflict between these sources of information can arise at the intuitive 
(Pennycook, Trippas, Handley & Thompson, 2013) or the deliberative (Banks & Hope, 
2014) level of processing.  
 
5.6 Research on Biases  
It is important to emphasise that the standard belief-bias effect in reasoning occurs in 
the context of instructing people to reason logically. Failure to do so inevitably leads to 
a belief based judgment since it is the only alternative response available in face of WM 
load (De Neys, 2006), cognitive ability and WM capacity (Macpherson & Stanovich, 
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2007; Stanovich, 2005; Stanovich & West, 1997; Stanovich &West, 2000). Correlations 
with performance on reasoning tasks may have nothing to do with belief-bias but might 
have everything to do with these ID measures reflecting an individual’s capacity to 
engage in the task in line with the instruction presented. The issue that arises from this 
is that our understanding of a biased reasoner or decision maker is only relative to the 
normative standard of the instructions provided which differ from one type of problem 
to the next.   
Research concerned with manipulating instruction has revealed different patterns of 
belief-bias which is not only the case in terms of syllogisms (Evans, Newstead, Allen & 
Pollard, 1994) but has been shown to affect the Conjunction Fallacy and Base Rate 
problems. For example, the Conjunction Fallacy (CF) or the Linda problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) is interpreted as the use of a Type 1- representative heuristics that 
leads to the neglect of the conjunction rule which is a basic rule of probability. This 
representative bias disappears when the problem is rephrased in terms frequencies. The 
same effect occurs for base rate problems (Gigerenzer, 1991), which causes us to 
question whether the focus of the problem or the way in which people are instructed is 
responsible for the outcome. For example does focusing on a specific person (Linda) in 
the Conjunction problem encourage a representative response, whilst the frequency 
format encourages a more general `normative’ response? Additionally, are the responses 
to the instruction `which is more probable?’ against `how many are there?’ really 
indicative of the same `normative standard’ or even measuring the same processes 
required to make these fundamentally different types of judgment.  
The processing of base-rate information is often regarded as requiring Type 2 
processing, however, Pennycook et al. (2013) found when they asked participants to 
respond to base-rate problems according to beliefs or statistical information, both 
sources of information where available at the Type 1 level. They found that participants 
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where just as fast and as confident about making judgments based on statistics as they 
were about judgments based on beliefs and these interfered with each other to the same 
extent. Therefore, ignoring base-rate information does not necessarily mean the 
information is not processed on some level.  
Similarly with the CRT, a normatively incorrect response on this measure does not 
necessarily mean that the ‘intuitive’ response is based on Type 1 processes. Perhaps the 
CRT is not about intuitive responding but about less processing being required for one 
type of response. For example, an incorrect response on any of the CRT questions is 
attributed to an erroneous intuitive (Type 1) output. However, even the incorrect 
response would involve some simple arithmetic to arrive at that answer. For example, 
take the third problem from the CRT;  
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it  
take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
The majority of people who answer incorrectly say 24; to arrive at 24 you would need 
to carry out the simple maths of dividing 48 by 2. If this simple processing was not 
occurring and people were not doing some mental arithmetic then there would not be a 
standard incorrect answer. The number 24 would be given as frequently as any other 
number and this is not the case. It is quite possible that the response regarded as 
intuitive is actually an effortful response that simply completes first producing a Type 
2/Type 2 conflict. The CRT is a really good example of a problem where, like belief-
bias, there is a simple cue to an erroneous solution. However, the fact that the cue is 
readily available does not necessarily mean that the response is driven by Type 1 
processing. Perhaps what should be focused on is the role of inhibition as a way of 
clarifying the type of conflict that is occurring in many of these problems? 
 184 
 
The assumptions and models offered in this thesis are relative to the instructions given 
to the participants and are specific to the type of problems used. Although some 
predictions are made about the outcomes using more complex syllogisms an important 
implication for research on biases is to not be tempted to make inferences about the 
state of response based on the fact that its activated rapidly, linked to limited cognitive 
ability or incorrect from a normative perspective because this does not necessarily mean 
it is intuitive in nature. Any changes to the direction of conflict and levels of processing 
will depend on problem type, instructions and the executive processes involved (i.e. 
inhibition).  
 
5.7 Future Research  
One of the key issues in determining the direction of interference between logic and 
belief judgments based on the models presented in section 5.5 is the complexity of the 
argument. As discussed earlier one would expect the impact of conflict to be greater on 
logical judgments with more complex arguments and smaller with belief judgments.  An 
interesting and potential area of development is to manipulate the complexity of beliefs 
by using materials that vary in terms of degree of belief and examine the impact on 
logic based reasoning as well as measuring how logical processing compromises 
beliefs. One might expect that with beliefs that are more complex to evaluate the impact 
of conflicting logical structure will be greater. 
In the last experimental chapter of this thesis we conjectured that inhibition plays a key 
role in dealing with conflict between belief and logic based reasoning, therefore another 
focus for future research could involve the manipulation of inhibition. There have been 
several studies to show a reduction in the size of colour–word interference through 
training on the Stroop task (Davidson, Zacks & Williams, 2003; Macleod, 1998), along 
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with improved response inhibition and reasoning through working memory training in 
children with ADHD (Klingberg et al., 2005). Further research on the effects of 
inhibition training has been carried out on the “Matching Bias” (Moutier, Angeard & 
Houdé, 2002; Houdé & Moutier, 1999) and the “Conjunction Fallacy” tasks (Cassotti & 
Moutier, 2010).  The training strategies used logical explanation and inhibition training 
which included emotional warnings about the risk of error. In both cases, logical 
explanation was not sufficient at overriding the heuristic response but inhibition training 
with emotional warning drastically changed the cortical anatomy of reasoning as a 
specific result of executive training (Houdé et al., 2000). It would be interesting to 
determine whether inhibition could be “trained” in order to modify some of findings in 
the research presented in this thesis. On the understanding that executive training aimed 
directly at bias inhibition can change reasoning performance and lead to neural 
reconfigurations (Moutier, Plagne-Cayeux, Melot & Houdé, 2006), perhaps inhibition 
training would improve an individual’s ability to inhibit the fast completing logic 
responses for simple arguments. Conversely, similar training using more complex 
inferences may improve the inhibition of faster completing belief responses.  
Developmental research on inhibition has shown that its capacity produces a curvilinear 
age trend. The ability to resist prepotent responses tends to improve from childhood to 
adolescence and declines again in later life (Bedard et al., 2002; Christ, White, 
Mandernach & Keys, 2001). De Neys & Van Geldor (2008) demonstrated that 
consistent with inhibitory capacities, syllogistic reasoning performance produced the 
same curvilinear pattern. Specifically they showed that when belief and logic conflict, 
performance is determined by a person’s aptitude for inhibiting belief based responses.  
Based on the research presented in this thesis one would expect that the effect of 
conflict on belief judgments to show a similar curvilinear trend. However the WM 
demand of the task would also depend on the type of arguments used. For example, 
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Modus Ponens inferences can be drawn relatively automatically (Reverberi et al. 2012) 
whilst more complex inferences such as Modus Tollens are available later (Reverberi, 
Burgio & Cherubini, 2009). One would expect no effect of conflict if inhibition 
resources were underdeveloped (in young children) or limited in any way. 
 
5.8 Conclusion  
This thesis has examined the impact of a secondary load on simple judgments using the 
novel methodology introduced by Handley et al. which instructed participants to 
reasoning on both the basis of logic and beliefs. The role of WM and inhibition in 
relation to both reasoning types was also investigated, using original variations of a 
Stroop and n-back task along with several ID measures. The main objective of this 
research was to advance the debate concerning DPT in reasoning, moving away from an 
exclusively DI model and toward a version of the PC approach to dual processing in an 
attempt to interpret our findings. We argued that the data was consistent with there 
being two routes to a logical solution for simple judgments; one intuitive and one 
deliberative. The findings also confirmed that effortful belief based judgments demand 
on executive resources; however, both background knowledge and the structure of a 
problem can provide important information that can be followed or disregarded. Finally, 
the conflict experienced between knowledge based and structural information can occur 
at a Type1/Type 2 level or a Type 2/Type 2 level.  
In this thesis, we have shown a function for intuitive logic and support for the effortful 
nature of belief judgments. Future research should focus on the important role 
instructions, problem type, complexity and executive resources play in our 
interpretation of research on biases in human reasoning.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Brief, Instructions & Debrief 
 
Experiment 1: Brief, Instructions, Debrief  
 
Brief & Consent Form 
 
In this Experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If a person is swimming, then they are dry 
Suppose and person is swimming  
Is the person wet? 
On some trials you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion follows logically and 
on other trials you will be asked whether the conclusion is believable.  
Whilst making these judgments you will also be asked to remember some information 
about the location of a series of dots in a grid. (See instructions for details).  The whole 
procedure will take approximately 25-35 minutes.  
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I understand the aims of this research; that I am free to withdraw from the research at 
any time and ask for my data to be destroyed if I wish (for up to two weeks after the 
experiment was run) and that my data will remain anonymous.  
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities.  
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
Name:        ……………………………………….   
Signature:   .....................................……………..               Date:   ................………….. 
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Instructions 
 
The instructions were delivered via E-prime as follows: 
In the following experiment you will be presented with 64 reasoning problems of the 
following type: 
If a child is crying, then it is sad 
Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child is sad? 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs or according 
to logic. When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in 
relation to your knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be full? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is unbelievable. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic. In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate 
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentences. A valid 
conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass is empty? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that “if you finish your drink then the glass will be full” and 
supposing you “finish your drink” you must logically conclude that your glass will be 
full. This is why the conclusion “does it follow that the glass is empty” is logically 
invalid. 
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For every problem you will first be presented with one statement. Once you have read 
this statement press space to see the second statement, the conclusion and response 
options. At this point the initial statement will disappear. 
The response options will either show valid/invalid or believable/unbelievable. If they 
show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic. If they show 
believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. 
Please indicate your choice by pressing:  s) for VALID or BELIEVABLE and k) for 
INVALID or UNBELIEVABLE; depending on the available options. 
Before every belief/logic problem you will be presented with a pattern of dots in a 3 x 3 
grid for a very short time. It is your task to remember this pattern before solving the 
main problem (which you will be presented with after studying the pattern). 
After responding to the main problem you will be presented with an empty grid in 
which you have to reproduce the dot pattern by clicking in the empty spaces.  
If you make a mistake, click the dot again to make it disappear. After reproducing the 
entire dot pattern, click `confirm’ to move on to the next problem. 
Make sure you reproduce the dot pattern correctly, or the trial becomes invalid. 
However, try to respond as quickly and accurately as possible on both tasks. 
You will now be presented with 8 trials to practice these instructions. These do not 
count towards your total performance. 
For the first four trials, you will be presented with four belief/logic reasoning problems. 
In the final four trials, you will be presented with the dot pattern task alongside the 
belief/logic reasoning problems.  
If you have not familiarised yourself with the task after these practice trials, please ask 
the experimenter for more instructions before you start with the actual experiment. 
You will now be presented with the last 4 practice trials. Please remember the dot 
pattern, make the belief or logic judgment and correctly reproduce the pattern using the 
mouse. 
This concludes the practice trials. 
If you have any additional questions, please ask them now. 
If not PRESS SPACE TO BEGIN WITH THE ACTUAL EXPERIMENT 
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Debrief 
 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument. 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere 
with one another when participants are asked to make judgments based upon either the 
structure of an argument or knowledge relating to its content.  
To test the hypothesis that reasoning on the basis of beliefs requires effortful processing; 
we added a secondary task to the Experiment. Participants were initially assigned to 
High and Low load conditions of the secondary task, which consisted of a Dot Memory 
Task being presented to the participant prior to the appearance of the problem and then 
asked to recall the pattern after they had made their inference. This task has been shown 
to interfere with conditional reasoning under logic instructions. We believe that if the 
secondary task interferes with belief based instructions in this research, then belief 
based reasoning requires more effort than previously reported.  
We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below: 
 
Researcher:    Stephanie Howarth:  
    stephanie.howarth@plymouth.ac.uk 
Supervisor:    Professor Simon Handley:  
    shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
Second Supervisor:              Dr Clare Walsh 
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    clare.walsh@plymouth.ac.uk 
Alternative Contact:                Paula Simson: Secretary to the Human Ethics Committee 
                          paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
Contact Tel: 01752 584503 
References:  
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual process accounts of reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454-459 
Handley, S.J., Newstead, S. E., & Trippas, D. (2011). Logic, beliefs and instruction: A 
test of the default interventionist account of belief bias. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 37,28-43. 
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Experiment 2: Brief, Instructions, Debrief  
 
Brief 
 
For the Random Number Generation Group in Experiments 2 & 3: 
In this Experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If a person is swimming, then they are dry 
Suppose a person is swimming  
Is the person wet? 
On some trials you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion follows logically and 
on other trials you will be asked whether the conclusion is believable.  
Whilst making these judgments you will also be asked to say out aloud a random 
number between 1 and 9, every second, on the beep of a metronome. (See instructions 
for details). The whole procedure will take approximately 20-30 minutes.  
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
 
 
For the Articulatory Suppression Group in Experiment 2 only: 
In this Experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If a person is swimming, then they are dry 
Suppose a person is swimming  
Is the person wet? 
On some trials you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion follows logically and 
on other trials you will be asked whether the conclusion is believable.  
Whilst making these judgments you will also be asked to say aloud the number two, 
every second, on the beep of a metronome. (See instructions for details). The whole 
procedure will take approximately 20-30 minutes.  
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You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
 
 
For the Control Group in Experiments 2 & 3: 
In this Experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If a person is swimming, then they are dry 
Suppose a person is swimming  
Is the person wet? 
On some trials you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion follows logically and 
on other trials you will be asked whether the conclusion is believable.  
The whole procedure will take approximately 15-20 minutes.  
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
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Consent form 
 
The same form was used across each group in experiments 2 – 5 & 7 – 9.  
I understand the aims of this research; that I am free to withdraw from the research at 
any time and ask for my data to be destroyed if I wish (for up to two weeks after the 
experiment was run) and that my data will remain anonymous.  
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities.  
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
Name:        ……………………………………….   
 
Signature:   .....................................……………..               Date:   ................………….. 
 
 
Instructions 
 
For the Random Number Generation Group: 
In the following experiment you will be presented with 64 reasoning problems of the 
following type: 
If a child is crying, then it is sad 
Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child is sad? 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs or according 
to logic. When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in 
relation to your knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be full? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
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The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is unbelievable. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic. In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate 
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentences. A valid 
conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass is empty? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid.  In this particular example the correct 
answer according to logic is INVALID, because the first premise states that “if you 
finish your drink then the glass will be full” and supposing you “finish your drink” you 
must logically conclude that your glass will be full. This is why the conclusion “does it 
follow that the glass is empty” is logically invalid. 
For every problem you will first be presented with one statement.  Once you have read 
this statement press space to see the second statement, the conclusion and response 
options. At this point the initial statement will disappear. The response options will 
either show valid/invalid or believable/unbelievable.  
If they show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic. If they show 
believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. 
Please indicate your choice by pressing s) for VALID or BELIEVABLE and k) for 
INVALID or UNBELIEVABLE; depending on the available options. 
During this experiment a metronome beep will sound every second (1000ms). This will 
be audible through your earphones.  It is your task to say aloud a number between 1-9 
on each beep; for the entire duration of the experiment; and your responses will be 
recorded on a dicta-phone. You are to continue generating random numbers whilst 
solving the reasoning problems.   
In order to understand the concept of randomness, please consider the following:  
Suppose you had written the numbers 1-9 on pieces of paper and put them in a hat. You 
take out one piece of paper, call out the number and return it to the hat. Then you reach 
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for another piece of paper and do the same thing. The series of numbers you call out in 
that way should be random.  
It is important for you to maintain a consistent response rhythm to the generation of 
numbers. If you should fall behind, please listen to the beep and promptly re-establish 
your pace.  
Place the earphones on now and you will hear the metronome beep.  Please practice 
generating random numbers on each beep for the next 10 seconds. 
Keeping your headphones on, you will now be presented with four practice reasoning 
problems, together with the metronome beep to practice the two together. These practice 
trials do not count towards your total performance. 
If you have not familiarised yourself with the task after these practice trials, please ask 
the experimenter for more instructions before you start with the actual experiment. 
You will now be presented with the four practice reasoning trials and metronome beep 
together.  
This concludes the practice trials. 
If you have any additional questions, please ask them now. 
If not Please PAUSE counting for 10 beeps:   
NOW COMMENCE COUNTING AND PRESS SPACE TO BEGIN WITH THE 
ACTUAL EXPERIMENT 
 
 
Specific instructions for the Articulatory Suppression Group: 
During this experiment a metronome beep will sound every 1000ms. This will be 
audible through your earphones.  It is your task to say aloud the number 2 on each beep, 
for the entire duration of the experiment, and your responses will be recorded on a dicta-
phone. 
You are to continue saying 2 on each beep whilst solving the reasoning problems.  It is 
important for you to maintain a consistent response rhythm. If you should fall behind, 
please listen to the beep and promptly re-establish your pace.  
 
 
For the Control Group, the instructions are the same as the RNG and AS group minus 
secondary task instructions.  
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Debrief 
 
Presented to each group: 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument. 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere 
with one another when participants are asked to make judgments based upon either the 
structure of an argument or knowledge relating to its content.  
To test the hypothesis that reasoning on the basis of beliefs requires effortful processing; 
we added a secondary task to the Experiment. Participants were initially assigned to 
High load, Low load, or Control condition. The High Load condition required 
participants to randomly generate a number between 1 and 9, every second, whilst 
completing the reasoning questions. This secondary task is meant to heavily impact on 
working memory and we believe if this interferes with belief based instructions in this 
research, then belief based reasoning requires more effort than previously reported. The 
Low load condition required participants to say the number two out aloud, every second, 
whilst completing the reasoning questions. Previous research has indicated that this 
form of Articulatory suppression should not impact greatly on reasoning ability. Finally 
the control group had no secondary load and completed the reasoning questions alone.  
We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below (see experiment 1) 
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Experiment 3: Instructions, Debrief  
 
Instructions 
 
For the RNG group:  
In the following experiment you will be presented with 64 reasoning problems of the 
following type: 
If a child is crying, then it is sad 
Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child is sad? 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs or according 
to logic. When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in 
relation to your knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be full? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is unbelievable. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic. In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate 
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentences. A valid 
conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass is empty? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
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If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. In this particular example the correct 
answer according to logic is INVALID, because the first premise states that “if you 
finish your drink then the glass will be full” and supposing you “finish your drink” you 
must logically conclude that your glass will be full. This is why the conclusion “does it 
follow that the glass is empty” is logically invalid. 
For every problem you will first be presented with one statement. You have a few 
seconds to read the first statement before the second statement, the conclusion and 
response options appear on the screen.  
The response options will either show valid/invalid or believable/unbelievable. If they 
show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic. If they show 
believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. 
Please indicate your choice by pressing s) for VALID or BELIEVABLE and k) for 
INVALID or UNBELIEVABLE; depending on the available options. 
During this experiment a metronome beep will sound every second (1000ms). This will 
be audible through your earphones. It is your task to say aloud a number between 1-9 on 
each beep; for the entire duration of the experiment; and your responses will be 
recorded on a dicta-phone. 
You are to continue generating random numbers whilst solving the reasoning problems.   
In order to understand the concept of randomness, please consider the following:  
Suppose you had written the numbers 1-9 on pieces of paper and put them in a hat. You 
take out one piece of paper, call out the number and return it to the hat. Then you reach 
for another piece of paper and do the same thing. The series of numbers you call out in 
that way should be random.  
It is important for you to maintain a consistent response rhythm to the generation of 
numbers. If you should fall behind, please listen to the beep and promptly re-establish 
your pace.  
Place the earphones on now and you will hear the metronome beep.  Please practice 
generating random numbers on each beep for the next 10 seconds. 
Keeping your headphones on, you will now be presented with four practice reasoning 
problems, together with the metronome beep to practice the two together. These practice 
trials do not count towards your total performance. 
If you have not familiarised yourself with the task after these practice trials, please ask 
the experimenter for more instructions before you start with the actual experiment. 
You will now be presented with the four practice reasoning trials and metronome beep 
together.  
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This concludes the practice trials. If you have any additional questions, please ask them 
now. 
If not please PAUSE counting for 10 beeps. 
NOW COMMENCE COUNTING AND PRESS SPACE TO BEGIN WITH THE 
ACTUAL EXPERIMENT. 
 
For the Control Group, the instructions are the same as above minus secondary task 
instructions.  
 
Debrief 
 
Presented to both groups: 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument. 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere 
with one another when participants are asked to make judgments based upon either the 
structure of an argument or knowledge relating to its content.  
To test the hypothesis that reasoning on the basis of beliefs requires effortful processing; 
we added a secondary task to the Experiment. Participants were initially assigned to the 
Secondary load condition or the Control condition. The secondary load condition 
required participants to randomly generate a number between 1 and 9, every second, 
whilst completing the reasoning questions. This secondary task is meant to heavily 
impact on working memory and we believe if this interferes with belief based 
instructions in this research, then belief based reasoning requires more effort than 
previously reported. The Control group had no secondary load and completed the 
reasoning questions alone.  
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We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below (see experiment 1). 
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Experiment 4: Brief, Instructions, Debrief  
 
Brief 
 
For the Random Number Generation Group:  
The first part of this study requires you to complete a short Intelligence questionnaire 
which will take less than 10 minutes.  
The second part to this study is interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If a person is swimming, then they are dry 
Suppose a person is swimming  
Is the person wet? 
Or  
The door is either red or blue. 
The door is not blue. 
Therefore, is the door red?  
On some trials you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion follows logically and 
on other trials you will be asked whether the conclusion is believable.  
Whilst making these judgments you will also be asked to say out aloud a random 
number between 1 and 9, every second, on the beep of a metronome. (See 
instructions for details). The whole procedure will take approximately 30-40 
minutes.  
On completion of the computer based task, you will be required to complete a short 
questionnaire and 3 short problems which should take between 5 – 10 minutes. 
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
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For the Control Group the bold font section referring to the secondary task was replaced 
with:  
“The whole procedure will take approximately 25-35 minutes”.  
 
 
Instructions  
 
In the following experiment you will be presented with 128 reasoning problems of the 
following type: 
If a child is crying, then it is sad 
Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child is sad? 
Or 
Either the snow is cold or the snow is hot 
Suppose the snow is not cold 
Does it follow that the snow is not hot? 
 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs or according 
to logic. When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in 
relation to your knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be full? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is unbelievable. 
The same applies to the following example: 
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Either you finish your drink and the glass is full or it is empty 
Suppose you finish your drink and the glass is not full 
Does it follow that the glass is empty? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
 
The correct answer according to beliefs is BELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is believable. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic. In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate 
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentences. A valid 
conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass is empty? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that “if you finish your drink then the glass will be full” and 
supposing you “finish your drink” you must logically conclude that your glass will be 
full. This is why the conclusion “does it follow that the glass is empty” is logically 
invalid. 
And the same applies to the following example:  
Either you finish your drink and the glass is full or it is empty 
Suppose you finish your drink and the glass is not empty 
Does it follow that the glass is not full? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
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In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that either the glass can be full or empty, if it is not empty then 
you must logically conclude that it has to be full. This is why the conclusion “does it 
follow that the glass is not full” is logically invalid. 
For every problem you will first be presented with one statement. You have a few 
seconds to read the first statement before the second statement, the conclusion and 
response options appear on the screen.  The response options will either show 
valid/invalid or believable/unbelievable. 
If they show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic. If they show 
believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. 
Please indicate your choice by pressing s) for VALID or BELIEVABLE and k) for 
INVALID or UNBELIEVABLE; depending on the available options. 
During this experiment a metronome beep will sound every second (1000ms). This will 
be audible through your earphones. It is your task to say aloud a number between 1-9 on 
each beep; for the entire duration of the experiment; and your responses will be 
recorded on a dicta-phone. You are to continue generating random numbers whilst 
solving the reasoning problems.   
In order to understand the concept of randomness, please consider the following:  
Suppose you had written the numbers 1-9 on pieces of paper and put them in a hat. You 
take out one piece of paper, call out the number and return it to the hat. Then you reach 
for another piece of paper and do the same thing. The series of numbers you call out in 
that way should be random.  
It is important for you to maintain a consistent response rhythm to the generation of 
numbers. If you should fall behind, please listen to the beep and promptly re-establish 
your pace.  
Place the earphones on now and you will hear the metronome beep.  Please practice 
generating random numbers ALOUD on each beep for the next 10 seconds. 
Keeping your headphones on, you will now be presented with 8 practice reasoning 
problems, together with the metronome beep to practice the two together. These practice 
trials do not count towards your total performance. 
If you have not familiarised yourself with the task after these practice trials, please ask 
the experimenter for more instructions before you start with the actual experiment. 
This concludes the practice trials. If you have any additional questions, please ask them 
now. 
If not please PAUSE counting for 10 beeps and then say ALOUD `Starting Experiment’.  
NOW COMMENCE COUNTING AND PRESS SPACE TO BEGIN WITH THE 
ACTUAL EXPERIMENT 
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The same instructions were used for the control group minus any reference to the 
secondary task.  
 
Debrief 
 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument. 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere 
with one another when participants are asked to make judgments based upon either the 
structure of an argument or knowledge relating to its content.  
To test the hypothesis that reasoning on the basis of beliefs requires effortful processing; 
we added a secondary task to the Experiment. Participants were initially assigned to 
High load, or Control conditions. The High Load condition required participants to 
randomly generate a number between 1 and 9, every second, whilst completing the 
reasoning questions. This secondary task is meant to heavily impact on working 
memory and we believe if this interferes with belief based instructions in this research, 
then belief based reasoning requires more effort than previously reported. The control 
group had no secondary load and completed the reasoning questions alone.  
With the short Intelligence test (AH4), Thinking Disposition Questionnaire (AOT) and 
Cognitive Reflection test (CRT), we are hoping to uncover significant relationships 
between cognitive ability and distinct reasoning types.  
We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below: 
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Researcher:    Stephanie Howarth:  
    stephanie.howarth@plymouth.ac.uk 
Supervisor:    Professor Simon Handley:  
    shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
Second Supervisor:              Dr Clare Walsh 
    clare.walsh@plymouth.ac.uk 
Alternative Contact:                Paula Simson: Secretary to the Human Ethics Committee 
                                      paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk  
      Contact Tel: 01752 584503  
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Experiment 5: Brief, Instructions, Debrief  
 
Brief 
 
For the Random Number Generation Group:  
The first part of this study requires you to complete 3 short problems which will take a 
couple of minutes.  
The second part to this study is interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If a person is swimming, then they are dry 
Suppose a person is swimming  
Is the person wet? 
Or  
The door is either red or blue. 
The door is not blue. 
Therefore, is the door red?  
On some trials you will be asked to judge whether the conclusion follows logically and 
on other trials you will be asked whether the conclusion is believable.  
Whilst making these judgments you will also be asked to say out aloud a random 
number between 1 and 9, every second, to the tick of a metronome. (See 
instructions for details). The whole procedure will take approximately 20-25 
minutes.  
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
 
For the Control Group the bold font section referring to the secondary task was replaced 
with:  
“The whole procedure will take approximately 15-20 minutes”.  
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Instructions  
 
In the following experiment you will be presented with 128 reasoning problems of the 
following type: 
If a child is crying, then it is sad 
Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child is sad? 
or 
Either the snow is cold or the snow is hot 
Suppose the snow is not cold 
Does it follow that the snow is not hot? 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs or according 
to logic. When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in 
relation to your knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If you finish a drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass will be full? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that if you finish your drink then the glass will be 
empty, therefore the conclusion is unbelievable. 
The same applies to the following example: 
Either the snow is cold or it is hot 
Suppose the snow is not hot 
Does it follow that snow is cold? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
The correct answer according to beliefs is BELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that snow is cold, therefore the conclusion is 
believable. 
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On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic. In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate 
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentences. A valid 
conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full 
Suppose you finish your drink 
Does it follow that the glass is empty? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. In this particular example the correct 
answer according to logic is INVALID, because the first premise states that “if you 
finish your drink then the glass will be full” and supposing you “finish your drink” you 
must logically conclude that your glass will be full. This is why the conclusion “does it 
follow that the glass is empty” is logically invalid. 
And the same applies to the following example:   
Either the snow is cold or it is hot 
Suppose the snow is not hot 
Does it follow that the snow is not cold? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that either the snow is cold or it is hot, if it is not hot then you 
must logically conclude that it cold.  This is why the conclusion “does it follow that the 
snow is not cold” is logically invalid. 
For every problem you will first be presented with one statement. You have a few 
seconds to read the first statement before the second statement, the conclusion and 
response options appear on the screen. The response options will either show 
valid/invalid or believable/unbelievable. 
If they show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic. If they show 
believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. 
Please indicate your choice by pressing s) for VALID or BELIEVABLE and k) for 
INVALID or UNBELIEVABLE; depending on the available options. 
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During this experiment a metronome tick will sound every second (1000)ms. This will 
be audible through your earphones.  
It is your task to say ALOUD a number between 1-9 on each tick; for the entire duration 
of the experiment; and your responses will be recorded on a dicta-phone. 
You will be asked to generate random numbers continuously for 5 minutes without 
answering any questions. Then you will be presented with a practice trial where you 
will be required to generate random numbers whilst solving the problems and this is 
what you will continue to do in the main part of the experiment. In order to understand 
the concept of randomness, please consider the following:  
Suppose you had written the numbers 1-9 on pieces of paper and put them in a hat. You 
take out one piece of paper, call out the number and return it to the hat. Then you reach 
for another piece of paper and do the same thing. The series of numbers you call out in 
that way should be random.  
It is important for you to maintain a consistent response rhythm to the generation of 
numbers. If you should fall behind, please listen to the tick and promptly re-establish 
your pace. 
Place the earphones on now and you will hear the metronome tick.   
In a moment I would like you to start generating random numbers ALOUD on each tick 
for the next 5 minutes. When you press the `space' bar a white screen will appear and 
you can start generating the numbers until further instructions.  
Blank screen for 5 minutes 
Keeping your headphones on, you will now be presented with 8 practice reasoning 
problems, together with the metronome tick to practice the two together. These practice 
trials do not count towards your total performance. 
If you have not familiarised yourself with the task after these practice trials, please ask 
the experimenter for more instructions before you start with the actual experiment. 
This concludes the practice trials, if you have any additional questions, please ask them 
now, if not please PAUSE counting for 10 ticks and then say ALOUD `Starting 
Experiment': 
NOW COMMENCE COUNTING AND PRESS SPACE TO BEGIN WITH THE 
ACTUAL EXPERIMENT. 
 
For the Control Group, the instructions were the same apart from they were only 
instructed to generate random numbers for the first 5 minutes of the experiment and 
then instructed to stop and continue with the reasoning questions only.  
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Debrief 
 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument. 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere 
with one another when participants are asked to make judgments based upon either the 
structure of an argument or knowledge relating to its content.  
To test the hypothesis that reasoning on the basis of beliefs requires effortful processing; 
we added a secondary task to the Experiment. Participants were initially assigned to 
High load, or Control conditions. The High Load condition required participants to 
randomly generate a number between 1 and 9, every second, whilst completing the 
reasoning questions. This secondary task is meant to heavily impact on working 
memory and we believe if this interferes with belief based instructions in this research, 
then belief based reasoning requires more effort than previously reported. The control 
group had no secondary load and completed the reasoning questions alone.  
With the Cognitive Reflection test (CRT), we are hoping to uncover significant 
relationships between cognitive ability and distinct reasoning types.  
We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below (see experiment 1). 
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Experiment 7: Brief, Instructions, Debrief  
 
Brief 
 
Brief for the Experimental and Control condition in Experiment 7 and the Experimental 
condition in Experiments 7 & 8:  
In this experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow  
Suppose the fruit is a cherry  
Does it follow that the fruit is red? 
Or  
Either polar bears are white or they are purple  
Suppose polar bears are white  
Does it follow that polar bears are purple? 
You will be asked to judge whether the conclusion is believable, whether it follows 
logically or determine whether the characteristic of the last word in the current trial is 
the `same’ or `different’ to the previous trial.  
The whole procedure will take approximately 30-35 minutes.  
On completion of the reasoning task, you will be required to complete another 2 
Working Memory tasks and a short cognitive ability task.  This should take between 15 
and 20 minutes. 
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
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Instructions  
 
Instructions for the Experimental and Control condition in Experiment 7 and the 
Experimental condition in Experiments 8:  
In the following experiment you will be presented with 192 reasoning problems with a 
break in between.  
The problems will be presented as follows:  
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
or 
Either tomatoes are red or they are white 
Suppose tomatoes are white 
Does it follow that tomatoes are not 
red? 
The last word of each problem will be in a different font. 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs, according to 
logic or according to the characteristics of the last word in the conclusion.  
When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in relation to your 
knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
The correct answer according to beliefs is BELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that cherries are red, therefore the conclusion is 
believable. 
The same applies to the following example: 
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Either tomatoes are red or they are white 
Suppose tomatoes are white 
Does it follow that tomatoes are not 
red? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that tomatoes are red, therefore the conclusion is 
unbelievable. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic. In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate 
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentence. 
A valid conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that “If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow” and supposing 
“...the fruit is a cherry” you must logically conclude that it has to be `yellow'. This is 
why the conclusion “does it follow that the fruit is red?” is logically invalid. 
And the same applies to the following example:  
Either tomatoes are red or they are white 
Suppose tomatoes are white 
Does it follow that tomatoes are 
red? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
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If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that either the tomatoes are red or white, if they are white then 
you must logically conclude that they are not red. This is why the conclusion “Does it 
follow that tomatoes are red?” is logically invalid. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to identify whether the characteristic of 
the last word in the present trial matches the characteristic of the last word in the 
previous trial.  In these cases it is irrelevant whether the statement is valid/invalid or 
believable/unbelievable. 
You will not know whether you will be required to answer according to beliefs, logic or 
characteristics until the response options are presented.  Therefore, it is essential that 
you keep track of the characteristic of the last word in each trial, throughout the 
experiment.  
In the first slide the answer was `believable' and the last word `red' was in Raive font.  
Therefore the correct answer for the second slide was S) Same, since the last word was 
in the same font. 
It is NOT important for you to know the name of the font, just indicate whether you 
think the font of the last word in the present trial matches the last word in the previous 
trial. 
You only do this when the trial indicates; `Same' or `Different' as the response options. 
Remember, you will not know how you should answer the trial until the response 
options are presented, therefore, always keep in mind the characteristic of last word 
from the previous trial.   
In the first slide the answer was `valid' and the last word `red' was in Lucida Font. 
Therefore the correct answer for the second slide was K) Different, because the last 
word was Curlz Font, not Lucida Font.  
For every problem you will first be presented with one statement. You have a few 
seconds to read the first statement before the second statement, the conclusion and 
response options appear on the screen.  
The response options will either show valid/invalid, believable/unbelievable or 
same/different.  If they show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic. If 
they show believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. If 
they show same/different indicate whether the characteristic of the last word in the 
present trial is the same or different from the last word of the previous trial.  
When answering on the basis of belief or logic, the characteristic of the last word is 
irrelevant.  
When responding on the basis of belief, logic or characteristic the following applies: 
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 s) for VALID, BELIEVABLE or SAME and k) for INVALID, UNBELIEVABLE or 
DIFFERENT; depending on the available options. 
You will now be presented with 12 practice reasoning problems. These practice trials do 
not count towards your total performance. 
If you have not familiarised yourself with the task after these practice trials, please ask 
the experimenter for more instructions before you start with the actual experiment. 
That completes the practice trials. If you have any questions please ask the experimenter 
now. If you are ready to continue PRESS SPACE TO START THE ACTUAL 
EXPERIMENT. 
 
 
Debrief 
 
The following debrief was used in Experiment 7 & 8. 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
Our research up to this point has suggested that whilst belief and logic based judgments 
employ the Working Memory, they may be pulling on distinct executive resources.  
The aim of this research is to investigate the executive process of memory updating and 
determine whether belief and logic based reasoning command this specific executive 
resource. 
To investigate this, we used a unique version of the N Back task. This task requires you 
to remember the characteristic of the last word 1 trial back and continuously update the 
information in your memory with each new trial.  
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This study should help us determine whether belief or logic based reasoning correlates 
with the executive resource of updating. We hypothesise that if logic based judgments 
require memory updating then the N back task should have a larger effect on logic 
judgments than belief based judgments. 
We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below (see experiment 1). 
 
Instructions for Short Stroop Task 
 
Adapted from Raz, Shapiro, Fan & Posner ( 2002) and used in Experiments 7 – 9.  
 
In this experiment you will be presented with a succession of words written in one of 
four of the following ink colours: red, blue, green yellow.  
Before a word is presented you must focus your eyes on a fixation cross at the centre of 
the screen, until a word appears replacing the cross and you respond.  
Your task is to identify the ink colour in which a word is written by pressing one of four 
keys on the keyboard.  
The following 4 keys; V, B, N, and M, correspond with the colours red, blue, green, and 
yellow.  
These are marked on your keyboard with the first letter that represents the colour.  
Please use two fingers of each hand to press these response keys. For example: left 
middle finger for V and right index finger for N. 
Please respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
There will be 3 practice trials, with feedback, to familiarise yourself with the 
experiment. If you have any queries once you have completed the practice trials, please 
speak to the experimenter.  
Press next to continue. 
After the practice trials: 
This concludes the practice trials, if you have any question before you start the main 
part of the experiment, please ask the experimenter now.  
If you are ready to continue on to the experimental trials, press next. 
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Instructions for Operation Span Task 
 
Adapted from Turner & Engle (1989) and used in Experiments 7 – 9.  
 
In this task you will be presented a simple equation followed by a single word to 
remember.  
For example:  
(3 x 4) + 11 = 22 
Bear 
You will have to determine whether the sum of the equation given is true or false and 
also memorise the word presented after the equation. 
If you think the answer to the sum is correct then click `Yes’ if you think the answer to 
the sum is incorrect then click `no’. 
You have 8 seconds to verify the equations so you need to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. 
After verifying the sum of the equation, you will be instructed to recall the words in the 
order in which they were presented.  
To begin with you will be presented with 3 practice trials, to familiarise yourself with 
the experiment. If you have any queries once you have completed the practice trials, 
please speak to the experimenter.  
After the practice trials: 
This concludes the practice trials, if you have any question before you start the main 
part of the experiment, please ask the experimenter now.  
If you are ready to continue on to the experimental trials, press next. 
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Experiment 8: Brief, Instructions  
 
Brief 
 
Brief for the Control group:  
In this experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow  
Suppose the fruit is a cherry  
Does it follow that the fruit is red? 
Or  
Either polar bears are white or they are purple  
Suppose polar bears are white  
Does it follow that polar bears are purple? 
You will be asked to judge whether the conclusion is believable, whether it follows 
logically or determine whether the characteristic of the last word in the conclusion is the 
`same’ or `different’ to the last word in the first premise (sentence).  
The whole procedure will take approximately 30-35 minutes.  
On completion of the reasoning task, you will be required to complete another 2 
Working Memory tasks and a short cognitive ability task.  This should take between 15 
and 20 minutes. 
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
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Instructions  
 
The body of information is the same as experiment 8 with specific instructions for the 
Control group outlined below: 
…On some of the problems you will be instructed to identify whether the characteristic 
of the last word in the conclusion matches the characteristic of the last word in the first 
premise (sentence).  
The last word in the first premise and conclusion will either be in: Lucida Font, 
Algerian Font, Curlz Font, Raive Font or Bradley Hand Font. 
When matching the word characteristics, it is irrelevant whether the statement is 
valid/invalid or believable/unbelievable. 
You will not know whether you will be required to answer according to beliefs, logic or 
characteristics until the response options are presented. 
In the first slide the conclusion was `believable'. The font style of the last word in the 
conclusion was irrelevant.  
In the second slide you would have been required to answer according to characteristics. 
The last word of the first premise `yellow' was in a different font style to the last word 
in the conclusion. So the correct response would have been: k) Different.  
It is NOT important for you to know the name of the font, just indicate whether you 
think the font of the last word in the conclusion is the same or different to the last word 
in the first premise.   
You only do this when the trial indicates; `Same' or `Different' as the response options. 
Remember, you will not know how you should answer the trial until the response 
options are presented. 
In the first slide the conclusion was `valid', the characteristics of the last word in the 
conclusion was irrelevant. 
In the second slide, the last word in the first premise and the last word in the conclusion 
shared the same characteristics so the correct answer would have been: s)Same … 
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Experiment 9: Brief, Instructions, Debrief  
 
Brief 
 
In this experiment we are interested in examining how people respond to different 
instructions on reasoning tasks. You will be presented with problems of the following 
kind:  
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow  
Suppose the fruit is a cherry  
Does it follow that the fruit is red? 
Or  
Either polar bears are white or they are purple  
Suppose polar bears are white  
Does it follow that polar bears are purple? 
You will be asked to judge whether the conclusion is believable, whether it follows 
logically or to determine the ink colour of the last word.  
The whole procedure will take approximately 30-35 minutes.  
On completion of the reasoning task, you will be required to complete another 2 
Working Memory tasks and a short cognitive ability task.  This should take between 15 
and 20 minutes. 
You should also be aware that you will have the right to withdraw at any point during 
the experiment without incurring any penalty. Your data will be identified by a code 
number, rather than a name and it will remain anonymous, and will not be distributed to 
other researchers. 
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Instructions  
 
Presented to both the Experimental and Control conditions: 
In the following experiment you will be presented with 192 reasoning problems with a 
break in between.  
The problems will be presented as follows:  
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
or 
Either tomatoes are red or they are white 
Suppose tomatoes are white 
Does it follow that tomatoes are not 
red? 
The last word of each problem will be in colour. 
For each problem you will have to answer either according to your beliefs, according to 
logic or you will have to identify the ink colour of the last word. 
When instructed to answer according to your beliefs you must answer in relation to your 
knowledge of what is true in the world.  
For example: 
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
The correct answer according to beliefs is BELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that cherries are red, therefore the conclusion is 
believable. 
The same applies to the following example: 
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Either tomatoes are red or they are white 
Suppose tomatoes are white 
Does it follow that tomatoes are not 
red? 
s) BELIEVABLE        k) UNBELIEVABLE 
The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEVABLE because based upon your 
knowledge of the world you know that tomatoes are red, therefore the conclusion is 
unbelievable. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to answer according to logic.  In this 
case you must assume each statement is true (even if in reality it is not true) and indicate  
whether the conclusion follows validly from the preceding sentence. 
A valid conclusion is one that logically follows. 
For example: 
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
 
If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that “If the fruit is a cherry, then it is yellow” and supposing 
“...the fruit is a cherry” you must logically conclude that it has to be `yellow'. This is 
why the conclusion “does it follow that the fruit is red?” is logically invalid. 
 And the same applies to the following example:  
Either tomatoes are red or they are white 
Suppose tomatoes are white 
Does it follow that tomatoes are 
red? 
s) VALID        k) INVALID 
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If you think the conclusion follows logically, choose valid. If you do not think the 
conclusion follows logically, choose invalid. 
In this particular example the correct answer according to logic is INVALID, because 
the first premise states that either the tomatoes are red or white, if they are white then 
you must logically conclude that they are not red. This is why the conclusion “Does it 
follow that tomatoes are red?” is logically invalid. 
On some of the problems you will be instructed to identify the ink colour of the last 
word. In these cases it is irrelevant whether the statement is valid/invalid or 
believable/unbelievable. 
<Example> 
In the example the last word was written in red ink so the correct answer was; S) - Red 
<Example> 
In the last example the last word was written in white ink so the correct answer was; K) 
- White 
For every problem you will first be presented with one statement. You have a few 
seconds to read the first statement before the second statement, the conclusion and 
response options appear on the screen.  The response options will either show 
valid/invalid, believable/unbelievable or the choice of to 2 colours.  
 If they show valid/invalid you should respond on the basis of logic.  If they show 
believable/unbelievable you should respond on the basis of your beliefs. If they show 2 
colour options you should respond based on the ink colour of the last word.  
When answering on the basis of belief or logic, the colour of the last word is irrelevant.  
When responding on the basis of belief or logic the following applies: s) for VALID or 
BELIEVABLE and k) for INVALID or UNBELIEVABLE; depending on the available 
options. 
You will now be presented with 12 practice reasoning problems. These practice trials do 
not count towards your total performance. If you have not familiarised yourself with the 
task after these practice trials, please ask the experimenter for more instructions before 
you start with the actual experiment. 
This concludes the practice trials. If you have any questions please ask the experimenter 
now. If you are ready PRESS SPACE TO START THE ACTUAL EXPERIMENT. 
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Debrief 
 
Anonymous participant ID: _________________________ 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Over the past thirty years research on thinking and reasoning has demonstrated that 
beliefs often lead to poor judgments, that is they interfere with our ability to reason 
logically and have a tendency to `lead us astray' when drawing inferences. These 
findings paint a rather pessimistic view of human rationality, suggesting that beliefs are 
often immune to change through logical argument 
Recent research, however, suggests a much more optimistic view, showing that under 
certain circumstances, judgments relating to strongly held beliefs can themselves be 
undermined if they are inconsistent with the logical structure of an accompanying 
argument. Furthermore, reasoning about beliefs is often an effortful process, relying 
upon the integration of relevant knowledge with aspects of problem structure in order to 
generate a novel response. 
Our research up to this point has suggested that whilst belief and logic based judgments 
employ the Working Memory, they may be pulling on distinct executive resources.  
The aim of this research is to investigate the executive process of inhibition and 
determine whether belief and logic based reasoning command this specific executive 
resource. 
To investigate this, we used a unique version of the Stroop task. This task requires you 
to name the font colour of a coloured word that is either congruent or incongruent to the 
actual font colour. Our prepotent response is to say the colour that is written rather than 
the ink colour; consequently, the task requires the inhibition of this automatic 
inclination to read the word on incongruent trials. 
This study should help us determine whether belief or logic based reasoning correlates 
with our ability to inhibit prepotent responses. We hypothesise that belief based 
judgment require the inhibition of logical interference in order to successfully complete, 
therefore, those who score highly on the Stroop task should be better at belief based 
judgments.  
We would like to thank you again for taking part in our study. Should you have any 
further questions, or decide that you wish to withdraw your data from the study (within 
two weeks of taking part in the study) the contact details of the lead researcher are 
shown below: (see experiment 1) 
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Appendix B: Materials 
 
Experiments 1 – 6 
 
Modus Ponens stimulus (Experiments 1 – 6) 
Practice Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion 
If hair is cut, then it is longer 
than before 
Suppose Harry’s 
hair is cut 
Does it follow that Harry’s hair is 
shorter than before? 
If sugar is added to tea then it 
will taste bitter 
Suppose sugar is 
added to tea 
Does it follow that the tea will 
taste sweet? 
If a plant is watered, then it will 
continue growing 
Suppose a plant is 
watered 
Does it follow that the plant stops 
growing? 
If a person exercises, then their 
heart rate increases 
Suppose Donna 
exercises 
Does it follow that Donna’s heart 
rate increases? 
 
Experimental Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion 
If a child is crying, then it is 
happy Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
is sad? 
If a child is crying, then it is 
happy Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
is happy? 
If a child is crying, then it is sad Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
is happy? 
If a child is crying, then it is sad Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
is sad? 
If a dog is barking, then it is 
silent Suppose a dog is barking 
Does it follow that the dog 
is silent? 
If a dog is barking, then it is 
silent Suppose a dog is barking 
Does it follow that the dog 
is loud? 
If a dog is barking, then it is 
loud Suppose a dog is barking 
Does it follow that the dog 
is loud? 
If a dog is barking, then it is 
loud Suppose a dog is barking 
Does it follow that the dog 
is silent? 
If a person is swimming, then 
he is dry 
Suppose a person is 
swimming 
Does it follow that the 
person is wet? 
If a person is swimming, then 
he is dry 
Suppose a person is 
swimming 
Does it follow that the 
person is dry? 
If a person is swimming, then 
he is wet 
Suppose a person is 
swimming 
Does it follow that the 
person is dry? 
If a person is swimming, then 
he is wet 
Suppose a person is 
swimming 
Does it follow that the 
person is wet? 
If a tree is old, then it is small Suppose a tree is old 
Does it follow that the tree 
is small? 
If a tree is old, then it is small Suppose a tree is old 
Does it follow that the tree 
is large? 
If a tree is old, then it is large Suppose a tree is old Does it follow that the tree 
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is large? 
If a tree is old, then it is large Suppose a tree is old 
Does it follow that the tree 
is small? 
If a new computer is high-end, 
then it is cheap 
Suppose a new computer 
is high-end 
Does it follow that the new 
computer is expensive? 
If a new computer is high-end, 
then it is cheap 
Suppose a new computer 
is high-end 
Does it follow that the new 
computer is cheap? 
If a computer is high-end, then 
it is expensive 
Suppose a new computer 
is high-end 
Does it follow that the new 
computer is expensive? 
If a computer is high-end, then 
it is expensive 
Suppose a new computer 
is high-end 
Does it follow that the new 
computer is cheap? 
If a person eats too much, then 
they are skinny 
Suppose a person eats 
too much 
Does it follow that the 
person is skinny? 
If a person eats too much, then 
they are skinny 
Suppose a person eats 
too much 
Does it follow that the 
person is fat? 
If a person eats too much, then 
they are fat 
Suppose a person eats 
too much 
Does it follow that the 
person is skinny? 
If a person eats too much, then 
they are fat 
Suppose a person eats 
too much 
Does it follow that the 
person is fat? 
If the sky is grey, then it is 
sunny Suppose the sky is grey 
Does it follow that it is 
cloudy? 
If the sky is grey, then it is 
sunny Suppose the sky is grey 
Does it follow that it is 
sunny? 
If the sky is grey, then it is 
cloudy Suppose the sky is grey 
Does it follow that it is 
sunny? 
If the sky is grey, then it is 
cloudy Suppose the sky is grey 
Does it follow that it is 
cloudy? 
If the light switch is on, then it 
is dark inside 
Suppose the light switch 
is on 
Does it follow that it is dark 
inside? 
If the light switch is on, then it 
is dark inside 
Suppose the light switch 
is on 
Does it follow that it is 
bright inside? 
If the light switch is on, then it 
is bright inside 
Suppose the light switch 
is on 
Does it follow that it is 
bright inside? 
If the light switch is on, then it 
is bright inside 
Suppose the light switch 
is on 
Does it follow that it is dark 
inside? 
If a hamster gets fed, then it 
will die 
Suppose a hamster gets 
fed 
Does it follow that the 
hamster will live? 
If a hamster gets fed, then it 
will die 
Suppose a hamster gets 
fed 
Does it follow that the 
hamster will die? 
If a hamster gets fed, then it 
will live 
Suppose a hamster gets 
fed 
Does it follow that the 
hamster will live? 
If a hamster gets fed, then it 
will live 
Suppose a hamster gets 
fed 
Does it follow that the 
hamster will die? 
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, 
then it will fly 
Suppose an aeroplane 
runs out of fuel 
Does it follow that the 
aeroplane will fly? 
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, 
then it will fly 
Suppose an aeroplane 
runs out of fuel 
Does it follow that the 
aeroplane will crash? 
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, 
then it will crash 
Suppose an aeroplane 
runs out of fuel 
Does it follow that the 
aeroplane will fly? 
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, 
then it will crash 
Suppose an aeroplane 
runs out of fuel 
Does it follow that the 
aeroplane will crash? 
If your mother bakes cookies, Suppose your mother Does it follow that you will 
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you will be sad bakes cookies be happy? 
If your mother bakes cookies, 
you will be sad 
Suppose your mother 
bakes cookies 
Does it follow that you will 
be sad? 
If your mother bakes cookies, 
you will be happy 
Suppose your mother 
bakes cookies 
Does it follow that you will 
be sad? 
If your mother bakes cookies, 
you will be happy 
Suppose your mother 
bakes cookies 
Does it follow that you will 
be happy? 
If a bear catches a fish, it is 
slow 
Suppose a bear catches a 
fish 
Does it follow that the bear 
is slow? 
If a bear catches a fish, it is 
slow 
Suppose a bear catches a 
fish 
Does it follow that the bear 
is quick? 
If a bear catches a fish, it is 
quick 
Suppose a bear catches a 
fish 
Does it follow that the bear 
is quick? 
If a bear catches a fish, it is 
quick 
Suppose a bear catches a 
fish 
Does it follow that the bear 
is slow? 
If a toilet has been flushed, 
then it is dirty 
Suppose a toilet is 
flushed 
Does it follow that the toilet 
is clean? 
If a toilet has been flushed, 
then it is dirty 
Suppose a toilet is 
flushed 
Does it follow that the toilet 
is dirty? 
If a toilet has been flushed, 
then it is clean 
Suppose a toilet is 
flushed 
Does it follow that the toilet 
is clean? 
If a toilet has been flushed, 
then it is clean 
Suppose a toilet is 
flushed 
Does it follow that the toilet 
is dirty? 
If a glass falls on the floor then 
it is intact 
Suppose a glass falls on 
the floor 
Does it follow that the glass 
is intact? 
If a glass falls on the floor then 
it is intact 
Suppose a glass falls on 
the floor 
Does it follow that the glass 
is broken? 
If a glass falls on the floor then 
it is broken 
Suppose a glass falls on 
the floor 
Does it follow that the glass 
is intact? 
If a glass falls on the floor then 
it is broken 
Suppose a glass falls on 
the floor 
Does it follow that the glass 
is broken? 
If heat bill has not been paid in 
time then it is warm inside 
Suppose the heat bill has 
not been paid in time 
Does it follow that it is cold 
inside? 
If heat bill has not been paid in 
time then it is warm inside 
Suppose the heat bill has 
not been paid in time 
Does it follow that it is 
warm inside? 
If the heat bill has not been 
paid in time then it is cold 
inside 
Suppose the heat bill has 
not been paid in time 
Does it follow that it is 
warm inside? 
If heat bill has not been paid in 
time then it is cold inside 
Suppose the heat bill has 
not been paid in time 
Does it follow that it is cold 
inside? 
If a singer has a sore throat, his 
singing will be nice 
Suppose the singer has a 
sore throat 
Does it follow that his 
singing will be nice? 
If a singer has a sore throat, his 
singing will be nice 
Suppose the singer has a 
sore throat 
Does it follow that his 
singing will be bad? 
If a singer has a sore throat, his 
singing will be bad 
Suppose the singer has a 
sore throat 
Does it follow that his 
singing will be bad? 
If a singer has a sore throat, his 
singing will be bad 
Suppose the singer has a 
sore throat 
Does it follow that his 
singing will be nice? 
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RGCalc program (Experiments 2 – 5) 
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Disjunctive stimulus (Experiments 4 – 6) 
Practice Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion Item 
Type 
Either ants are insects or 
they are arachnids 
Suppose an ant is not 
an insect 
Does it follow that the ant 
is an arachnid? 
SDA 
Either pubs sell drinks or 
they sell books 
Suppose a pub sells 
books 
Does it follow that the pub 
does not sell drinks? 
SDB 
Either photographs are 
visual or they are auditory 
Suppose a 
photograph is not 
auditory  
Does it follow that the 
photograph is visual? 
SDA 
Either vegetarians eat 
vegetables or they eat meat 
Suppose a vegetarian 
eats vegetables 
Does it follow that the 
vegetarian eats meat? 
SDB 
 
 Experimental Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion Item 
Type 
Either cats are mammals or 
they are plants 
Suppose a cat is not a 
mammal 
Does it follow that the cat 
is not a plant? SDA 
Either cats are mammals or 
they are plants 
Suppose a cat is not a 
mammal 
Does it follow that the cat 
is a plant? SDA 
Either cats are mammals or 
they are plants 
Suppose a cat is not a 
plant 
Does it follow that the cat 
is not a mammal? SDA 
Either cats are mammals or 
they are plants 
Suppose a cat is not a 
plant 
Does it follow that the cat 
is a mammal? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it is 
green 
Suppose the sky is not 
blue 
Does it follow that the sky 
is green? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it is 
green. 
Suppose the sky is not 
blue 
Does it follow that the sky 
is not green? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it is 
green 
Suppose the sky is not 
green 
Does it follow that the sky 
is blue? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it is 
green 
Suppose the sky is not 
green 
Does it follow that the sky 
is not blue? SDA 
Either the sun is yellow or it is 
blue 
Suppose the sun is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sun 
is yellow? SDB 
Either the sun is yellow or it is 
blue 
Suppose the sun is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sun 
is not yellow? SDB 
Either the sun is yellow or it is 
blue 
Suppose the sun is 
yellow 
Does it follow that the sun 
is blue? SDB 
Either the sun is yellow or it is 
blue 
Suppose the sun is 
yellow 
Does it follow that the sun 
is not blue? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it is 
pink 
Suppose the sea is 
pink 
Does it follow that the sea 
is not blue? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it is 
pink 
Suppose the sea is 
pink 
Does it follow that the sea 
is blue? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it is 
pink 
Suppose the sea is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sea 
is not pink? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it is 
pink 
Suppose the sea is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sea 
is pink? SDB 
Either parrots can fly or they Suppose a parrot Does it follow that the SDA 
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can swim cannot fly parrot cannot swim? 
Either parrots can fly or they 
can swim 
Suppose a parrot 
cannot fly 
Does it follow that the 
parrot can swim? SDA 
Either parrots can fly or they 
can swim 
Suppose a parrot 
cannot swim 
Does it follow that the 
parrot cannot fly? SDA 
Either parrots can fly or they 
can swim 
Suppose a parrot 
cannot swim 
Does it follow that the 
parrot can fly? SDA 
Either obese people are fat or 
they are skinny 
Suppose an obese 
person is not fat 
Does it follow that the 
obese person is skinny? SDA 
Either obese people are fat or 
they are skinny 
Suppose an obese 
person is not fat 
Does it follow that the 
obese person is not 
skinny? SDA 
Either obese people are fat or 
they are skinny 
Suppose an obese 
person is not skinny 
Does it follow that the 
obese person is fat? SDA 
Either obese people are fat or 
they are skinny 
Suppose an obese 
person is not skinny 
Does it follow that the 
obese person is not fat? SDA 
Either skyscrapers are huge or 
they are tiny 
Suppose a skyscraper 
is not huge 
Does it follow that the 
skyscraper is tiny? SDB 
Either skyscrapers are huge or 
they are tiny 
Suppose a skyscraper 
is not huge 
Does it follow that the 
skyscraper is not tiny? SDB 
Either skyscrapers are huge or 
they are tiny 
Suppose a skyscraper 
is not tiny 
Does it follow that the 
skyscraper is not huge? SDB 
Either skyscrapers are huge or 
they are tiny 
Suppose a skyscraper 
is not tiny 
Does it follow that the 
skyscraper is huge? SDB 
Either roses are flowers or 
they are machines 
Suppose a rose is a 
machine 
Does it follow that the rose 
is not a flower? SDB 
Either roses are flowers or 
they are machines 
Suppose a rose is a 
machine 
Does it follow that the rose 
is a flower? SDB 
Either roses are flowers or 
they are machines 
Suppose a rose is a 
flower 
Does it follow that the rose 
is not a machine? SDB 
Either roses are flowers or 
they are machines 
Suppose a rose is a 
flower 
Does it follow that the rose 
is a machine? SDB 
Either sentences are made out 
of words or they are made out 
of bricks 
Suppose a sentence is 
not made out of 
words 
Does it follow that the 
sentence is not made out 
of bricks? SDA 
Either sentences are made out 
of words or they are made out 
of bricks 
Suppose a sentence is 
not made out of 
words 
Does it follow that the 
sentence is made out of 
bricks? SDA 
Either sentences are made out 
of words or they are made out 
of bricks 
Suppose a sentence is 
not made out of 
bricks 
Does it follow that the 
sentence is not made out 
of words? SDA 
Either sentences are made out 
of words or they are made out 
of bricks 
Suppose a sentence is 
not made out of 
bricks 
Does it follow that the 
sentence is made out of 
words? SDA 
Either mice eat cheese or they 
eat steel 
Suppose a mouse 
does not eat cheese 
Does it follow that the 
mouse eats steel? SDA 
Either mice eat cheese or they 
eat steel 
Suppose a mouse 
does not eat cheese 
Does it follow that the 
mouse does not eat steel? SDA 
Either mice eat cheese or they 
eat steel 
Suppose a mouse 
does not eat steel 
Does it follow that the 
mouse eats cheese? SDA 
Either mice eat cheese or they 
eat steel 
Suppose a mouse 
does not eat steel 
Does it follow that the 
mouse does not eat 
cheese? SDA 
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Either alligators eat meat or 
they eat plastic 
Suppose an alligator 
eats plastic 
Does it follow that the 
alligator does not eat 
meat? SDB 
Either alligators eat meat or 
they eat plastic 
Suppose an alligator 
eats plastic 
Does it follow that the 
alligator eats meat? SDB 
Either alligators eat meat or 
they eat plastic 
Suppose an alligator 
eats meat 
Does it follow that the 
alligator does not eat 
plastic? SDB 
Either alligators eat meat or 
they eat plastic 
Suppose an alligator 
eats meat 
Does it follow that the 
alligator eats plastic? SDB 
Either circles are round or they 
are square 
Suppose a circle is 
square 
Does it follow that the 
circle is round? SDB 
Either circles are round or they 
are square 
Suppose a circle is 
square 
Does it follow that the 
circle not round? SDB 
Either circles are round or they 
are square 
Suppose a circle is 
round 
Does it follow that the 
circle is square? SDB 
Either circles are round or they 
are square 
Suppose a circle is 
round 
Does it follow that the 
circle is not square? SDB 
Either monkeys are primates 
or they are rodents 
Suppose a monkey is 
not a primate 
Does it follow that the 
monkey is not a rodent? SDA 
Either monkeys are primates 
or they are rodents 
Suppose a monkey is 
not a primate 
Does it follow that the 
monkey is a rodent? SDA 
Either monkeys are primates 
or they are rodents 
Suppose a monkey is 
not a rodent 
Does it follow that the 
monkey is not a primate? SDA 
Either monkeys are primates 
or they are rodents 
Suppose a monkey is 
not a rodent 
Does it follow that the 
monkey is a primate? SDA 
Either flowers are organic or 
they are vehicles 
Suppose a flower is 
not organic 
Does it follow that the 
flower is a vehicle? SDA 
Either flowers are organic or 
they are vehicles 
Suppose a flower is 
not organic 
Does it follow that the 
flower is not a vehicle? SDA 
Either flowers are organic or 
they are vehicles 
Suppose a flower is 
not a vehicle 
Does it follow that the 
flower is organic? SDA 
Either flowers are organic or 
they are vehicles 
Suppose a flower is 
not a vehicle 
Does it follow that the 
flower is not organic? SDA 
Either shovels are tools or they 
are stationary 
Suppose a shovel is 
stationary 
Does it follow that the 
shovel is not a tool? SDB 
Either shovels are tools or they 
are stationary 
Suppose a shovel is 
stationary 
Does it follow that the 
shovel is a tool? SDB 
Either shovels are tools or they 
are stationary 
Suppose a shovel is a 
tool 
Does it follow that the 
shovel is stationary? SDB 
Either shovels are tools or they 
are stationary 
Suppose a shovel is a 
tool 
Does it follow that the 
shovel is not stationary? SDB 
Either spears are weapons or 
they are thermostats 
Suppose a spear is a 
thermostat 
Does it follow that the 
spear is a weapon? SDB 
Either spears are weapons or 
they are thermostats 
Suppose a spear is a 
thermostat 
Does it follow that the 
spear is not a weapon? SDB 
Either spears are weapons or 
they are thermostats 
Suppose a spear is a 
weapon 
Does it follow that the 
spear is not a thermostat? SDB 
Either spears are weapons or 
they are thermostats 
Suppose a spear is a 
weapon 
Does it follow that the 
spear is a thermostat? SDB 
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Item type refers to the category of disjunctives used. SDA are disjunctives of the 
following type: A or B, not A, therefore B. Negation of the first part which makes the 
second part true. SDB are of the type: A or B, A, therefore not B. The first part is true 
which makes the second part not true. These are valid because they are exclusive 
disjunctives, meaning A and B can never be true at the same time. An equal number of 
the SDA and SDB were used in Experiments 4 & 5.  
 
 
Individual Differences stimulus (Experiments 4) 
 
Questions from the AH4 Group Test of General Intelligence Part 1 (Heim, 1970). 
Q1  
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.    Multiply the middle one of these figures by 2.  
Q2                                                              1              2             3             4            5    
Easy means the opposite of…. problem, simple, difficult, always, cannot.  
Q3  
15, 35, 55, 75, 95…    What number comes next?  
Q4                                                            1         2         3         4          5 
Seed is to plant as egg is to …    tree, bird, pollen, oats, potato. 
Q5  
Here are three figures: 234.    Divide the biggest figure by the smallest and add the 
results to the figure printed immediately after the smallest figure.  
Q6                                                        1          2           3        4        5   
Rich means the same as …    poor, wealthy, high, new, lucky. 
Q7  
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.    Write down the fourth figure to the left of 7.  
Q8                                                                  1         2            3            4           5                                                     
Right means the opposite of …    action, good, careless, wrong, motive.  
Q9  
1, 2, 4, 8, 16…    what number comes next?  
Q10                                                            1          2        3       4       5                                                     
Foot is to leg as hand is to …    body, finger, tail, limb, arm. 
Q11  
Here are three figures: 327.    Subtract the smallest figure from the biggest and multiply 
the result by the figure printed immediately before the biggest figure.  
Q12                                                         1           2          3          4           5                                                     
Old means the same as…    decaying, tired, aged, youth, mended.  
Q13  
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.    Add the first five figures together and subtract them from the 
sum of the last four.  
Q14                                                                  1           2         3          4          5                                  
Lost means the opposite of…    winning, draw, found, alone, mislaid.  
Q15  
3, 3, 7, 7, 11…    What number comes next?  
Q16                                                                     1         2          3          4          5                                  
Army is to navy as soldier is to …    airman, sea, service, sailor, uniform.  
Q17  
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Here are three figures: 132.    Divide the biggest figure by the smallest and add the 
result to the figure printed immediately after the smallest figure. 
Q18                                                             1         2         3        4        5                                  
Portion means the same as…    some, whole, part, any, cake.  
Q19  
If a castle is bigger than a cottage, write down the second of these figures: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9.    If it is not, write down the sixth.  
Q20                                                           1         2        3        4          5                                  
Up means the opposite of…    short, small, low, down, young.  
Q21  
1
2
, 
1
3
, 
1
4
, 
1
5
, 
1
6
 …    what number comes next?  
Q22                                                                           1           2           3        4        5       
Seeing is to picture as hearing is to…    sight, sculpture, ear, song, deaf. 
Q23  
Here are three figures: 189.    Subtract the smallest figure from the biggest and multiply 
the result by the figure printed immediately before the biggest figure. 
Q24                                                   1           2          3          4         5       
Ill means the same as…    health, fever, dirty, mumps, sick.  
Q25  
Write down the number of the letters in the fourth word of this sentence.  
Q26                                                               1         2         3        4         5       
Near means the opposite of…    close, road, speed, far, distance.  
Q27  
2, 3, 5, 8 , 12…    What number comes next?  
Q28                                                                              
                                                                             1               2              3           4          5       
Legs are to running as teeth are to …    chattering, walking, eating, biting, arms.  
Q29  
Here are three figures: 627.   Add the largest two figures together and divide the total 
by the smallest figure.  
Q30                                                                   1               2         3          4             5       
Scarce means the same as…    unobtainable, lack, unique, rare, frightened.  
Q31  
If Z is the last letter of the alphabet and is B does not come before A, write down the 
fifth of these figures: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Otherwise, write down the last one.   
Q32                                                                 1           2          3         4        5       
Never means the opposite of…    rarely, always, now, will, forget.  
Q33  
1, 2, 4, 5, 7 …   What number comes next?  
Q34                                                                   1         2         3       4       5       
Sky is to ground as ceiling is to…    roof, down, floor, rug, high.  
Q35  
Here are three figures: 823.    Divide the biggest figure by the smallest and add the 
result to the figure printed immediately after the smallest figure. 
Q36                                                          1           2        3        4        5       
Odd means the same as…    strange, even, one, man, number.  
Q37  
If 8 is more than 3, write down 7, unless 3 is more than 7, in which case write 8.  
Q38                                                                 1           2           3                    4             5       
War means the opposite of…    suffering, joy, dictatorship, inflation, peace.  
Q39  
11, 12, 10, 13, 9…    What number comes next?  
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Q40                                                                      1         2         3          4            5       
When is to where as time is to…         how, why, space, length, relativity.  
Q41  
Here is a row of figures: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Write down the figure from this row 
which, when added to another number smaller than it, would make 17.  
Q42                                                                          1                   2            3          4            5       
Backwards means the same as…    upside-down, reversed, stop, forward, gear.  
Q43  
If 20 is more than 3 time 5, write down the figure 2, unless 14 is less than 16, in which 
case write 7.  
Q44                                                                         1                2                   3                  4                5       
Multiplication is the opposite of…    subtraction, addition, mathematics, figures, 
division.   
Q45  
0.9, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7…    What number comes next?  
Q46                                                                             1        2         3         4         5       
Autumn is to Winter as October is to…    April, July, Spring, rain, January.  
Q47  
Here are three figures: 456.    Subtract the smallest figure from the biggest and multiply 
the result by the figure printed immediately before the biggest figure. 
Q48                                                              1         2         3         4        5       
Prevent means the same as…    avoid, cure, allow, deter, help.  
Q49  
Write down the total number of letters contained in the words in thi s sentence.  
Q50                                                                           
                                                                            1            2            3               4                5       
Permanent means the opposite of…    part-time, ever, changing, temporary, stable.  
Q51  
100, 81, 64, 49, 36…    What number comes next?  
Q52                                                                          1         2           3              4            5       
Fact is to fiction as historian is to…    history, book, novelist, teacher, story.  
Q53  
Here are three figures: 934.    Divide the biggest figure by the smallest and add the 
result to the figure printed immediately after the smallest figure. 
Q54                                                                   1               2                        3              4                   5       
Industrious means the same as…    busy, hard-working, energetic, overworked, happy.  
Q55  
If G is the seventh letter of the alphabet and Wednesday is not a month of the year, 
divide 63 by 7. Otherwise subtract 3 from 5. Write down your answer.  
Q56                                                                          1            2                3              4             5       
Dangerous means the opposite of…    brave, cowardly, situation, safe, bravado.  
Q57  
0.1, 1.3, 2.5, 3.7, 4.9…    What number comes next?  
Q58                                                                          1               2           3            4            5       
Motive is to method as why is to…   wherefore, reason, how, because, where.   
Q59  
Here are three figures: 847.    Divide the biggest figure by the smallest and add the 
result to the figure printed immediately after the smallest figure. 
Q60                                                         1           2          3            4            5       
Flat means the same as…    straight, level, uneven, oblique, inclined.  
Q61  
0, 2, 8, 26, 80…    What number comes next? 
Q62  
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Doubt means the opposite of…    wonder, certainty, correct, dubious, indefinite.  
Q63  
130, 118, 107, 97, 98…   What number comes next?  
Q64  
The day after tomorrow is to the day before yesterday as Wednesday is to…     
     1              2             3              4              5       
Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday. 
Q65  
Here are three figures: 948.    Divide the biggest figure by the smallest and add the 
result to the figure printed immediately after the smallest figure. 
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Statements presented in the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale questionnaire 
(McPherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich & West, 2007).  
“Please circle the number that corresponds to the alternative that best describes your 
opinion. There are no right or wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding 
on an answer. The first thing that comes to mind is probably the best response. Be sure 
the number on the answer sheet corresponds to the number of the statement to which 
you are responding. There is no time limit, but work as quickly as possible”. 
 
1.    Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately 
necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
2.    What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the 
experiences that may have given rise to them 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Sl ightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
3.    I tend to classify people as either for me or against me. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
4.    A person should always consider new possibilities. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
5.    There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
6.    Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
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7.    I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
8.    I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
9.    It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
10. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through 
waiting for good fortune. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
11. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
12. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
13. No one can talk me out of something I know is right.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
14. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
 260 
 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
15. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against 
them.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
16. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
17. There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
18. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
19. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made 
against them.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
20. Most people just don't know what's good for them.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
21. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
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22. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
23. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-
mindedness."  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
24. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is 
correct.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
25. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set of 
parents.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
26. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
27. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may 
be valid for them. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
28. Even if my environment (family, neighbourhood, schools) had been different, I probably 
would have the same religious views. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
29. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues. 
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         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
30. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
31. My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
32. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
33. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
34. Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
35. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members cannot exist for 
long.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
36. Often, when people criticize me, they don't have their facts straight.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
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37. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
38. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's 
something wrong with them.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
39. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
40. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.  
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
 
41. People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs. 
         1___________2___________3___________4___________5___________6 
     Disagree Strongly             Disagree Moderately           Disagree Slightly           Agree Slightly            Agree Moderately            Agree Strongly  
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The Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005)  
 
Please answer these questions 
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? _____________ 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? _____________ 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? _____________ 
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Experiments 7 – 9 
 
Modus Ponens stimulus (Experiments 7 – 9) 
 
Practice Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion 
If the fruit is a cherry, then it is 
yellow 
Suppose the fruit is a 
cherry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
If the vegetable is a courgette, 
then it is green  
Suppose vegetable is a 
courgette 
Does it follow that the 
vegetable is pink? 
If the drink is Guinness, then it is 
red 
Suppose the drink is 
Guinness  
Does it follow that the drink is 
black? 
If the swan is a cygnet, then it is 
grey 
Suppose the swan is a 
cygnet 
Does it follow that the swan is 
grey? 
 
Experimental Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion 
If the car has stopped, then the 
traffic lights are green  
Suppose the car has 
stopped 
Does it follow that the traffic 
lights are green? 
If a child is crying, it feels blue  Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
feels pink? 
If the clouds are stormy, then 
they are red 
Suppose the clouds are 
stormy 
Does it follow that the clouds 
are grey?  
If the fruit is a strawberry, then it 
is red 
Suppose the fruit is a 
strawberry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
If the teeth are cleaned, then 
they will be brown 
Suppose the teeth are 
cleaned 
Does it follow that the teeth 
will be white? 
If it is night time, then the sky is 
black  Suppose it is night time 
Does it follow that the sky is 
black? 
If the banana is ripe, then it is red 
Suppose the banana is 
ripe 
Does it follow that the 
banana is red? 
If the bird is a canary, then it is 
yellow 
Suppose the bird is a 
canary 
Does it follow that the bird is 
blue? 
If the gemstone is an Emerald, 
then it is yellow 
Suppose the gemstone 
is an Emerald 
Does it follow that the 
gemstone is yellow? 
If the plant is a Shamrock, then it 
is green  
Suppose the plant is a 
Shamrock 
Does it follow that the plant 
is pink? 
If a bird is a dove, then it is 
orange Suppose a bird is a dove 
Does it follow that the bird is 
white? 
If the drink is Pepsi, then the 
drink is brown 
Suppose the drink is 
Pepsi 
Does it follow that the drink 
is brown? 
If the vegetable is a carrot, then it 
is blue 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a carrot 
Does it follow that it is 
orange? 
If the vegetable is a beetroot, 
then it is purple 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a beetroot 
Does it follow that the 
vegetable is purple? 
If the herb is basil, then it is blue  
Suppose the herb is 
basil  
Does it follow that the herb is 
blue?  
If the flower is a Daffodil, then it Suppose the flower is a Does it follow that the flower 
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is yellow Daffodil is purple? 
If a child is crying, then it feels 
pink  Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
feels pink? 
If the car has stopped, then the 
traffic lights are red 
Suppose the car has 
stopped 
Does it follow that the traffic 
lights are green?  
If the fruit is a strawberry, then it 
is purple 
Suppose the fruit is a 
strawberry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
red? 
If the clouds are stormy, then 
they are grey 
Suppose the clouds are 
stormy 
Does its follow that the 
clouds are grey? 
If it is night time, then the sky is 
yellow  Suppose it is night time 
Does it follow that the sky is 
black? 
If the teeth are cleaned, then 
they will be white 
Suppose the teeth are 
cleaned 
Does it follow that the teeth 
will be white? 
If the bird is a canary, then it is 
blue 
Suppose the bird is a 
canary  
Does it follow that the bird is 
blue? 
If the banana is ripe, then it is 
yellow 
Suppose the banana is 
ripe 
Does it follow that the 
banana is red? 
If the plant is a Shamrock, then it 
is pink 
Suppose the plant is a 
Shamrock 
Does it follow that the plant 
is pink? 
If the gemstone is an Emerald, 
then it is green 
Suppose the gemstone 
is an Emerald 
Does it follow that the 
gemstone is yellow? 
If the drink is Pepsi, then the 
drink is blue 
Suppose the drink is 
Pepsi 
Does it follow that the drink 
is brown? 
If a bird is a dove, then it is white  Suppose a bird is a dove 
Does it follow that the bird is 
white? 
If the vegetable is a beetroot, 
then it is white 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a beetroot 
Does it follow that the 
vegetable is purple? 
If the vegetable is carrot, then it 
is orange 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a carrot 
Does it follow that it is 
orange? 
If the flower is a Daffodil, then it 
is purple 
Suppose the flower is a 
Daffodil 
Does it follow that the flower 
is purple? 
If the herb is basil, then it is green  
Suppose the herb is 
basil  
Does it follow that the herb is 
blue?  
If a child is crying, then it feels 
pink Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
feels blue? 
If the car has stopped, then the 
traffic lights are red 
Suppose the car has 
stopped 
Does it follow that the traffic 
lights are red? 
If the fruit is a strawberry, then it 
is purple  
Suppose the fruit is a 
strawberry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
purple? 
If the clouds are stormy, then 
they are grey 
Suppose the clouds are 
stormy 
Does it follow that the clouds 
are red?  
If it is night time, then the sky is 
yellow  Suppose it is night time 
Does it follow that the sky is 
yellow? 
If the teeth are cleaned, then 
they will be white 
Suppose the teeth are 
cleaned 
Does it follow that the teeth 
will be brown? 
If the bird is a canary, then it is 
blue 
Suppose the bird is a 
canary 
Does it follow that the bird is 
yellow? 
If the banana is ripe, then it is 
yellow 
Suppose the banana is 
ripe 
Does it follow that the 
banana is yellow? 
If the plant is a Shamrock, then it 
is pink 
Suppose the plant is a 
Shamrock 
Does it follow that the plant 
is green? 
If the gemstone is an Emerald, Suppose the gemstone Does it follow that the 
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then it is green is an Emerald gemstone is green? 
If the drink is Pepsi, then the 
drink is blue 
Suppose the drink is 
Pepsi 
Does it follow that the drink 
is blue? 
If a bird is a dove, then it is white Suppose a bird is a dove 
Does it follow that the bird is 
orange? 
If the vegetable is a beetroot, 
then it is white 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a beetroot 
Does it follow that the 
vegetable is white? 
If the vegetable is carrot, then it 
is orange 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a carrot Does it follow that it is blue? 
If the flower is a Daffodil, then it 
is purple 
Suppose the flower is a 
Daffodil 
Does it follow that the flower 
is yellow? 
If the herb is basil, then it is green  
Suppose the herb is 
basil  
Does it follow that the herb is 
green?  
If the car has stopped, then the 
traffic lights are green 
Suppose the car has 
stopped 
Does it follow that the traffic 
lights are red? 
If a child is crying, then it feels 
blue Suppose a child is crying 
Does it follow that the child 
feels blue? 
If the clouds are stormy, then 
they are red 
Suppose the clouds are 
stormy 
Does it follow that the clouds 
are red?  
If the fruit is a strawberry, then it 
is red 
Suppose the fruit is a 
strawberry 
Does it follow that the fruit is 
purple? 
If the teeth are cleaned, then 
they will be brown 
Suppose the teeth are 
cleaned 
Does it follow that the teeth 
will be brown? 
If it is night time, then the sky is 
black  Suppose it is night time 
Does it follow that the sky is 
yellow? 
If the banana is ripe, then it is red 
Suppose the banana is 
ripe 
Does it follow that the 
banana is yellow? 
If the bird is a canary, then it is 
yellow 
Suppose the bird is a 
canary  
Does it follow that the bird is 
yellow? 
If the gemstone is an Emerald, 
then it is yellow 
Suppose the gemstone 
is an Emerald 
Does it follow that the 
gemstone is green? 
If the plant is a Shamrock, then it 
is green  
Suppose the plant is a 
Shamrock 
Does it follow that the plant 
is green? 
If a bird is a dove, then it is 
orange Suppose a bird is a dove 
Does it follow that the bird is 
orange? 
If the drink is Pepsi, then the 
drink is brown 
Suppose the drink is 
Pepsi 
Does it follow that the drink 
is blue? 
If the vegetable is a carrot, then it 
is blue 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a carrot Does it follow that it is blue? 
If the vegetable is a beetroot, 
then it is purple 
Suppose the vegetable 
is a beetroot 
Does it follow that the 
vegetable is white? 
If the herb is basil, then it is blue  
Suppose the herb is 
basil  
Does it follow that the herb is 
green?  
If the flower is a Daffodil, then it 
is yellow 
Suppose the flower is a 
Daffodil 
Does it follow that the flower 
is yellow? 
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Disjunctive stimulus (Experiments 7 – 9) 
 
Practice Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion Item 
Type 
Either grass is green or it is 
blue 
Suppose grass is not 
blue 
Does it follow that grass is 
green? 
SDA 
Either tomatoes are red or 
they are white  
Suppose tomatoes 
are white  
Does it follow that tomatoes 
are not red? 
SDB 
Either milk is white or it is 
purple 
Suppose milk is not 
white  
Does it follow that milk is 
purple? 
SDA 
Either coffee is black or it is 
green 
Suppose coffee is 
not green  
Does it follow that coffee is 
not black? 
SDB 
 
Experimental Trials Stimuli  
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion Item 
Type 
Either lemons are yellow 
or they are purple 
Suppose lemons are 
not yellow 
Does it follow that lemons 
are purple? SDA 
Either snow is white or it 
is orange 
Suppose snow is not 
orange 
Does it follow that snow is 
not white? SDA 
Either blood is red or it is 
white 
Suppose blood is not 
red 
Does it follow that blood is 
not white? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it 
is green 
Suppose the sky is 
not green 
Does it follow that the sky 
is blue? SDA 
Either cucumbers are 
green or they are blue 
Suppose cucumbers 
are not green 
Does it follow that 
cucumbers are blue? SDA 
Either elephants are grey 
or red 
Suppose elephants 
are not red 
Does it follow that 
elephants are not grey? SDA 
Either sapphires are blue 
or they are yellow 
Suppose sapphires 
are not blue 
Does it follow that 
sapphires are not yellow? SDA 
Either charcoal is black or 
it is green 
Suppose charcoal is 
not green 
Does it follow that charcoal 
is black? SDA 
Either snow is white or it 
is orange 
Suppose snow is not 
white 
Does it follow that snow is 
orange? SDA 
Either lemons are yellow 
or they are purple 
Suppose lemons are 
not purple 
Does it follow that lemons 
are not yellow? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it 
is green. 
Suppose the sky is 
not blue 
Does it follow that the sky 
is not green? SDA 
Either blood is red or it is 
white 
Suppose blood is not 
white 
Does it follow that blood is 
red? SDA 
Either elephants are grey 
or red 
Suppose elephants 
are not grey 
Does it follow that 
elephants are red? SDA 
Either cucumbers are 
green or they are blue 
Suppose cucumbers 
are not blue 
Does it follow that 
cucumbers are not green? SDA 
Either charcoal is black or 
it is green 
Suppose charcoal is 
not black 
Does it follow that charcoal 
is not green? SDA 
Either sapphires are blue 
or they are yellow 
Suppose sapphires 
are not yellow 
Does it follow that 
sapphires are blue? SDA 
Either swans are white or Suppose swans are Does it follow that swans SDB 
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black  black are white? 
Either the sun is yellow or 
it is blue 
Suppose the sun is 
yellow 
Does it follow that the sun 
is blue? SDB 
Either flamingos are pink 
or purple 
Suppose flamingos 
are purple 
Does it follow that 
flamingos are not pink? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it 
is pink 
Suppose the sea is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sea 
is not pink? SDB 
Either Ravens are black or 
yellow 
Suppose Ravens are 
black 
Does it follow that Ravens 
are yellow? SDB 
Either Ravens are black or 
yellow 
Suppose Ravens are 
yellow 
Does it follow that Ravens 
are black? SDB 
Either plums are purple or 
green 
Suppose plums are 
green 
Does it follow that plums 
are purple? SDB 
Either plums are purple or 
green 
Suppose plums are 
purple 
Does it follow that plums 
are not green? SDB 
Either the sun is yellow or 
it is blue 
Suppose the sun is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sun 
is yellow? SDB 
Either swans are white or 
black  
Suppose swans are 
white 
Does it follow that swans 
are black? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it 
is pink 
Suppose the sea is 
pink 
Does it follow that the sea 
is not blue? SDB 
Either flamingos are pink 
or purple 
Suppose flamingos 
are pink 
Does it follow that 
flamingos are not purple? SDB 
Either custard is yellow or 
it is black 
Suppose custard is 
black  
Does it follow that custard 
is yellow? SDB 
Either custard is yellow or 
it is black 
Suppose custard is 
yellow 
Does it follow that custard 
is not black? SDB 
Either ketchup is red or 
brown 
Suppose ketchup is 
brown 
Does it follow that ketchup 
is not red? SDB 
Either ketchup is red or 
brown 
Suppose ketchup is 
red 
Does it follow that ketchup 
is brown? SDB 
Either snow is white or it 
is orange 
Suppose snow is not 
white 
Does it follow that snow is 
not orange? SDA 
Either lemons are yellow 
or they are purple 
Suppose lemons are 
not purple 
Does it follow that lemons 
are yellow? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it 
is green 
Suppose the sky is 
not blue 
Does it follow that the sky 
is green? SDA 
Either blood is red or it is 
white 
Suppose blood is not 
white 
Does it follow that blood is 
not red? SDA 
Either swans are white or 
they are black 
Suppose swans are 
black  
Does it follow that swans 
are not white? SDB 
Either swans are white or 
they are black 
Suppose swans are 
white  
Does it follow swans are 
not black? SDB 
Either flamingos are pink 
or purple 
Suppose flamingos 
are purple 
Does it follow that 
flamingos are pink? SDB 
Either flamingos are pink 
or purple 
Suppose flamingos 
are pink 
Does it follow that 
flamingos are purple? SDB 
Either cucumbers are 
green or they are blue 
Suppose cucumbers 
are not green  
Does it follow that 
cucumbers are not blue? SDA 
Either elephants are grey 
or they are red 
Suppose elephants 
are not red  
Does it follow that 
elephants are grey? SDA 
Either sapphires are blue Suppose sapphires Does it follow that SDA 
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or they are yellow are not blue sapphires are yellow? 
Either charcoal is black or 
it is green 
Suppose charcoal is 
not green 
Does it follow that charcoal 
is not black? SDA 
Either custard is yellow or 
it is black 
Suppose custard is 
black  
Does it follow that custard 
is not yellow? SDB 
Either Ravens are black or 
they are yellow 
Suppose Ravens are 
yellow 
Does it follow that Ravens 
are not black? SDB 
Either ketchup is red or 
brown 
Suppose ketchup is 
brown 
Does it follow that ketchup 
is red? SDB 
Either plums are purple or 
they are green 
Suppose plums are 
purple  
Does it follow that plums 
are green? SDB 
Either lemons are yellow 
or they are purple 
Suppose lemons are 
not yellow 
Does it follow that lemons 
are not purple? SDA 
Either snow is white or it 
is orange 
Suppose snow is not 
orange 
Does it follow that snow is 
white? SDA 
Either blood is red or it is 
white 
Suppose blood is not 
red 
Does it follow that blood is 
white? SDA 
Either the sky is blue or it 
is green 
Suppose the sky is 
not green 
Does it follow that the sky 
is not blue? SDA 
Either the sun is yellow or 
it is blue 
Suppose the sun is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sun 
is yellow? SDB 
Either the sun is yellow or 
it is blue 
Suppose the sun is 
yellow 
Does it follow that the sun 
is blue? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it 
is pink 
Suppose the sea is 
pink 
Does it follow that the sea 
is blue? SDB 
Either the sea is blue or it 
is pink 
Suppose the sea is 
blue 
Does it follow that the sea 
is pink? SDB 
Either cucumbers are 
green or they are blue 
Suppose cucumbers 
are not blue  
Does it follow that 
cucumbers are green? SDA 
Either elephants are grey 
or they are red 
Suppose elephants 
are not grey 
Does it follow that 
elephants are not red? SDA 
Either sapphires are blue 
or they are yellow 
Suppose sapphires 
are not yellow  
Does it follow that 
sapphires are not blue? SDA 
Either charcoal is black or 
it is green 
Suppose charcoal is 
not black  
Does it follow that charcoal 
is green? SDA 
Either custard is yellow or 
it is black 
Suppose custard is 
yellow 
Does it follow that custard 
is black? SDB 
Either Ravens are black or 
they are yellow 
Suppose Ravens are 
black 
Does it follow that Ravens 
are yellow? SDB 
Either ketchup is red or 
brown 
Suppose ketchup is 
red  
Does it follow that ketchup 
is not brown? SDB 
Either plums are purple or 
they are green 
Suppose plums are 
green 
Does it follow that plums 
are not purple? SDB 
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Individual Differences stimulus (Experiments 7 – 9) 
 
Short Stroop Task Stimulus  
Word Ink Colour Condition 
Blue Red Incongruent 
Blue Green Incongruent 
Blue Yellow Incongruent 
Red Blue Incongruent 
Red Green Incongruent 
Red Yellow Incongruent 
Yellow Red Incongruent 
Yellow Blue Incongruent 
Yellow Green Incongruent 
Green Blue Incongruent 
Green Red Incongruent 
Green Yellow Incongruent 
Flower Red Neutral 
Flower Green Neutral 
Flower Yellow Neutral 
Ship Blue Neutral 
Ship Red Neutral 
Ship Green Neutral 
Lot Yellow Neutral 
Lot Blue Neutral 
Lot Red Neutral 
Knife Green Neutral 
Knife Yellow Neutral 
Knife Blue Neutral 
Blue Blue Congruent 
Blue Blue Congruent 
Blue Blue Congruent 
Red Red Congruent 
Red Red Congruent 
Red Red Congruent 
Yellow Yellow Congruent 
Yellow Yellow Congruent 
Yellow Yellow Congruent 
Green Green Congruent 
Green Green Congruent 
Green Green Congruent 
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Operation Span Stimulus  
Number 
 in set 
Equation Word 
2 (10 ÷ 2) - 3 = 2 ? SEA 
2 (10 ÷ 10) - 1 = 2 ? CLASS 
2 (17 ÷ 1) + 2 = 7 ? PAINT 
2 (3 ÷ 1) - 2 = 3 ? CLOUD 
2 (2 x 1) - 1 = 1 ? PIPE 
2 (10 ÷ 1) + 3 = 13 ? EAR 
2 (9 x 2) + 1 = 18 ? FLAME 
2 (9 ÷ 1) - 7 = 4 ? BIKE 
2 (8 x 4) - 2 = 32 ? BEAN 
2 (9 x 3) - 3 =24 ? ARM 
2 (4 ÷ 1) + 1 = 4 ? GROUND 
2 (10 ÷ 1) - 1 = 9 ? HOLE 
3 (8 x 4) + 2 = 34 ? DAD 
3 (6 x 3) + 2 = 17 ? KID 
3 ( 6 ÷ 3 ) + 2 = 5 ? FORK 
3 (6 x 2) - 3 = 10 ? JAIL 
3 (8 ÷ 2) + 4 = 2 ? HAT 
3 (8 ÷ 2) - 1 = 3 ? LAMP 
3 (9 ÷ 1) - 5 = 4 ? CAVE 
3 (6 ÷ 2) - 2 = 2 ? BACK 
3 (7 x 2) - 1 = 14 ? HALL 
4 (6 x 2) - 2 = 10 ? FERN 
4 (2 x 2) + 1 =4 ? MAN 
4 (7 x 1) + 6 = 13 ? WORLD 
4 (3 ÷ 1) + 3 = 6 ? DRILL 
4 (10 ÷ 1) + 1 = 10 ? CALF 
4 (4 x 4) + 1 = 17 ? FISH 
4 (3 x 3) -1 = 8 ? CHEEK 
4 (3 x 1) + 2 = 2 ? BREAD 
4 (4 ÷ 2) + 1 = 6 ? GERM 
4 (5 ÷ 5) + 1 = 2 ? DOCK 
4 (2 x 3) + 1 = 4 ? GAME 
4 (9 ÷ 3) - 2 = 1 ? NERVE 
5 (10 ÷ 2) - 4 = 3 ? WAX 
5 (5 ÷ 1) + 4 = 9 ? TIN 
5 (10 x 2) + 3 = 23 ? CHURCH 
5 (7 ÷ 1) + 6 = 12 ? BEACH 
5 (3 x 2) + 1 = 6 ? CARD 
5 (6 x 4) + 1 = 25 JOB 
5 (9 ÷ 3) - 1 = 2 ? CONE 
5 (8 ÷ 1) - 6 = 4 ? BRASS 
5 (9 x 1) + 9 = 1 ? STREET 
5 (4 x 6) - 4 = 20 ? SHIN 
5 (2 x 9) + 7 = 24 ? ROAD 
5 (5 ÷ 5) + 5 = 5 ? HUMAN 
5 (6 x 7) + 4 = 54? POST 
5 (3 x 9) + 1 = 28 ? WASH 
5 (9 x 9) + 2 = 82 ? CAMP 
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The Cognitive Reflection Task  (Experiments 7 – 9) 
 
Please answer these questions 
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? _____________ 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? _____________ 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? _____________ 
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Appendix C: Statistical Tables 
 
The following analyses are presented in the order in which they are presented in the 
thesis.  
Experiment 1  
Accuracy  
Table C1.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data – N = 75  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.173 1 .173 3.435 .068 .045 
Instruction x Load (high or low load) 
 
.001 1 .001 .020 .889 .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
3.685 73 .050    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
3.175 1 3.175 51.057 .000 .412 
Problem Type x Load  
 
.001 1 .001 .017 .897 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
4.540 73 .062    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.140 1 .140 3.717 .058 .048 
Instruction x Problem Type x Load  
 
.058 1 .058 1.547 .218 .021 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.758 73 .038    
Note: Load is a between subjects factor 
Table C1.2 Between subject effects on excluded data – N = 75  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
536.419 1 536.419 3272.210 .000 .987 
Load  
 
.181 1 .181 1.102 .297 .015 
Error 
 
11.967 73 .164    
 
Table C1.3 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set– N = 81  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.131 1 .131 2.189 .143 .027 
Instruction x Load (high or low load) 
 
.025 1 .025 .412 .523 .005 
Error (Instruction) 
 
4.727 79 .060    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4.750 1 4.750 59.022 .000 .428 
Problem Type x Load  
 
.006 1 .006 .076 .783 .001 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
6.358 79 .080    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.101 1 .101 1.468 .229 .018 
Instruction x Problem Type x Load  
 
8.883E-5 1 8.883E-5 .001 .971 .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
5.411 79 .068    
Note: Load is a between subjects factor 
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Table C1.4 Between subject effects on full data set–N = 81  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
554.108 1 554.108 2739.552 .000 .972 
Load  
 
.122 1 .122 .602 .440 .008 
Error 
 
15.979 79 .202    
 
Latencies  
Table C1.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data – N = 75  
     SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
  7469937.847 1 7469937.847 36.921 .000 .336 
Instruction x Load (high or low 
load) 
 
777079.282 1 777079.282 3.841 .054 .050 
Error (Instruction) 
 
147696033.58 73 202323.337    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
10269660.24 1 10269660.24 36.928 .000 .336 
Problem Type x Load  
 
531888.539 1 531888.539 1.913 .171 .026 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
20301246.08 73 278099.261    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
529269.195 1 529269.195 1.780 .186 .024 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Load  
 
436182.799 1 436182.799 1.467 .230 .020 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
21706064.53 73 297343.350    
Note: Load is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C1.6 Between subject effects on excluded data – N = 75  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4.082E9 1 4.082E9 2028.485 .000 .965 
Load  
 
10713.367 1 10713.367 .005 .942 .000 
Error 
 
1.469E8 73 2012351.110    
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Table C1.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 81  
     SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
  7387475.292 1 7387475.292 23.257 .000 .227 
Instruction x Load (high or low 
load) 
 
777665.560 1 777665.560 2.448 .122 .030 
Error (Instruction) 
 
25094394.06 79 317650.558    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
15216636.35 1 15216636.35 26.994 .000 .255 
Problem Type x Load  
 
2002904.124 1 2002904.124 3.553 .063 .043 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
44533218.63 79 563711.628    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
407499.502 1 407499.502 .730 .395 .009 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Load  
 
331080.763 1 331080.763 .593 .444 .007 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
44096495.89 79 297343.350    
Note: Load is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C1.8 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 81  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4.670E9 1 4.670E9 1422.926 .000 .947 
Load  
 
157392.388 1 157392.388 .048 .827 .001 
Error 
 
2.4593E8 79 3281895.575    
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Experiment 2  
Accuracy  
 
Table C2.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data – N = 67 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.034 1 .034 .973 .328 .015 
Instruction x Condition (RNG,AS or Control) 
 
.397 2 .198 5.675 .005 .151 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.236 64 .035 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.739 1 2.739 50.555 .000 .441 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.064 2 .032 .588 .559 .018 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.467 64 .054 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.044 1 .044 .697 .407 .011 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.003 2 .001 .022 .978 .001 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
4.060 64 .063 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C2.2 Between subject effects on excluded data – N = 67  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
343.993 1 343.993 1896.683 .000 .967 
Condition 
 
6.201 2 3.101 17.097 .000 .348 
Error 
 
11.607 64 .181 
   
 
 
Table C2.3 Post Hoc Analysis (LSD) of Condition 
 AS Control RNG 
AS 
 
 .001 .018 
Control  
 
.001  .000 
RNG 
 
.018 .000  
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Table C2.4 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 74 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
166.824 1 166.824 1.101 .298 .015 
Instruction x Condition (RNG,AS or 
Control) 
 
769.215 2 384.607 2.538 .086 .067 
Error (Instruction) 
 
10758.577 71 151.529    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
8654.372 1 8654.372 48.003 .000 .403 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
420.387 2 210.193 1.167 .317 .032 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
12787.093 71 180.100    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
340.063 1 340.063 1.462 .231 .020 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
218.487 2 109.243 .470 .627 .013 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
16518.343 71 232.653    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C2.5 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 74 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
2082412.388 1 2082412.388 4553.925 .000 .985 
Condition  
 
15713.250 2 7856.625 17.181 .000 .326 
Error 
 
32466.781 71 457.295    
 
 
Follow Up Analysis 
 
Table C2.6 Repeated measures ANOVA comparing RNG and AS condition - 
excluded data set – N = 43 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.005 1 .005 .112 .740 .003 
Instruction x Condition (RNG, AS) 
 
.142 1 .142 2.932 .094 .067 
Error (Instruction) 
 
1.980 41 .048    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.363 1 1.363 32.842 .000 .445 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.076 1 .076 1.832 .183 .043 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.702 41 .042    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.119 1 .119 1.480 .231 .035 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.014 1 .014 .171 .681 .004 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.309 41 .081    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C2.7 Between subject effects on RNG and AS condition - excluded data set– 
N = 43 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
185.235 1 185.235 816.079 .000 .952 
Condition 
 
1.062 1 1.062 4.678 .036 .102 
Error 
 
9.306 41 .227    
 
Table C2.8 T-Test for the difference between belief and logic instruction between 
the RNG and AS Condition –excluded data set – N = 43 
 Mean Std.Dv. N Diff. t df p 
Belief AS 
Belief RNG 
 
.833807 
.788690 
.1405461 
.1397210 
22 
21 
 
.0451163 
 
1.055 
 
41 
 
.297 
Logic AS 
Logic RNG 
.860795 
.776786 
.1230228 
.1235406 
22 
21 
 
.0840097 
 
2.234 
 
41 
 
.031 
        
 
Table C2.9 Repeated measures ANOVA comparing RNG and Control Condition - 
excluded data set– N = 45 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.018 1 .018 .430 .515 .010 
Instruction x Condition (RNG, Control) 
 
.197 1 .197 4.690 .036 .098 
Error (Instruction) 
 
1.802 43 .042    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.490 1 1.490 28.332 .000 .397 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.096 1 .096 1.829 .183 .041 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
2.261 43 .053    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.093 1 .093 .970 .330 .022 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.028 1 .028 .297 .589 .007 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
4.109 43 .096    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C2.10 Between subject effects on RNG and Control Condition - excluded 
data set – N = 45 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
234.485 1 234.485 2003.433 .000 .979 
Condition  
 
6.097 1 6.097 52.089 .000 .548 
Error 
 
5.033 43 .117    
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Table C2.11 T-Test for the difference between belief and logic instruction between 
the RNG and Control Condition –excluded data set – N = 46 
 Mean Std.Dv. N Diff. t df p 
Belief RNG 
Belief Control 
 
.789773 
.917969 
.1364482 
.0730338 
22 
24 
 
 .1281960 
 
 4.020 
 
44 
 
.000 
Logic RNG 
Logic Control 
.769886 
.950521 
.1248308 
.0469127 
22 
24 
 
.1806345 
 
6.604 
 
44 
 
.000 
        
 
Table C2.12 Repeated measures ANOVA comparing AS and Control Condition - 
excluded data set – N = 46 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.275 1 .275 8.062 .007 .155 
Instruction x Condition  (AS, Control) 
 
.004 1 .004 .105 .747 .002 
Error (Instruction) 
 
1.504 44 .034    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.313 1 2.313 38.827 .000 .469 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.001 1 .001 .014 .906 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
2.621 44 .060    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.035 1 .035 .718 .402 .016 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.002 1 .002 .049 .825 .001 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.137 44 .049    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C2.13 between subject effects on AS and Control Condition - excluded data 
set– N = 46 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
274.465 1 274.465 1262.653 .000 .969 
Condition 
 
2.058 1 2.058 10.218 .003 .188 
Error 
 
8.862 44 .201    
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Latencies  
Table C2.14 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 67  
     SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
  8168111.499 1 8168111.499 11.779 .001 .155 
Instruction x Condition (RNG, 
AS & Control) 
 
854381.711 2 427190.856 .616 .543 .019 
Error (Instruction) 
 
44379358.331 64 693427.474 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
4924959.005 1 4924959.005 9.098 .004 .124 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
558535.320 2 279267.660 .516 .599 .016 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
34643417.290 64 541303.395 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1936951.996 1 1936951.996 4.286 .042 .063 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition 
 
11749.711 2 5874.855 .013 .987 .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
28921260.489 64 451894.695 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C2.15 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 67  
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
3749660399.632 1 3749660399.632 1254.417 .000 .951 
Condition 
 
6863368.493 2 3431684.247 1.148 .324 .035 
Error 
 
3749660399.632 1 3749660399.632 1254.417 .000 .951 
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Table C2.16 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 74 
    SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
  21240754.72 1 21240754.72 7.841 .008 .095 
Instruction x Condition 
 
1227574.593 2 613787.296 .216 .806 .006 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.016E8 71 2839403.667    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
12169573.30 1 1269573.30 3.689 .059 .049 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
4162313.611 2 2081156.805 .631 .535 .017 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
2.342E8 71 3298938.351    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
8742993.382 1 8742993.832 3.333 .072 .045 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
5530089.635 2 2765044.818 1.054 .345 .029 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
1.863E8 71 2623354.328    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C2.17 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 74  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4.540E9 1 4.540E9 685.547 .000 .906 
Condition  
 
7653676.581 2 3826838.291 .578 .564 .016 
Error 
 
4.702E8 71 6623160.400    
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Experiment 3 
Accuracy  
 
Table C3.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 58 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.242 1 1.242 14.460 .000 .205 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or Control) 
 
.002 1 .001 .002 .891 .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
4.810 56 .086    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4.025 1 4.025 54.650 .000 .494 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.102 1 .102 1.383 .245 .024 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
4.125 56 .074    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.015 1 .015 .189 .666 .003 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.064 1 .064 .790 .378 .014 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
4.570 56 .082    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C3.2 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 58  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
335.903 1 335.903 1234.008 .000 .957 
Condition 
 
1.055 1 1.055 3.874 .054 .065 
Error 
 
15.243 56 .272    
 
Table C3.3 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 76 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.297 1 .297 7.026 .010 .087 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or Control) 
 
.222 1 .022 .531 .468 .007 
Error (Instruction) 
 
3.125 74 .042    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.952 1 1.952 68.596 .000 .481 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.058 1 .058 2.026 .159 .027 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
2.106 74 .028    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.093 1 .093 2.503 .118 .033 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.080 1 .080 2.148 .147 .028 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.759 74 .037    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table BC.4 Between subject effects on full data set– N = 76 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
201.194 1 201.194 2394.757 .000 .970 
Condition 
 
.637 1 .637 7.587 .007 .093 
Error 
 
6.217 74 .084    
 
Latencies  
Table C3.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 58  
     SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
   280.784 1 280.784 .000 .992 .000 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) 
 
2258888.502 1 2258888.502 .920 .341 .016 
Error (Instruction) 
 
1.374E8 56 2454021.896    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
13770978.602 1 13770978.602 5.661 .021 .092 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
650269.747 1 650269.747 .270 .607 .005 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.362E8 56 2432790.847    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
20529075.858 1 20529075.858 8.414 .005 .131 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
2158302.730 1 2158302.730 .885 .351 .016 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
1.366E8 56 2439743.763    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C3.6 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 58  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
1.173E10 1 1.173E10 608.792 .000 .916 
Condition  
 
3.388E8 1 3.388E8 17.579 .000 .239 
Error 
 
1.079E9 56 19274194.761    
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Table C3.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 76 
     SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
  4094787.801 1 4094787.801 .844 .361 .011 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) 
 
1744227.569 1 1744227.569 .359 .551 .005 
Error (Instruction) 
 
3.591E8 74 4853377.682    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
23780731.057 1 23780731.057 4.728 .033 .060 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
1489430.880 1 1489430.880 .296 .588 .004 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.722E8 74 5029282.851    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
11563204.844 1 11563204.844 1.495 .255 .020 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
6423045.882 1 6423045.882 .831 .365 .011 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
5.723E8 74 7733264.163    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C3.8 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 76  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
1.518E10 1 1.518E10 415.766 .000 .849 
Condition  
 
4.296E8 1 4.296E8 11.765 .001 .137 
Error 
 
2.702E9 74 36516410.570    
 
Follow Up Analysis 
 
Table C3.7 Showing the impact of conflict on belief judgments: excluded data set – 
N = 58  
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type  
 
36461424.201 1 36461424.201 14.896 .000 .210 
       
Error 
 
137072910.599 56 2447730.546 
   
 
Table C3.8 Showing the impact of conflict on logic judgments: excluded data set – 
N = 58  
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type  
 
157980.475 1 157980.475 .065 .799 .001 
       
Error 
 
135281384.432 56 2415739.008 
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Experiment 4 
Accuracy  
 
Table C4.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 67 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 2.345 1 2.345 19.266 .000 .229 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or Control) 
 .240 1 .240 1.968 .165 .029 
Error (Instruction) 
 7.911 65 .122 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 6.868 1 6.868 66.225 .000 .505 
Problem Type x Condition  
 .144 1 .144 1.391 .243 .021 
Error (Problem Type) 
 6.741 65 .104 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 3.026 1 3.026 43.964 .000 .403 
Complexity x Condition 
 .070 1 .070 1.015 .317 .015 
Error (Complexity) 
 4.474 65 .069 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 2.019 1 2.019 20.278 .000 .239 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 .042 1 .042 .429 .515 .007 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 6.439 65 .099 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .126 1 .126 3.189 .079 .047 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition 
.033 1 .033 .846 .361 .013 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  2.565 65 .039 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .394 1 .394 10.962 .002 .144 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.137 1 .137 3.807 .055 .055 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
2.337 65 .036 
   
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 .055 1 .055 1.627 .207 .024 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition .001 1 .001 .042 .839 .001 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
2.211 65 .034 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.2 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 67  
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 677.746 1 677.746 1390.461 .000 .955 
Condition  
 6.431 1 6.431 13.193 .001 .169 
Error 
 31.683 65 .487 
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Table C4.3 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 80 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.528 1 .528 11.601 .001 .129 
Instruction x Condition  (RNG or 
Control) 
 
.003 1 .003 .063 .802 .001 
Error (Instruction) 
 
3.548 78 .045    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.967 1 2.967 59.335 .000 .432 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.000 1 .000 .008 .928 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.900 78 .050    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.415 1 .415 43.476 .000 .358 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.011 1 .011 1.168 .283 .015 
Error (Complexity) 
 
.745 78 .010    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.402 1 .402 10.016 .002 .114 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.083 1 .083 2.069 .154 .026 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.130 78 .040    
Instruction x Complexity 
 
.001 1 .001 .128 .722 .002 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition 
.025 1 .025 2.666 .107 .033 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
 
.730 78 .009    
Problem x Complexity 
 
.053 1 .053 5.848 .018 .070 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.003 1 .003 .325 .570 .004 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
.703 78 .009    
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.014 1 .014 1.450 .232 .018 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 1 .000 .019 .892 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
.753 78 .010 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.4 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 80  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
419.537 1 419.537 2759.145 .000 .973 
Condition  
1.617 1 1.617 10.636 .002 .120 
Error 
 
11.860 78 .152    
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Follow Up Analysis 
Table C4.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data for MP arguments – N = 
67  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 1.779 1 1.779 23.537 .000 .266 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) 
 
.047 1 .047 .622 .433 .009 
Error (Instruction) 
 4.912 65 .076 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 5.276 1 5.276 70.356 .000 .520 
Problem Type x Condition 
 .281 1 .281 3.748 .057 .055 
Error (Problem Type) 
 4.875 65 .075 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 .703 1 .703 9.613 .003 .129 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 .014 1 .014 .194 .661 .003 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 4.752 65 .073 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.6 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data for Disjunctive 
arguments – N = 67  
         SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 .692 1 .692 8.085 .006 .111 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) .226 1 .226 2.638 .109 .039 
Error (Instruction) 
5.565 65 .086 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 1.985 1 1.985 30.703 .000 .321 
Problem Type x Condition 
4.766E-
005 
1 4.766E-005 .001 .978 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
4.203 65 .065 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
1.371 1 1.371 22.868 .000 .260 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition .030 1 .030 .496 .484 .008 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
3.898 65 .060 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Latencies  
Table C4.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 67 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 3905627.639 1 3905627.639 .808 .372 .012 
Instruction x Condition 
(RNG or Control) 
 
913642.368 1 913642.368 .189 .665 .003 
Error (Instruction) 
 314158764.629 65 4833211.764 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
10603267.102 1 10603267.102 2.611 .111 .039 
Problem Type x Condition 
 530963.598 1 530963.598 .131 .719 .002 
Error (Problem Type) 
 263948074.213 65 4060739.603 
   
Complexity 
(MP/Disjunctives) 
 
375920794.093 1 375920794.093 66.329 .000 .505 
Complexity x Condition 
 659676.764 1 659676.764 .116 .734 .002 
Error (Complexity) 
 368386426.489 65 5667483.484 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 10352651.083 1 10352651.083 2.650 .108 .039 
Instruction x Problem Type 
x Condition 
 
15830.448 1 15830.448 .004 .949 .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
253886692.927 65 3905949.122    
Instruction x Complexity  
 13311259.561 1 13311259.561 3.389 .070 .050 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 6630675.851 1 6630675.851 1.688 .198 .025 
Error (Instruction * 
Complexity) 
  
255340590.832 65 3928316.782    
Problem x Complexity  
 537434.622 1 537434.622 .181 .672 .003 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 152449.980 1 152449.980 .051 .822 .001 
 
Error (Problem * 
Complexity) 
193490645.741 65 2976779.165    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
183731.729 1 183731.729 .063 .803 .001 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 961552.042 1 961552.042 .329 .568 .005 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem 
x Complexity) 
189864508.449 65 2920992.438    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.8 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 67  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 29026745643.943 1 29026745643.943 951.326 .000 .936 
Condition  
656200167.407 1 656200167.407 21.506 .000 .249 
Error 
 1983271662.601 65 30511871.732 
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Table C4.9 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 80 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 4.975E8 1 4.975E8 42.703 .000 .354 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) 
 
3099545.257 1 3099545.257 .266 .607 .003 
Error (Instruction) 
 
9.088E8 78 
11650982.70
4 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
28247200.13
7 
1 
28247200.13
7 
4.351 .040 .053 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
12918860.70
8 
1 
12918860.70
8 
1.990 .162 .025 
Error (Problem Type) 
 5.063E8 78 6491400.830    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
30743881.49
3 
1 
30743881.49
3 
4.805 .031 .058 
Complexity x Condition 
 28089.039 1 28089.039 .004 .947 .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 4.991E8 78 6398811.315 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 5576530.499 1 5576530.499 .937 .336 .012 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition 
 
6410843.252 1 6410843.252 1.077 .303 .014 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
4.643E8 78 5952346.115    
Instruction x Complexity  
 3281172.515 1 3281172.515 .580 .449 .007 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 2220.643 1 2220.643 .000 .984 .000 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  4.414E8 78 5658893.391 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 2476763.679 1 2476763.679 .447 .506 .006 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
28293280.23
5 
1 
28293280.23
5 
5.105 .027 .061 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
4.323E8 78 5542601.001    
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
11427.645 1 11427.645 .003 .954 .000 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 3073443.162 1 3073443.162 .894 .347 .011 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
2.681E8 78 3436886.299    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.10 between subject effects on full data set – N = 80  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 3.852E10 1 3.852E10 734.088 .000 .904 
Condition  
1.302E9 1 1.302E9 24.811 .000 .241 
Error 
 4.093E9 78 52479737.322 
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Individual Differences 
 
Table C4.11 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded accuracy data set – N = 72 –
AH4 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 2.523 1 2.523 22.286 .000 .241 
Instruction x AH4 (high or low group) 
 .453 1 .453 4.004 .049 .054 
Error (Instruction) 
 7.926 70 .113 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 6.571 1 6.571 61.949 .000 .469 
Problem Type x AH4 
 .013 1 .013 .119 .731 .002 
Error (Problem Type) 
 7.425 70 .106 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 2.874 1 2.874 42.395 .000 .377 
Complexity x AH4 
 .009 1 .009 .130 .719 .002 
Error (Complexity) 
 4.745 70 .068 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 1.817 1 1.817 19.254 .000 .216 
Instruction x Problem Type x AH4  
 .181 1 .181 1.919 .170 .027 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 6.605 70 .094 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .090 1 .090 2.316 .133 .032 
Instruction x Complexity x AH4 
.001 1 .001 .016 .901 .000 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  2.722 70 .039 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .286 1 .286 7.227 .009 .094 
Problem x Complexity x AH4 
.002 1 .002 .059 .809 .001 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
2.767 70 .040 
   
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 .089 1 .089 2.571 .113 .035 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x AH4 
.000 1 .000 .006 .938 .000 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
2.433 70 .035 
   
Note: AH4 group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.12 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 72 – AH4 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 725.463 1 725.463 1348.045 .000 .951 
AH4 group 
 5.170 1 5.170 9.607 .003 .121 
Error 
 37.671 70 .538 
   
 
 
 
 
 292 
 
Table C4.13 Repeated measures ANOVA on full accuracy data set – N = 80 – AH4 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 .533 1 .533 11.827 .001 .132 
Instruction x AH4 (high or low group) 
 .037 1 .037 .824 .367 .010 
Error (Instruction) 
 3.514 78 .045 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 2.965 1 2.965 59.319 .000 .432 
Problem Type x AH4 
 .002 1 .002 .031 .861 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 3.899 78 .050 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 .411 1 .411 42.435 .000 .352 
Complexity x AH4 
 .001 1 .001 .102 .750 .001 
Error (Complexity) 
 .755 78 .010 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 .395 1 .395 9.596 .003 .110 
Instruction x Problem Type x AH4  
 .004 1 .004 .094 .760 .001 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 3.209 78 .041 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .001 1 .001 .092 .762 .001 
Instruction x Complexity x AH4 
.001 1 .001 .096 .757 .001 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  .754 78 .010 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .051 1 .051 5.709 .019 .068 
Problem x Complexity x AH4 
.009 1 .009 1.004 .319 .013 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
.697 78 .009 
   
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 .014 1 .014 1.439 .234 .018 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
AH4 
2.458E-
005 
1 
2.458E
-005 
.003 .960 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
.753 78 .010 
   
Note: AH4 group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.14 Between subject effects on full accuracy data set – N = 80 – AH4 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 422.202 1 422.202 2810.566 .000 .973 
AH4 group 
 1.760 1 1.760 11.718 .001 .131 
Error 
 11.717 78 .150 
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Table C4.15 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded accuracy data set – N = 72 – 
CRT 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 2.919 1 2.919 25.783 .000 .269 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 .455 1 .455 4.024 .049 .054 
Error (Instruction) 
 7.924 70 .113 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 5.794 1 5.794 57.050 .000 .449 
Problem Type x CRT 
 .329 1 .329 3.235 .076 .044 
Error (Problem Type) 
 7.109 70 .102 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 2.648 1 2.648 39.322 .000 .360 
Complexity x CRT 
 .040 1 .040 .591 .445 .008 
Error (Complexity) 
 4.714 70 .067 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 2.029 1 2.029 21.610 .000 .236 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 .215 1 .215 2.286 .135 .032 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 6.572 70 .094 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .074 1 .074 1.914 .171 .027 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT 
.014 1 .014 .364 .549 .005 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  2.708 70 .039 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .297 1 .297 7.526 .008 .097 
Problem x Complexity x CRT 
.009 1 .009 .240 .626 .003 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
2.760 70 .039 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.098 1 .098 2.826 .097 .039 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT 
.010 1 .010 .300 .586 .004 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
2.423 70 .035 
   
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.16 Between subject effects on excluded accuracy data set – N = 72 – CRT  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 707.004 1 707.004 1161.962 .000 .943 
CRT group 
 .249 1 .249 .409 .524 .006 
Error 
 42.592 70 .608 
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Table C4.17 Repeated measures ANOVA on full accuracy data set – N = 80 – CRT  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 .661 1 .661 15.506 .000 .166 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 .224 1 .224 5.254 .025 .063 
Error (Instruction) 
 3.327 78 .043 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 2.732 1 2.732 54.824 .000 .413 
Problem Type x CRT 
 .014 1 .014 .278 .600 .004 
Error (Problem Type) 
 3.886 78 .050 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 .356 1 .356 37.529 .000 .325 
Complexity x CRT 
 .017 1 .017 1.748 .190 .022 
Error (Complexity) 
 .739 78 .009 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 .504 1 .504 13.030 .001 .143 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 .194 1 .194 5.024 .028 .061 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 3.018 78 .039 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .001 1 .001 .055 .815 .001 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT 
.001 1 .001 .093 .761 .001 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  .754 78 .010 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .051 1 .051 5.643 .020 .067 
Problem x Complexity x CRT 
.000 1 .000 .027 .870 .000 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
.706 78 .009 
   
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 .011 1 .011 1.182 .280 .015 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
CRT .001 1 .001 .139 .710 .002 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
.751 78 .010 
   
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C4.18 Between subject effects on full accuracy data set – N = 80 – CRT   
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 404.363 1 404.363 2385.818 .000 .968 
CRT group 
 .257 1 .257 1.519 .221 .019 
Error 
 13.220 78 .169 
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Table C4.19 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded accuracy data set – N = 72 - 
AOT 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 2.514 1 2.514 21.325 .000 .234 
Instruction x AOT (high or low group) 
 .127 1 .127 1.080 .302 .015 
Error (Instruction) 
 8.252 70 .118 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 6.643 1 6.643 63.053 .000 .474 
Problem Type x AOT 
 .063 1 .063 .593 .444 .008 
Error (Problem Type) 
 7.375 70 .105 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 2.863 1 2.863 42.201 .000 .376 
Complexity x AOT 
 .005 1 .005 .069 .794 .001 
Error (Complexity) 
 4.749 70 .068 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 1.868 1 1.868 19.343 .000 .217 
Instruction x Problem Type x AOT 
 .025 1 .025 .257 .614 .004 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 6.761 70 .097 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .095 1 .095 2.445 .122 .034 
Instruction x Complexity x AOT 
.016 1 .016 .414 .522 .006 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  2.706 70 .039 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .279 1 .279 7.094 .010 .092 
Problem x Complexity x AOT 
.016 1 .016 .396 .531 .006 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
2.754 70 .039 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.086 1 .086 2.481 .120 .034 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x AOT 
.008 1 .008 .236 .629 .003 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
2.425 70 .035 
   
Note: AOT (Active Open-minded Thinking) group (high and low) as a between subjects 
factor 
 
Table C4.20 Between subject effects on excluded accuracy data set – N = 72 - AOT  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 724.296 1 724.296 1209.686 .000 .945 
AOT group 
 .929 1 .929 1.551 .217 .022 
Error 
 41.912 70 .599 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 296 
 
Table C4.21 Repeated measures ANOVA on full accuracy data set – N = 80 - AOT 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 .527 1 .527 11.583 .001 .129 
Instruction x AOT (high or low group) 
 .001 1 .001 .030 .863 .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 3.550 78 .046 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 2.941 1 2.941 60.430 .000 .437 
Problem Type x AOT 
 .105 1 .105 2.153 .146 .027 
Error (Problem Type) 
 3.796 78 .049 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 .412 1 .412 42.574 .000 .353 
Complexity x AOT 
 .000 1 .000 .043 .836 .001 
Error (Complexity) 
 .755 78 .010 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 .388 1 .388 9.489 .003 .108 
Instruction x Problem Type x AOT 
 .020 1 .020 .500 .482 .006 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 3.192 78 .041 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 .001 1 .001 .091 .764 .001 
Instruction x Complexity x AOT 
.002 1 .002 .189 .665 .002 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
.753 78 .010 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .052 1 .052 5.757 .019 .069 
Problem x Complexity x AOT 
3.079E-
006 
1 
3.079E-
006 
.000 .985 .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .706 78 .009 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.014 1 .014 1.419 .237 .018 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x AOT 
.002 1 .002 .184 .669 .002 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) .751 78 .010 
   
 
      
Note: AOT (Active Open-minded Thinking) group (high and low) as a between subjects 
factor 
 
Table C4.22 Between subject effects on full accuracy data set – N = 80 - AOT  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 421.895 1 421.895 2649.376 .000 .971 
AOT group 
 1.056 1 1.056 6.634 .012 .078 
Error 
 12.421 78 .159 
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Experiment 5  
Randomness   
Table C5.1 MANOVA on the Randomness Indices across the 3 Primary task 
conditions –N = 108  
 Value F df Error 
df 
p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
.009 3927.615 3 103.00 .000 .991 
Primary Task (Belief/Logic and 
baseline) 
 
.747 5.386 6 206.000 .000 .136 
 
Table C5.2 ANOVA measuring the effect of the Primary task on 3 Randomness 
Indices N = 108  
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept Redundancy .080 1 .080 148.275 .000 .585 
 Adjacency 11.745 1 11.745 1307.550 .000 .926 
 RNG 35.593 1 35.593 9177.353 .000 .989 
Primary 
Task 
Redundancy 
.019 2 .009 17.316 .000 .248 
 Adjacency .008 2 .004 .458 .634 .009 
 RNG .000 2 9.259E-005 .024 .976 .000 
Error Redundancy .057 105 .001 
   
 Adjacency .943 105 .009 
   
 RNG .407 105 .004 
   
Total Redundancy .155 108 
    
 Adjacency 12.697 108 
    
 RNG 36.000 108 
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Table C5.3 Post Hoc Analysis (LSD) of Primary task on Randomness indices – N = 
108  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I)Primary 
Task  
Instruction 
(J)Primary 
Task  
Instruction 
Mean 
Dif ference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval  
---------------------------------- 
 Upper Bound         Lower Bound 
Redundancy Baseline Belief -.026646* .0054694 .000 -.037491 -.015801 
  Logic -.028960* .0054694 .000 -.039805 -.018115 
 Belief Baseline .026646
* .0054694 .000 .015801 .037491 
  Logic -.002314 .0054694 .673 -.013159 .008531 
 Logic Baseline .028960* .0054694 .000 .018115 .039805 
  Belief .002314 .0054694 .673 -.008531 .013159 
Adjacency Baseline Belief -.018422 .0223392 .411 -.062717 .025872 
  Logic -.018594 .0223392 .407 -.062889 .025700 
 Belief Baseline .018422 .0223392 .411 -.025872 .062717 
  Logic -.000172 .0223392 .994 -.044467 .044122 
 Logic Baseline .018594 .0223392 .407 -.025700 .062889 
  Belief .000172 .0223392 .994 -.044122 .044467 
RNG Baseline Belief .002778 .0146786 .850 -.026327 .031883 
  Logic .000000 .0146786 1.000 -.029105 .029105 
 Belief Baseline -.002778 .0146786 .850 -.031883 .026327 
  Logic -.002778 .0146786 .850 -.031883 .026327 
 Logic Baseline .000000 .0146786 1.000 -.029105 .029105 
  Belief .002778 .0146786 .850 -.026327 .031883 
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Accuracy  
 
Table C5.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 61 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.659 1 1.659 14.359 .000 .196 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or Control) 
 
.843 1 .843 7.295 .009 .110 
Error (Instruction) 
 
6.816 59 .116 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4.286 1 4.286 40.138 .000 .405 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.054 1 .054 .505 .480 .008 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
6.301 59 .107 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1.526 1 1.526 22.195 .000 .273 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.130 1 .130 1.888 .175 .031 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.056 59 .069 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.619 1 .619 9.778 .003 .142 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.029 1 .029 .454 .503 .008 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.737 59 .063 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.062 1 .062 1.071 .305 .018 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition 
.074 1 .074 1.286 .261 .021 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  3.400 59 .058 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
.036 1 .036 1.374 .246 .023 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.050 1 .050 1.932 .170 .032 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
1.536 59 .026 
   
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.028 1 .028 .512 .477 .009 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.006 1 .006 .103 .750 .002 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
3.231 59 .055 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C5.6 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 61 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 638.864 1 638.864 1262.663 .000 .955 
Condition  
4.313 1 4.313 8.525 .005 .126 
Error 
 29.852 59 .506 
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Table C5.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 71 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.478 1 .478 10.253 .002 .129 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) 
 
.011 1 .011 .245 .622 .004 
Error (Instruction) 
 
3.215 69 .047 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
3.113 1 3.113 53.074 .000 .435 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.001 1 .001 .016 .901 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
4.047 69 .059 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.213 1 .213 17.154 .000 .199 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.038 1 .038 3.077 .084 .043 
Error (Complexity) 
 
.856 69 .012 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.452 1 .452 10.353 .002 .130 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition 
 
.012 1 .012 .270 .605 .004 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.013 69 .044 
   
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.005 1 .005 .367 .547 .005 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition 
.021 1 .021 1.593 .211 .023 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  .889 69 .013 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
.005 1 .005 .805 .373 .012 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.022 1 .022 3.243 .076 .045 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
.469 69 .007 
   
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.004 1 .004 .328 .568 .005 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
 
.006 1 .006 .515 .475 .007 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
.792 69 .011 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
Table C5.8 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 71 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 376.386 1 376.386 2435.064 .000 .972 
Condition  
1.118 1 1.118 7.232 .009 .095 
Error 
 10.665 69 .155 
   
 
Follow Up Analysis 
Table C5.9 Examining the effect of condition on Belief instruction across early 
blocks (1 &2) – excluded data set – N = 61 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
310.932 1 310.932 913.999 .000 .939 
Condition  
1.001 1 1.001 2.943 .092 .048 
Error 
 
20.071 59 .340 
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Table C5.10 Examining the effect of condition on Belief instruction across later 
blocks (3 &4) – excluded data set – N = 61 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
306.871 1 306.871 706.326 .000 .923 
Condition  
1.027 1 1.027 2.363 .130 .039 
Error 
 
25.633 59 .434 
   
 
Latencies  
Table C5.11 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded data set – N = 61 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 36750924.696 1 36750924.696 5.786 .019 .089 
Instruction x Condition (RNG or 
Control) 
 
16284021.057 1 16284021.057 2.564 .115 .042 
Error (Instruction) 
 374763452.919 59 6351922.931 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
196103.463 1 196103.463 .120 .731 .002 
Problem Type x Condition 
 8470462.479 1 8470462.479 5.170 .027 .081 
Error (Problem Type) 
 96668264.201 59 1638445.156 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 289359950.064 1 
289359950.06
4 
108.661 .000 .648 
Complexity x Condition 
 2694863.670 1 2694863.670 1.012 .319 .017 
Error (Complexity) 
 157115072.551 59 2662967.331 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 7796600.776 1 7796600.776 2.902 .094 .047 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition 
 
3229365.662 1 3229365.662 1.202 .277 .020 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
158491033.560 59 2686288.704    
Instruction x Complexity  
 443697.311 1 443697.311 .284 .596 .005 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 2880771.409 1 2880771.409 1.847 .179 .030 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
92030819.468 59 1559844.398    
Problem x Complexity  
 93862.337 1 93862.337 .054 .817 .001 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 1752.993 1 1752.993 .001 .975 .000 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
101989945.785 59 1728643.149    
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
39239.311 1 39239.311 .024 .877 .000 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 853038.065 1 853038.065 .521 .473 .009 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
96567979.911 59 1636745.422    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C5.12 Between subject effects on excluded data set – N = 61 
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 16030578053.285 1 16030578053.285 878.593 .000 .937 
Condition  
302806557.219 1 302806557.219 16.596 .000 .220 
Error 
 1076498531.674 59 18245737.825 
   
 
Table C5.13 Repeated measures ANOVA on full data set – N = 71 
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 21671446.651 1 21671446.651 1.689 .198 .024 
Instruction x Condition 
(RNG or Control) 
 
13894197.292 1 13894197.292 1.083 .302 .015 
Error (Instruction) 
 885185347.374 69 12828773.150 
   
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
23903.605 1 23903.605 .015 .902 .000 
Problem Type x Condition 
 4976603.992 1 4976603.992 3.157 .080 .044 
Error (Problem Type) 
 108777815.455 69 1576490.079 
   
Complexity 
(MP/Disjunctives) 
 
365786420.074 1 365786420.074 77.553 .000 .529 
Complexity x Condition 
 14960521.448 1 14960521.448 3.172 .079 .044 
Error (Complexity) 
 325443713.964 69 4716575.565 
   
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 4647749.209 1 4647749.209 2.274 .136 .032 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition 
 
4816217.766 1 4816217.766 2.357 .129 .033 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
141013679.372 69 2043676.513    
Instruction x Complexity  
 193286.358 1 193286.358 .078 .781 .001 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 35271.591 1 35271.591 .014 .905 .000 
 
Error (Instruction * 
Complexity) 
  
170450267.624 69 2470293.734    
Problem x Complexity  
 116152.255 1 116152.255 .034 .854 .000 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 2916122.755 1 2916122.755 .856 .358 .012 
 
Error (Problem * 
Complexity) 
235113190.481 69 3407437.543    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
1112744.294 1 1112744.294 .300 .586 .004 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 4900111.301 1 4900111.301 1.321 .254 .019 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem 
x Complexity) 
255921990.344 69 3709014.353    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C5.14 Between subject effects on full data set – N = 71 
  SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 20724930175.794 1 20724930175.794 617.711 .000 .900 
Condition  
785664425.618 1 785664425.618 23.417 .000 .253 
Error 
 2315032267.372 69 33551192.281 
   
 
Follow Up Analysis 
 
Table C5.15 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 30 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2142162.907 1 2142162.907 .760 .390 .025 
Instruction x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
84542285.968 30 2818076.199    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
5804514.036 1 5804514.036 5.522 .026 .155 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
31536476.339 30 1051215.878    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
119666521.940 1 119666521.940 74.805 .000 .714 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
47991630.935 30 1599721.031    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
530025.101 1 530025.101 .420 .522 .014 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
37824110.774 30 1260803.692    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
513695.036 1 513695.036 .528 .473 .017 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
29177705.339 30 972590.178    
Problem x Complexity  
 
71162.907 1 71162.907 .091 .766 .003 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 23589211.968 30 786307.066    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
287028.101 1 287028.101 .213 .648 .007 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
40457423.274 30 1348580.776 
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Table C5.16 Repeated measures ANOVA on RNG Condition only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 29 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
43070801.004 1 43070801.004 4.284 .047 .129 
Instruction x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
291570026.371 29 10054138.840    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
5551954.204 1 5551954.204 2.514 .124 .080 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
64049592.171 29 2208606.627    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
156983227.538 1 156983227.538 54.587 .000 .653 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
83398506.838 29 2875810.581    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
14461423.204 1 14461423.204 2.990 .094 .093 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem 
Type)  
 
140251675.671 29 4836264.678    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
1796605.104 1 1796605.104 .982 .330 .033 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
53077748.771 29 1830267.199    
Problem x Complexity  
 
109953.204 1 109953.204 .038 .847 .001 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 84415753.671 29 2910888.058    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
268068.504 1 268068.504 .113 .739 .004 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
68554218.871 29 2363938.582 
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Experiment 7 
 
Accuracy  
 
Table C6.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - excluded 
data set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 .090 1 .090 2.243 .139 .030 
Problem Type x Condition  
 .066 1 .066 1.654 .202 .022 
Error (Problem Type) 
 2.932 73 .040 
   
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 .237 1 .237 4.094 .047 .053 
Complexity x Condition 
 .237 1 .237 4.105 .046 .053 
Error (Complexity) 
 4.222 73 .058 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .006 1 .006 .155 .695 .002 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.198 1 .198 5.257 .025 .067 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
2.744 73 .038 
   
 
      
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C6.2 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - excluded data set 
– N = 75  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
308.537 1 308.537 905.456 .000 .925 
Condition  
 
.650 1 .650 1.908 .171 .025 
Error 
 
24.875 73 .341    
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Table C6.3 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - full data set 
– N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.046 1 .046 3.257 .075 .040 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.046 1 .046 3.257 .075 .040 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.115 79 .014    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.107 1 .107 5.624 .020 .066 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.098 1 .098 5.161 .026 .061 
Error (Complexity) 
 
1.500 79 .019    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.025 1 .025 2.217 .141 .027 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .065 1 .065 5.692 .019 .067 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .905 79 .011    
 
      
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C6.4 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - full data set – N = 
81  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
201.102 1 201.102 2052.177 .000 .963 
Condition  
 
.166 1 .166 1.696 .197 .021 
Error 
 
7.742 79 .098    
 
Follow Up Analysis 
 
Table C6.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on Experimental Condition only - 
excluded accuracy data set – N = 37 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
.154 1 .154 3.300 .078 .084 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.676 36 .047    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.468 1 .468 7.933 .008 .181 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
2.124 36 .059    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.134 1 .134 2.434 .127 .063 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
1.979 
 
36 
 
.055 
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Table C6.6 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 38 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
.001 1 .001 .027 .871 .001 
Problem Type x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.256 37 .034    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.141E-007 1 2.141E-007 .000 .998 .000 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
2.099 37 .057    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.069 1 .069 3.326 .076 .082 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
.764 
 
37 
 
.021 
   
 
Table C6.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded 
data set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2.935 1 2.935 35.460 .000 .327 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.337 1 .337 4.073 .047 .053 
Error (Instruction) 
 
6.042 73 .083    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.697 1 2.697 33.004 .000 .311 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.110 1 .110 1.350 .249 .018 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
5.966 73 .082    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.782 1 2.782 37.279 .000 .338 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.002 1 .002 .028 .868 .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
5.447 73 .075    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.823 1 .823 10.899 .001 .130 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.251 1 .251 3.324 .072 .044 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
5.514 73 .076    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.286 1 .286 4.586 .036 .059 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .000 1 .000 .003 .957 .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
4.553 73 .062    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.412 1 .412 14.367 .000 .164 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .067 1 .067 2.346 .130 .031 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 2.092 73 .029    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.134 1 .134 3.656 .060 .048 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.072 1 .072 1.954 .166 .026 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 2.673 73 .037    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C6.8 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded data 
set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
1008.513 1 1008.513 2841.077 .000 .975 
Condition  
 
.242 1 .242 .683 .411 .009 
Error 
 
25.913 73 .355    
 
Table C6.9 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data 
set – N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.681 1 .681 20.499 .000 .206 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.135 1 .135 4.066 .047 .049 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.626 79 .033    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.337 1 1.337 26.680 .000 .252 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.045 1 .045 .892 .348 .011 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.960 79 .050    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.441 1 .441 39.061 .000 .331 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.007 1 .007 .590 .445 .007 
Error (Complexity) 
 
.891 79 .011    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.501 1 .501 16.114 .000 .169 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.116 1 .116 3.722 .057 .045 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.454 79 .031    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.081 1 .081 6.510 .013 .076 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .002 1 .002 .145 .705 .002 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
.987 79 .012    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.136 1 .136 16.001 .000 .168 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .008 1 .008 .908 .344 .011 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .673 79 .009    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.047 1 .047 6.633 .012 .077 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
7.821E-
006 
1 7.821E-
006 
.001 .974 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
.557 79 .007    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
Table C6.10 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data set – 
N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
512.743 1 512.743 4398.477 .000 .982 
Condition  
 
.018 1 .018 .151 .699 .002 
Error 
 
9.209 79 .117    
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Latencies  
 
Table C6.11 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - excluded 
data set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2673853.144 1 2673853.144 4.746 .033 .061 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
1256336.770 1 1256336.770 2.230 .140 .030 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
41130685.376 73 563434.046    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
867923.999 1 867923.999 1.594 .211 .021 
Complexity x Condition 
 
204161.333 1 204161.333 .375 .542 .005 
Error (Complexity) 
 
39751775.787 73 544544.874    
Problem x Complexity  
 
400854.684 1 400854.684 .574 .451 .008 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 835594.044 1 835594.044 1.196 .278 .016 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
51003938.503 
 
73 
 
698684.089 
   
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C6.12 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - excluded data set 
– N = 75  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
3154081627.589 1 3154081627.589 595.575 .000 .891 
Condition  
 
342605.456 1 342605.456 .065 .800 .001 
Error 
 
386597984.331 73 5295862.799    
 
 
Table C6.13 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - full data set 
– N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1550575.587 1 1550575.587 1.231 .271 .015 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
1550028.994 1 1550028.994 1.230 .271 .015 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
99548391.419 79 1260106.220    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2079779.895 1 2079779.895 2.045 .157 .025 
Complexity x Condition 
 
339934.414 1 339934.414 .334 .565 .004 
Error (Complexity) 
 
80336753.889 79 1016920.935    
Problem x Complexity  
 
1961908.684 1 1961908.684 2.193 .143 .027 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 1861165.129 1 1861165.129 2.081 .153 .026 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
70668198.396 
 
79 
 
894534.157 
   
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C6.14 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - full data set – N 
= 81  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4147417057.135 1 4147417057.135 430.642 .000 .845 
Condition  
 
11007188.122 1 11007188.122 1.143 .288 .014 
Error 
 
760831637.588 79 9630780.223    
 
 
Table C6.15 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded 
data set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
11536018.985 1 11536018.985 5.628 .020 .072 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
2023424.065 1 2023424.065 .987 .324 .013 
Error (Instruction) 
 
149628853.359 73 2049710.320    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
21812799.061 1 21812799.061 14.403 .000 .165 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
81827.501 1 81827.501 .054 .817 .001 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
110558631.082 73 1514501.796    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1631774.347 1 1631774.347 1.352 .249 .018 
Complexity x Condition 
 
2420921.827 1 2420921.827 2.006 .161 .027 
Error (Complexity) 
 
88116938.796 73 1207081.353    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1200619.930 1 1200619.930 .927 .339 .013 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
80840.103 1 80840.103 .062 .803 .001 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
94565845.480 73 1295422.541    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
1503017.796 1 1503017.796 1.043 .311 .014 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
4134750.396 1 4134750.396 2.868 .095 .038 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
 
105240384.547 
 
73 
 
1441649.103 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
1028600.815 1 1028600.815 .990 .323 .013 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 1814046.721 1 1814046.721 1.746 .191 .023 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
75858869.529 
 
73 
 
1039162.596 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
 
2198319.065 
 
1 
 
2198319.065 
 
1.574 
 
.214 
 
.021 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
923287.905 1 923287.905 .661 .419 .009 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
101923165.678 73 1396207.749    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C6.16 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded data 
set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
27723381354.280 1 27723381354.280 1381.670 .000 .950 
Condition  
 
3075157.760 1 3075157.760 .153 .697 .002 
Error 
 
1464753738.263 73 20065119.702    
 
Table C6.17 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data 
set – N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2762883.311 1 2762883.311 .692 .408 .009 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
3520792.941 1 3520792.941 .882 .351 .011 
Error (Instruction) 
 
315341543.247 79 3991665.104    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
22907127.562 1 22907127.562 9.718 .003 .110 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
3329663.117 1 3329663.117 1.413 .238 .018 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
186217407.633 79 2357182.375    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
10948157.080 1 10948157.080 3.803 .055 .046 
Complexity x Condition 
 
134546.562 1 134546.562 .047 .829 .001 
Error (Complexity) 
 
227439129.516 79 2878976.323    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
867421.874 1 867421.874 .312 .578 .004 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
3569141.207 1 3569141.207 1.282 .261 .016 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
219982934.018 79 2784594.101    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
941542.541 1 941542.541 .236 .629 .003 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
8099741.676 1 8099741.676 2.028 .158 .025 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
 
315548941.518 
 
79 
 
3994290.399 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
112032.805 1 112032.805 .060 .807 .001 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 503195.398 1 503195.398 .269 .605 .003 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
147683241.828 
 
79 
 
1869408.124 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
 
803836.241 
 
1 
 
803836.241 
 
.227 
 
.635 
 
.003 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
7792211.106 1 7792211.106 2.204 .142 .027 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
 
279280021.286 
 
79 
 
3535190.143 
   
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C6.18 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data set – 
N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
32333320636.290 1 32333320636.290 1036.812 .000 .929 
Condition  
 
1435482.981 1 1435482.981 .046 .831 .001 
Error 
 
2463641002.213 79 31185329.142    
 
 
Individual Differences 
 
Table C6.19 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded accuracy data set – N = 75 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2.404 1 2.404 27.869 .000 .276 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.082 1 .082 .946 .334 .013 
Error (Instruction) 
 
6.298 73 .086    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.089 1 2.089 25.767 .000 .261 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.159 1 .159 1.964 .165 .026 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
5.918 73 .081    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.210 1 2.210 30.196 .000 .293 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.108 1 .108 1.470 .229 .020 
Error (Complexity) 
 
5.342 73 .073    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.475 1 .475 6.402 .014 .081 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.348 1 .348 4.683 .034 .060 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
5.417 73 .074    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.136 1 .136 2.282 .135 .030 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .210 1 .210 3.526 .064 .046 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
 
4.344 
 
73 
 
.060 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
.253 1 .253 9.039 .004 .110 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .116 1 .116 4.151 .045 .054 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
2.043 
 
73 
 
.028 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
 
.128 
 
1 
 
.128 
 
3.399 
 
.069 
 
.044 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 1 .000 .009 .923 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
 
2.745 
 
73 
 
.038 
   
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
Table C6.20 Between subject effects on excluded accuracy data set – N = 75  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
943.319 1 943.319 2901.901 .000 .975 
CRT group 
 
2.426 1 2.426 7.462 .008 .093 
Error 
 
23.730 73 .325    
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Table C6.21 Repeated measures ANOVA on full accuracy data set – N = 81 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.506 1 .506 14.832 .000 .158 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.064 1 .064 1.866 .176 .023 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.697 79 .034    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.966 1 .966 19.798 .000 .200 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.151 1 .151 3.087 .083 .038 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.854 79 .049    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.375 1 .375 33.135 .000 .295 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.003 1 .003 .300 .585 .004 
Error (Complexity) 
 
.894 79 .011    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.334 1 .334 10.695 .002 .119 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.103 1 .103 3.307 .073 .040 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.466 79 .031    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.054 1 .054 4.386 .039 .053 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .015 1 .015 1.251 .267 .016 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
 
.973 
 
79 
 
.012 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
.101 1 .101 11.960 .001 .131 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .010 1 .010 1.238 .269 .015 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
.670 
 
79 
 
.008 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
 
.042 
 
1 
 
.042 
 
5.960 
 
.017 
 
.070 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT 4.895E-
006 
1 4.895E-
006 
.001 .979 .000 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
.557 79 .007    
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C6.22 Between subject effects on full accuracy data set – N = 81  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
472.409 1 472.409 4224.626 .000 .982 
CRT group 
 
.393 1 .393 3.513 .065 .043 
Error 
 
8.834 79 .112    
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Follow Up Analysis 
 
Table C6.23 Repeated measures ANOVA on High CRT group only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 26 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.612 1 .612 14.384 .001 .365 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
1.064 25 .043    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.419 1 .419 10.887 .003 .303 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
.962 25 .038    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.514 1 .514 9.747 .004 .281 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
1.317 25 .053    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.004 1 .004 .110 .743 .004 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
.864 25 .035    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.003 1 .003 .072 .791 .003 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
 
1.067 
 
25 
 
.043 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
.010 1 .010 .467 .500 .018 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
.538 
 
25 
 
.022 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
 
.054 
 
1 
 
.054 
 
2.206 
 
.150 
 
.081 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
 
.614 
 
25 
 
.025 
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Table C6.24 Repeated measures ANOVA on Low CRT group only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 49 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2.431 1 2.431 22.300 .000 .317 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
5.234 48 .109    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.453 1 2.453 23.759 .000 .331 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
4.956 48 .103    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.374 1 2.374 28.317 .000 .371 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.024 48 .084    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1.179 1 1.179 12.431 .001 .206 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
4.554 48 .095    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.493 1 .493 7.218 .010 .131 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
 
3.276 
 
48 
 
.068 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 
.513 1 .513 16.376 .000 .254 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
1.505 
 
48 
 
.031 
   
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
 
.083 
 
1 
 
.083 
 
1.863 
 
.179 
 
.037 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 
 
2.130 
 
48 
 
.044 
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Table C6.25 Correlations Matrix for Global Span (GS) scores against both 
Instruction and Problem Types – N = 75 
 
 Global 
Span Score 
 
 
Belief 
Belief 
No-
conflict 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Logic No-
conflict 
Logic 
Conflict 
GS Scores P- Corr 1 .330** .204 .315** .177 .171 .167 
Sig.   .004 .079 .006 .128 .141 .152 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Belief P- Corr .330** 1 .563** .971** .457** .488** .390** 
 Sig.  .004  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
 N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Belief No-
conflict 
P- Corr .204 .563** 1 .348** .651** .647** .579** 
Sig.  .079 .000  .002 .000 .000 .000 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Belief 
Conflict 
P- Corr .371** .971** .348** 1 .330** .366** .269** 
Sig.  .001 .000 .002  .004 .000 .000 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Logic P- Corr .177 .457** .651** .330** 1 .950** .959** 
 Sig.  .128 .000 .000 .004  .000 .000 
 N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Logic No-
conflict  
P- Corr .171 .488** .647** .366** .950** 1 .823** 
Sig.  .141 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Logic 
Conflict 
P- Corr .167 .390** .579** .269* .959** .823** 1 
Sig.  .152 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Key: P-Corr = Pearson Correlation.  Sig. = 2-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 
0.05 level. 
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Table C6.26 Correlations Matrix for Stroop Interference Effect (SIE) on Accuracy 
scores – N = 75 
 
  
SIE 
 
Belief 
Belief No-
conflict 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Logic No-
conflict 
Logic 
Conflict 
SIE P- Corr 1 -.330** -.196 -.295 -.028 .043 -.090 
Sig.   .007 .092 .010 .814 .711 .444 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Belief P- Corr -.310** 1 .563** .971** .457** .488** .390** 
 Sig.  .007  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
 N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Belief No-
conflict 
P- Corr -.196 .563** 1 .348** .651** .647** .579** 
Sig.  .092 .000  .002 .000 .000 .000 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Belief Conflict P- Corr -.295* .971** .348** 1 .330** .366** .269* 
Sig.  .010 .000 .002  .004 .000 .000 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Logic P- Corr -.028 .457** .651** .330** 1 .950** .959** 
 Sig.  .814 .000 .000 .004  .000 .000 
 N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Logic No-
conflict  
P- Corr .043 .488** .647** .366** .950** 1 .823** 
Sig.  .711 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Logic Conflict P- Corr -.090 .390** .579** .269* .959** .823** 1 
Sig.  .444 .001 .000 .020 .000 .000  
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Key: P-Corr = Pearson Correlation.  Sig. = 2-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 
0.05 level. 
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Experiment 8  
Accuracy  
Table C7.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - excluded 
data set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.172 1 .172 3.827 .054 .051 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.136 1 .136 3.023 .086 .041 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.186 71 .045    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1.000 1 1.000 12.712 .001 .152 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.043 1 .043 .541 .465 .008 
Error (Complexity) 
 
5.587 71 .079    
Problem x Complexity  
 
7.383E-
005 1 
7.383E-
005 .002 .963 .000 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .033 1 .033 .985 .324 .014 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 2.412 71 .034    
 
      
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
Table C7.2 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - excluded data set 
– N = 73  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
378.623 1 378.623 1194.037 .000 .944 
Condition  
 
5.433 1 5.433 17.132 .000 .194 
Error 
 
22.514 71 .317    
Table C7.3 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - full data set 
– N = 79 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.039 1 .039 3.244 .076 .040 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.005 1 .005 .438 .510 .006 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
.926 77 .012    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.247 1 .247 11.015 .001 .125 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.016 1 .016 .725 .397 .009 
Error (Complexity) 
 
1.729 77 .022    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.016 1 .016 2.019 .159 .026 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .003 1 .003 .415 .521 .005 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .615 77 .008    
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C7.4 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - full data set – N = 
79  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
225.477 1 225.477 2833.439 .000 .974 
Condition  
 
.642 1 .642 8.064 .006 .095 
Error 
 
6.127 77 .080    
 
Table C7.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded 
data set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.634 1 1.634 22.482 .000 .240 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.038 1 .038 .518 .474 .007 
Error (Instruction) 
 
5.161 71 .073    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.917 1 1.917 37.058 .000 .343 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.001 1 .001 .014 .906 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.673 71 .052    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.412 1 2.412 37.944 .000 .348 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.132 1 .132 2.082 .153 .028 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.512 71 .064    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.788 1 .788 16.034 .000 .184 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.444 1 .444 9.035 .004 .113 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.488 71 .049    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
1.066 1 1.066 27.773 .000 .281 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .003 1 .003 .073 .788 .001 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
2.725 71 .038    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.482 1 .482 10.255 .002 .126 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .146 1 .146 3.108 .082 .042 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 3.339 71 .047    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.077 1 .077 1.698 .197 .023 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
5.421E-
006 
1 
5.421E-
006 
.000 .991 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 3.219 71 .045    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C7.6 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded data 
set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
938.704 1 938.704 1826.430 .000 .963 
Condition  
 
.467 1 .467 .909 .344 .013 
Error 
 
36.491 71 .514    
 
Table C7.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data 
set – N = 79 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.455 1 .455 16.324 .000 .175 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.007 1 .007 .263 .610 .003 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.148 77 .028    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.128 1 1.128 27.301 .000 .262 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.001 1 .001 .023 .880 .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.180 77 .041    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.371 1 .371 30.455 .000 .283 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 1 .000 .033 .856 .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
.939 77 .012    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.463 1 .463 19.132 .000 .199 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.026 1 .026 1.060 .306 .014 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
1.865 77 .024    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.176 1 .176 19.407 .000 .201 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .000 1 .000 .016 .899 .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  .700 77 .009    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.131 1 .131 13.443 .000 .149 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .019 1 .019 1.905 .172 .024 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .751 77 .010    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.060 1 .060 5.468 .022 .066 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.002 1 .002 .139 .710 .002 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) .850 77 .011    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
Table C7.8 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data set – N 
= 79 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
488.694 1 488.694 3325.712 .000 .977 
Condition  
 
.107 1 .107 .728 .396 .009 
Error 
 
11.315 77 .147    
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Follow Up Analysis 
Table C7.9 Repeated measures ANOVA on Experimental Condition - excluded 
data set N = 37 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.099 1 1.099 16.268 .000 .311 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.432 36 .068    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.934 1 .934 18.142 .000 .335 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.854 36 .052    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1.862 1 1.862 26.784 .000 .427 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
2.503 36 .070    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1.224 1 1.224 18.727 .000 .342 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.352 36 .065    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.486 1 .486 15.983 .000 .307 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
1.096 36 .030    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.588 1 .588 10.592 .002 .227 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 1.998 36 .055    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.040 1 .040 .835 .367 .023 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 1.712 36 .048    
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Table C7.10 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition - excluded data set 
N = 36 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.580 1 .580 7.438 .010 .175 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.729 35 .078    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.983 1 .983 18.911 .000 .351 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
1.819 35 .052    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.697 1 .697 12.149 .001 .258 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
2.009 35 .057    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.024 1 .024 .745 .394 .021 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
1.135 35 .032    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.581 1 .581 12.480 .001 .263 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
1.629 35 .047    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.048 1 .048 1.254 .270 .035 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 1.341 35 .038    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.037 1 .037 .867 .358 .024 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 1.507 35 .043    
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Latencies  
Table C7.11 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - excluded 
data set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
89762.405 1 89762.405 .144 .705 .002 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
1378778.651 1 1378778.651 2.217 .141 .030 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
44148983.931 71 621816.675    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
14058837.595 1 14058837.595 22.106 .000 .237 
Complexity x Condition 
 
3137907.650 1 3137907.650 4.934 .030 .065 
Error (Complexity) 
 
45154165.932 71 635974.168    
Problem x Complexity  
 
733558.090 1 733558.090 1.431 .236 .020 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
16324.665 1 16324.665 .032 .859 .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
36406310.917 
 
71 
 
512764.942    
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C7.12 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - excluded data set 
– N = 73  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4150416200.125 1 4150416200.125 722.995 .000 .911 
Condition  
 
78591821.495 1 78591821.495 13.691 .000 .162 
Error 
 
407581977.498 71 5740591.232    
 
Table C7.13 Repeated measures ANOVA on N-Back Instruction only - full data set 
– N = 79 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
12141.641 1 12141.641 .013 .909 .000 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
2283788.729 1 2283788.729 2.483 .119 .031 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
70811497.068 77 919629.832    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
22955792.423 1 22955792.423 20.385 .000 .209 
Complexity x Condition 
 
5920963.132 1 5920963.132 5.258 .025 .064 
Error (Complexity) 
 
86708559.551 77 1126085.189    
Problem x Complexity  
 
1090932.508 1 1090932.508 1.112 .295 .014 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 829.292 1 829.292 .001 .977 .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
75541349.391 
 
77 
 
981056.486 
   
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C7.14 Between subject effects on N-Back Instruction only - full data set – N 
= 79  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4958630414.642 1 4958630414.642 388.110 .000 .834 
Condition  
 
36473822.642 1 36473822.642 2.855 .095 .036 
Error 
 
983779176.801 77 12776352.945    
 
Table C7.15 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded 
data set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1516913.785 1 1516913.785 .796 .375 .011 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
7530276.484 1 7530276.484 3.949 .051 .053 
Error (Instruction) 
 
135372483.756 71 1906654.701    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
14900245.775 1 14900245.775 9.097 .004 .114 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
1035446.460 1 1035446.460 .632 .429 .009 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
116294430.383 71 1637949.724    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
9473566.228 1 9473566.228 6.009 .017 .078 
Complexity x Condition 
 
3634590.543 1 3634590.543 2.305 .133 .031 
Error (Complexity) 
 
111935912.833 71 1576562.153    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1578455.037 1 1578455.037 1.608 .209 .022 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
59414.325 1 59414.325 .061 .806 .001 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
69695723.648 71 981629.911    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
16009295.293 1 16009295.293 18.414 .000 .206 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
377755.937 1 377755.937 .434 .512 .006 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
61728763.583 71 869419.205    
Problem x Complexity  
 
3639745.552 1 3639745.552 4.161 .045 .055 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 2116743.552 1 2116743.552 2.420 .124 .033 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 62108171.941 71 874762.985    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
142204.834 1 142204.834 .114 .737 .002 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
4785.190 1 4785.190 .004 .951 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
88898741.830 71 1252094.955    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C7.16 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded data 
set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
22941223818.108 1 22941223818.108 1420.085 .000 .952 
Condition  
 
19663628.834 1 19663628.834 1.217 .274 .017 
Error 
 
1146992207.385 71 16154819.822    
 
Table C7.17 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data 
set – N = 79 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
186269.202 1 186269.202 .044 .834 .001 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
2977456.544 1 2977456.544 .706 .403 .009 
Error (Instruction) 
 
324826640.045 77 4218527.793    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
34211613.113 1 34211613.113 13.165 .001 .146 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
3040086.379 1 3040086.379 1.170 .283 .015 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
200096457.336 77 2598655.290    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
16482027.653 1 16482027.653 7.433 .008 .088 
Complexity x Condition 
 
3028921.526 1 3028921.526 1.366 .246 .017 
Error (Complexity) 
 
170738268.835 77 2217380.115    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
11304224.937 1 11304224.937 3.176 .079 .040 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
685236.785 1 685236.785 .193 .662 .002 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
274026435.936 77 3558784.882    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
11039175.692 1 11039175.692 5.824 .018 .070 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
15917023.490 1 15917023.490 8.397 .005 .098 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
145950841.396 77 1895465.473    
Problem x Complexity  
 
2547517.134 1 2547517.134 1.331 .252 .017 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 1152104.375 1 1152104.375 .602 .440 .008 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 147395974.359 77 1914233.433    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
532710.952 1 532710.952 .198 .658 .003 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
30819.306 1 30819.306 .011 .915 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
207568508.067 77 2695694.910    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C7.18 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data set – 
N = 79 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
27130119637.403 1 27130119637.403 815.504 .000 .914 
Condition  
 
42761810.567 1 42761810.567 1.285 .260 .016 
Error 
 
2561630268.268 77 33267925.562    
 
Follow Up Analysis 
Table C7.19 Repeated measures ANOVA on Experimental Condition - excluded 
data set N = 37 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
8013124.338 1 8013124.338 4.478 .041 .111 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
64421413.912 36 1789483.720    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4096055.405 1 4096055.405 2.911 .097 .075 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
50656529.845 36 1407125.829    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
695684.122 1 695684.122 .530 .471 .015 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
47222996.628 36 1311749.906    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1140801.946 1 1140801.946 .970 .331 .026 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
42330767.804 36 1175854.661    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
10800668.122 1 10800668.122 11.366 .002 .240 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
34210036.128 36 950278.781    
Problem x Complexity  
 
103987.514 1 103987.514 .132 .718 .004 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 28268297.736 36 785230.493    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
48067.514 1 48067.514 .033 .856 .001 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity 
x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
52098221.236 36 1447172.812    
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Table C7.20 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition - excluded data set 
N = 38 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1128377.531 1 1128377.531 .557 .461 .016 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
70951069.844 35 2027173.424    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
11734993.837 1 11734993.837 6.257 .017 .152 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
65637900.538 35 1875368.587    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
12254137.670 1 12254137.670 6.628 .014 .159 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
64712916.205 35 1848940.463    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
505766.531 1 505766.531 .647 .427 .018 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
27364955.844 35 781855.881    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
5656846.420 1 5656846.420 7.195 .011 .171 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
27518727.455 35 786249.356    
Problem x Complexity  
 
5577521.670 1 5577521.670 5.769 .022 .141 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 33839874.205 35 966853.549    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
98235.281 1 98235.281 .093 .762 .003 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity 
x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
36800520.594 35 1051443.446    
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Individual Differences 
 
Table C7.21 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded accuracy data set – N = 73 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.526 1 1.526 21.191 .000 .230 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.085 1 .085 1.182 .281 .016 
Error (Instruction) 
 
5.114 71 .072    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.751 1 1.751 35.462 .000 .333 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.168 1 .168 3.393 .070 .046 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.506 71 .049    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.293 1 2.293 35.563 .000 .334 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.067 1 .067 1.040 .311 .014 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.578 71 .064    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.785 1 .785 14.176 .000 .166 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.001 1 .001 .019 .891 .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.930 71 .055    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
1.023 1 1.023 26.731 .000 .274 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .010 1 .010 .265 .608 .004 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
2.717 71 .038    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.511 1 .511 10.503 .002 .129 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .028 1 .028 .577 .450 .008 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 3.457 71 .049    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.064 1 .064 1.424 .237 .020 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .034 1 .034 .756 .388 .011 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 3.185 71 .045    
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
Table C7.22 Between subject effects on excluded accuracy data set – N = 73  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
936.812 1 936.812 1924.282 .000 .964 
CRT group 
 
2.393 1 2.393 4.914 .030 .065 
Error 
 
34.565 71 .487    
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Table C7.23 Correlations Matrix for Global Span (GS) scores against both 
Instruction and Problem Types – N = 73 
 
 Global 
Span 
Score  
 
 
Belief 
Belief No-
conflict 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Logic No-
conflict 
Logic 
Conflict 
GS Scores P- Corr 1 .135 .290* .046 .187 .212 .151 
Sig.   .253 .013 .697 .112 .072 .202 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Belief P- Corr .135 1 .833** .965** .691** .746** .587** 
 Sig.  .253  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Belief No-
conflict 
P- Corr .290* .833** 1 .659** .743** .796** .635** 
Sig.  .013 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Belief Conflict P- Corr .046 .965** .659** 1 .588** .637** .497** 
Sig.  .697 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Logic P- Corr .187 .691** .743** .588** 1 .962** .962** 
 Sig.  .112 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
 N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Logic No-
conflict  
P- Corr .212 .746** .796** .637** .575** 1 .800** 
Sig.  .072 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Logic Conflict P- Corr .151 .587** .635** .497** .962** .800** 1 
Sig.  .202 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Key: P-Corr = Pearson Correlation.  Sig. = 2-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 
0.05 level. 
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Table C7.24 Correlations Matrix for Stroop Interference Effect (SIE) on Accuracy 
scores – N = 73 
 
  
SIE 
 
Belief 
Belief 
No-
conflict 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Logic No-
conflict 
Logic 
Conflict 
SIE P- Corr 1 .206 .228 .171 .228 .210 .222 
Sig.   .081 .052 .147 .052 .074 .059 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Belief P- Corr .206 1 .833** .965** .691** .746** .587** 
 Sig.  .081  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
 N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Belief No-
conflict 
P- Corr .228 .833** 1 .659** .743** .796** .635** 
Sig.  .052 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Belief Conflict P- Corr .171 .965** .659** 1 .588** .497** .269* 
Sig.  .147 .000 .000  .000 .020 .000 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Logic P- Corr .228 .691** .743** .588** 1 .934** .962** 
 Sig.  .052 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
 N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Logic No-
conflict  
P- Corr .210 .746** .796** .637** .934** 1 .800** 
Sig.  .074 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Logic Conflict P- Corr .222 .587** .635** .497** .962** .800** 1 
Sig.  .059 .001 .000 .020 .000 .000  
N 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Key: P-Corr = Pearson Correlation.  Sig. = 2-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 
0.05 level. 
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Experiment 9 
Accuracy  
Table C8.1 Repeated measures ANOVA on Stroop Instruction only - excluded data 
set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.126 1 1.126 37.066 .000 .283 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
1.669 1 1.669 54.942 .000 .369 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
2.855 94 .030    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.458 1 .458 34.873 .000 .271 
Complexity x Condition 
 
1.522 1 1.522 115.982 .000 .552 
Error (Complexity) 
 
1.234 94 .013    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.364 1 .364 21.957 .000 .189 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 1.156 1 1.156 69.692 .000 .426 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
1.559 
 
94 
 
.017    
 
      
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
Table C8.2 Between subject effects on Stroop Instruction only - excluded data set – 
N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
798.615 1 798.615 14568.755 .000 .994 
Condition  
 
.320 1 .320 5.845 .018 .059 
Error 
 
5.153 94 .055    
Table C8.3 Repeated measures ANOVA on Stroop Instruction only - full data set – 
N = 112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
.082 1 .082 29.409 .000 .211 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.110 1 .110 39.395 .000 .264 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
.306 110 .003    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.017 1 .017 4.875 .029 .042 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.141 1 .141 41.072 .000 .272 
Error (Complexity) 
 
.377 110 .003    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.027 1 .027 16.635 .000 .131 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .077 1 .077 46.915 .000 .299 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
.180 
 
110 
 
.002    
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
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Table C8.4 Between subject effects on Stroop Instruction only - full data set – N = 
112  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
410.598 1 410.598 18972.745 .000 .994 
Condition  
 
.024 1 .024 1.120 .292 .010 
Error 
 
2.381 110 .022    
Follow Up Analysis on Stroop Instruction 
Table C8.5 Repeated measures ANOVA on Experimental Condition - excluded 
data set N = 50 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 2.888 1 2.888 93.371 .000 .656 
Problem Type x Condition  
 .000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 1.516 49 .031    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 1.904 1 1.904 215.481 .000 .815 
Complexity x Condition 
 .000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 .433 49 .009    
Problem x Complexity  
 1.470 1 1.470 106.408 .000 .685 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .677 49 .014    
 
      
 
Table C8.6 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition - excluded data set 
N = 46 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 .026 1 .026 .859 .359 .019 
Problem Type x Condition  
 .000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 1.339 45 .030    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 .149 1 .149 8.376 .006 .157 
Complexity x Condition 
 .000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 .801 45 .018 
   
Problem x Complexity  
 .107 1 .107 5.447 .024 .108 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .882 45 .020    
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Analysis on Belief & Logic Instruction 
 
Table C8.7 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded 
data set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2.046 1 2.046 22.637 .000 .194 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.213 1 .213 2.354 .128 .024 
Error (Instruction) 
 
8.497 94 .090    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4.808 1 4.808 56.043 .000 .374 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.013 1 .013 .153 .697 .002 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
8.065 94 .086    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
4.633 1 4.633 50.773 .000 .351 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.125 1 .125 1.368 .245 .014 
Error (Complexity) 
 
8.577 94 .091    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.401 1 .401 8.476 .004 .083 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.175 1 .175 3.710 .057 .038 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
4.446 94 .047    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.087 1 .087 1.571 .213 .016 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .045 1 .045 .809 .371 .009 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
5.216 94 .055    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.491 1 .491 17.322 .000 .156 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .054 1 .054 1.917 .169 .020 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 2.666 94 .028    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.182 1 .182 6.131 .015 .061 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.025 1 .025 .856 .357 .009 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 2.798 94 .030    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.8 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded data 
set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
1245.583 1 1245.583 3477.233 .000 .974 
Condition  
 
.004 1 .004 .010 .919 .000 
Error 
 
33.672 94 .358    
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Table C8.9 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data 
set – N =112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.827 1 .827 21.567 .000 .164 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
8.053E-
006 
1 
8.053E-
006 
.000 .988 .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
4.216 110 .038    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.981 1 2.981 47.948 .000 .304 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.293 1 .293 4.714 .032 .041 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
6.839 110 .062    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.639 1 .639 45.203 .000 .291 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.010 1 .010 .692 .407 .006 
Error (Complexity) 
 
1.555 110 .014    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.739 1 .739 22.076 .000 .167 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.008 1 .008 .230 .632 .002 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.681 110 .033    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.041 1 .041 4.536 .035 .040 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .001 1 .001 .105 .746 .001 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
.996 110 .009    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.154 1 .154 26.670 .000 .195 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 1 .000 .049 .825 .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .637 110 .006    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.030 1 .030 7.080 .009 .060 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 1 .000 .092 .762 .001 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) .471 110 .004    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.10 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data set – 
N = 112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
671.995 1 671.995 4926.406 .000 .978 
Condition  
 
.445 1 .445 3.265 .074 .029 
Error 
 
15.005 110 .136    
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Follow Up Analysis 
Table C8.11 Repeated measures ANOVA on Experimental Condition - excluded 
data set N = 50 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.867 1 1.867 15.097 .000 .236 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
6.060 49 .124    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.254 1 2.254 22.657 .000 .316 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
4.874 49 .099    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1.689 1 1.689 18.279 .000 .272 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.527 49 .092    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.577 1 .577 8.871 .004 .153 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.190 49 .065    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.004 1 .004 .062 .805 .001 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
2.874 49 .059    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.455 1 .455 17.277 .000 .261 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 1.291 49 .026    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.037 1 .037 .996 .323 .020 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 1.837 49 .037    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 337 
 
Table C8.12 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition - excluded data set 
N = 46 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.451 1 .451 8.325 .006 .156 
Instruction x Condition (Experimental or 
Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.437 45 .054    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.555 1 2.555 36.035 .000 .445 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.191 45 .071    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
3.014 1 3.014 33.483 .000 .427 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.051 45 .090    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.022 1 .022 .789 .379 .017 
Instruction x Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
1.256 45 .028    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.123 1 .123 2.372 .131 .050 
Instruction x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
2.341 45 .052    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.105 1 .105 3.437 .070 .071 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 1.375 45 .031    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.165 1 .165 7.742 .008 .147 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) .961 45 .021    
 
Table C8.13 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief Instruction - excluded data set 
N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
3.993 1 3.993 41.622 .000 .307 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.046 1 .046 .483 .489 .005 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
9.018 94 .096    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1.724 1 1.724 38.912 .000 .293 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.010 1 .010 .226 .636 .002 
Error (Complexity) 
 
4.166 94 .044    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.636 1 .636 19.695 .000 .173 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .003 1 .003 .084 .773 .001 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
3.037 
 
94 
 
.032    
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Table C8.14 Repeated measures ANOVA on Logic Instruction - excluded data set 
N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.216 1 1.216 32.732 .000 .258 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.142 1 .142 3.827 .053 .039 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
3.493 94 .037    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2.995 1 2.995 29.249 .000 .237 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.160 1 .160 1.560 .215 .016 
Error (Complexity) 
 
9.627 94 .102    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.037 1 .037 1.451 .231 .015 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .077 1 .077 2.988 .087 .031 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
2.427 
 
94 
 
.026    
       
 
Latencies  
Table C8.15 Repeated measures ANOVA on Stroop Instruction only - excluded 
data set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
4983111.086 1 4983111.086 7.145 .009 .071 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
2429471.638 1 2429471.638 3.483 .065 .036 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
65561594.820 94 697463.775    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
2087359.223 1 2087359.223 5.400 .022 .054 
Complexity x Condition 
 
16762.963 1 16762.963 .043 .835 .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
36332181.777 94 386512.572    
Problem x Complexity  
 
6861.060 1 6861.060 .020 .888 .000 
Problem x Complexity x 
Condition 
248565.987 1 248565.987 .729 .396 .008 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
32069274.846 
 
94 
 
341162.498    
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.16 Between subject effects on Stroop Instruction only - excluded data set 
– N = 96  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
4908146569.626 1 4908146569.626 1203.040 .000 .928 
Condition  
 
110713088.074 1 110713088.074 27.137 .000 .224 
Error 
 
383499842.832 94 4079785.562    
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Table C8.17 Repeated measures ANOVA on Stroop Instruction only - full data set 
– N = 112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
7768622.021 1 7768622.021 10.948 .001 .091 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
3030427.736 1 3030427.736 4.271 .041 .037 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
78055648.693 110 709596.806    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
821266.799 1 821266.799 1.320 .253 .012 
Complexity x Condition 
 
12512.871 1 12512.871 .020 .887 .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
68423461.192 110 622031.465    
Problem x Complexity  
 
259175.951 1 259175.951 .606 .438 .005 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 330731.059 1 330731.059 .774 .381 .007 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 
 
47019961.049 
 
110 
 
427454.191    
       
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.18 Between subject effects on Stroop Instruction only - full data set – N = 
112  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
6538189397.755 1 6538189397.755 768.706 .000 .875 
Condition  
 
189878467.755 1 189878467.755 22.324 .000 .169 
Error 
 
935599156.165 110 8505446.874    
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Table C8.19 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded 
data set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
3013043.349 1 3013043.349 2.150 .146 .022 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
1611165.224 1 1611165.224 1.150 .286 .012 
Error (Instruction) 
 
131706215.681 94 1401129.954    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
55997624.262 1 55997624.262 34.661 .000 .269 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
4125699.158 1 4125699.158 2.554 .113 .026 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
151866042.081 94 1615596.192    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
45654413.564 1 45654413.564 38.171 .000 .289 
Complexity x Condition 
 
7570312.991 1 7570312.991 6.329 .014 .063 
Error (Complexity) 
 
112430020.279 94 1196064.046    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
1487491.416 1 1487491.416 1.890 .172 .020 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
5737682.031 1 5737682.031 7.290 .008 .072 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
73980055.270 94 787021.865    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
121314.182 1 121314.182 .121 .729 .001 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
710000.370 1 710000.370 .707 .402 .007 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
94346101.379 94 1003681.930    
Problem x Complexity  
 
2333474.918 1 2333474.918 1.835 .179 .019 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 433471.751 1 433471.751 .341 .561 .004 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 119550380.175 94 1271812.555    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
646307.002 1 646307.002 .556 .458 .006 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
311.950 1 311.950 .000 .987 .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
109261188.799 94 1162353.072    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.20 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - excluded data 
set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
26412220278.153 1 26412220278.153 1293.496 .000 .932 
Condition  
 
7340356.372 1 7340356.372 .359 .550 .004 
Error 
 
1919409811.273 94 20419253.311    
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Table C8.21 Repeated measures ANOVA on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data 
set – N = 112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
349780.034 1 349780.034 .062 .804 .001 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
795568.034 1 795568.034 .141 .708 .001 
Error (Instruction) 
 
621982940.750 110 5654390.370    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-
conflict) 
 
75877965.051 1 75877965.051 15.626 .000 .124 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
5902653.810 1 5902653.810 1.216 .273 .011 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
534141147.002 110 4855828.609    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
72152633.368 1 72152633.368 14.552 .000 .117 
Complexity x Condition 
 
2385261.180 1 2385261.180 .481 .489 .004 
Error (Complexity) 
 
545417270.185 110 4958338.820    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
9259183.374 1 9259183.374 2.080 .152 .019 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
7108742.392 1 7108742.392 1.597 .209 .014 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
489727502.741 110 4452068.207    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
3904199.830 1 3904199.830 1.344 .249 .012 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
1854155.401 1 1854155.401 .638 .426 .006 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  319527653.848 110 2904796.853    
Problem x Complexity  
 
4214352.266 1 4214352.266 1.438 .233 .013 
Problem x Complexity x Condition 171492.400 1 171492.400 .059 .809 .001 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 322270435.849 110 2929731.235    
 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity  
 
3688530.556 1 3688530.556 1.171 .282 .011 
Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity x Condition 
846929.931 1 846929.931 .269 .605 .002 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
346488707.747 110 3149897.343    
Note: Condition is a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.22 Between subject effects on Belief & Logic Instruction - full data set – 
N = 112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
34373588941.000 1 34373588941.000 811.515 .000 .881 
Condition  
 
24363686.687 1 24363686.687 .575 .450 .005 
Error 
 
4659304674.178 110 42357315.220    
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Follow Up Analysis 
Table C8.23 Repeated measures ANOVA on Experimental Condition - excluded 
data set N = 50 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
4711721.422 1 4711721.422 5.469 .023 .100 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
42212709.953 49 861483.877    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
47229194.522 1 47229194.522 24.168 .000 .330 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
95754420.353 49 1954171.844    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
8370316.922 1 8370316.922 8.817 .005 .153 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
46516391.452 49 949314.111    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
6818104.323 1 6818104.323 9.586 .003 .164 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
34851785.052 49 711260.919    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
127484.702 1 127484.702 .120 .731 .002 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
52234077.173 49 1066001.575    
Problem x Complexity  
 
2493083.103 1 2493083.103 2.600 .113 .050 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 46981248.272 49 958800.985    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
352182.903 1 352182.903 .388 .536 .008 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity 
x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
44510061.973 49 908368.612    
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Table C8.24 Repeated measures ANOVA on Control Condition - excluded data set 
N = 46 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
104456.522 1 104456.522 .053 .820 .001 
Instruction x Condition 
(Experimental or Control) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
89493505.728 45 1988744.572    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
14267531.522 1 14267531.522 11.442 .001 .203 
Problem Type x Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
56111621.728 45 1246924.927    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
43395045.924 1 43395045.924 29.626 .000 .397 
Complexity x Condition 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
65913628.826 45 1464747.307    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
663510.533 1 663510.533 .763 .387 .017 
Instruction x Problem Type x 
Condition  
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
39128270.217 45 869517.116    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
680776.043 1 680776.043 .727 .398 .016 
Instruction x Complexity x 
Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
42112024.207 45 935822.760    
Problem x Complexity  
 
362632.348 1 362632.348 .225 .638 .005 
Problem x Complexity x Condition .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 72569131.902 45 1612647.376    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
296745.924 1 296745.924 .206 .652 .005 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity 
x Condition 
.000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 
64751126.826 45 1438913.929    
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Individual Differences 
 
Table C8.25 Repeated measures ANOVA on excluded accuracy data set – N = 96 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
1.973 1 1.973 22.551 .000 .193 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.488 1 .488 5.577 .020 .056 
Error (Instruction) 
 
8.222 94 .087    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4.608 1 4.608 56.335 .000 .375 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.389 1 .389 4.753 .032 .048 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
7.689 94 .082    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
4.479 1 4.479 48.900 .000 .342 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.091 1 .091 .994 .321 .010 
Error (Complexity) 
 
8.611 94 .092    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.389 1 .389 8.225 .005 .080 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.174 1 .174 3.670 .058 .038 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
4.448 94 .047    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.082 1 .082 1.467 .229 .015 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT 5.019E-
005 
1 
5.019E-
005 
.001 .976 .000 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
5.260 94 .056    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.464 1 .464 17.364 .000 .156 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .206 1 .206 7.719 .007 .076 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 2.514 94 .027    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.173 1 .173 5.780 .018 .058 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .003 1 .003 .114 .736 .001 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x 
Complexity) 2.820 94 .030   
 
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.26 Between subject effects on excluded accuracy data set – N = 96  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
1249.946 1 1249.946 3793.036 .000 .976 
CRT group 
 
2.699 1 2.699 8.191 .005 .080 
Error 
 
30.976 94 .330    
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Table C8.27 Repeated measures ANOVA on full accuracy data set – N = 112 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.633 1 .633 18.296 .000 .143 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.408 1 .408 11.784 .001 .097 
Error (Instruction) 
 
3.808 110 .035    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
2.603 1 2.603 43.668 .000 .284 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.576 1 .576 9.660 .002 .081 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
6.556 110 .060    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
.590 1 .590 42.255 .000 .278 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.029 1 .029 2.048 .155 .018 
Error (Complexity) 
 
1.537 110 .014    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.536 1 .536 18.447 .000 .144 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.494 1 .494 16.992 .000 .134 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
3.195 110 .029    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.034 1 .034 3.765 .055 .033 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .013 1 .013 1.472 .228 .013 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
.984 110 .009    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.117 1 .117 23.099 .000 .174 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .080 1 .080 15.824 .000 .126 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) .557 110 .005    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.027 1 .027 6.422 .013 .055 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .002 1 .002 .531 .468 .005 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) .469 110 .004    
Note: CRT group (high and low) as a between subjects factor 
 
Table C8.28 Between subject effects on full accuracy data set – N = 112  
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Intercept 
 
666.517 1 666.517 5467.966 .000 .980 
CRT group 
 
2.042 1 2.042 16.749 .000 .132 
Error 
 
13.408 110 .122    
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Table C8.29 Repeated measures ANOVA on High CRT group only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 45 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
.235 1 .235 4.967 .031 .101 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
2.078 44 .047    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
1.092 1 1.092 16.065 .000 .267 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
2.990 44 .068    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
1.550 1 1.550 21.948 .000 .333 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
3.107 44 .071    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.020 1 .020 .493 .486 .011 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
1.802 44 .041    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.041 1 .041 .689 .411 .015 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
2.592 44 .059    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.024 1 .024 .977 .328 .022 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 1.092 44 .025    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.060 1 .060 2.178 .147 .047 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 1.218 44 .028    
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Table C8.30 Repeated measures ANOVA on Low CRT group only - excluded 
accuracy data set – N = 51 
 SS df MS F p 𝜼𝒑
𝟐 
Instruction (Belief/Logic) 
 
2.359 1 2.359 19.192 .000 .277 
Instruction x CRT (high or low group) 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction) 
 
6.144 50 .123    
Problem Type (Conflict/No-conflict) 
 
4.093 1 4.093 43.549 .000 .466 
Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Problem Type) 
 
4.699 50 .094    
Complexity (MP/Disjunctives) 
 
3.119 1 3.119 28.332 .000 .362 
Complexity x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Complexity) 
 
5.504 50 .110    
Instruction  x Problem Type 
 
.577 1 .577 10.912 .002 .179 
Instruction x Problem Type x CRT 
 
.000 0 . . . .000 
Error (Instruction * Problem Type)  
 
2.646 50 .053    
Instruction x Complexity  
 
.042 1 .042 .780 .381 .015 
Instruction x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction * Complexity) 
  
2.668 50 .053    
Problem x Complexity  
 
.688 1 .688 24.204 .000 .326 
Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Problem * Complexity) 1.421 50 .028    
 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity  
 
.120 1 .120 3.754 .058 .070 
Instruction x Problem x Complexity x CRT .000 0 . . . .000 
 
Error (Instruction x Problem x Complexity) 1.602 50 .032    
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Table C8.31 Correlations Matrix for Global Span (GS) scores against both 
Instruction and Problem Types – N = 96 
 
 Global 
Span 
Score  
 
 
Belief 
Belief 
No-
conflict 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Logic 
No-
conflict 
Logic 
Conflict 
GS Scores P- Corr 1 .268** .178 .256* .115 .212* .028 
Sig.   .008 .083 .012 .266 .038 .787 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Belief P- Corr .268** 1 .640** .961** .471** .359** .483** 
 Sig.  .008  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Belief No-
conflict 
P- Corr .178 .640** 1 .404** .603** .597** .519** 
Sig.  .083 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Belief Conflict P- Corr .256* .961** .404** 1 .345** .214* .389** 
Sig.  .012 .000 .000  .001 .036 .000 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Logic P- Corr .115 .471** .603** .345** 1 .880** .940** 
 Sig.  .266 .000 .000 .001  .000 .000 
 N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Logic No-
conflict  
P- Corr .212* .359** .597** .214* .880** 1 .666** 
Sig.  .038 .000 .000 .036 .000  .000 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Logic Conflict P- Corr .028 .483** .519** .389** .940** .666** 1 
Sig.  .787 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Key: P-Corr = Pearson Correlation.  Sig. = 2-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 
0.05 level. 
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Table C8.32 Correlations Matrix for Stroop Interference Effect (SIE) on Accuracy 
scores – N = 96 
 
  
SIE 
 
Belief 
Belief 
No-
conflict 
Belief 
Conflict 
 
Logic 
Logic 
No-
conflict 
Logic 
Conflict 
SIE P- Corr 1 -.244* -.009 -.288** -.103 .033 -.185 
Sig.   .016 .929 .004 .317 .753 .071 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Belief P- Corr -.244* 1 .640** .961** .471** .359** .483** 
 Sig.  .016  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Belief No-
conflict 
P- Corr -.009 .640** 1 .404** .603** .597** .519** 
Sig.  .929 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Belief Conflict P- Corr -.288** .961** .404** 1 .345** .214* .389** 
Sig.  .004 .000 .000  .001 .036 .000 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Logic P- Corr -.103 .471** .603** .345** 1 .880** .940** 
 Sig.  .317 .000 .000 .001  .000 .000 
 N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Logic No-
conflict  
P- Corr .033 .359** .597** .214* .880** 1 .666** 
Sig.  .753 .000 .000 .036 .000  .000 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Logic Conflict P- Corr -.185 .483** .519** .389** .940** .666** 1 
Sig.  .071 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Key: P-Corr = Pearson Correlation.  Sig. = 2-tailed. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed): * = 
0.05 level. 
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